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Significant studies in cyber defence analysis have predominantly revolved around a single linear 
analysis of information from a single source of evidence (The Network). These studies were limited in 
their ability to understand the dynamics of entanglements related to cyber-incidents. This research 
integrates evidence beyond the network in an attempt to understand and predict phases of the kill-
chain across the information space. 
This research provides a multi-dimensional phased analysis of the traditional kill-chain model using 
structural vector autoregressive models.  In the ‘Entangled Cyberspace Framework’, each phase of the 
kill-chain corresponds to a single dimension of the information space based on time observations of 
certain events. Events are represented as time signals, where each phase is characterised by multiple 
time signals representing multiple events on that phase. Multiple time signals are analysed using 
structural models for multiple time series analysis (Vector Auto-Regressive models). At each phase of 
the kill-chain, we perform a lagged co-integration analysis of events across the information space. 
This nature of analysis detects hidden entanglements that characterise events in the kill-chain beyond 
the network. The measured prediction accuracy and error measured at each stage of the experiment 
represents the usefulness of selected events in characterising the defined stage of the kill-chain.  
The entangled cyberspace, in theory, is the fusion of three conceptual foundations: a) A multi-
dimensional characterisation of cyberspace, b) A sequential phased model for perpetrating cyber-
attacks and c) A structural model for integrating and simultaneously analysing multiple sources of 
evidence. It starts with the characterisation of the information space into different dimensions of 
interest. The framework goes further to identify evidence sources across these characterised 
dimensions and integrates them in the analytical context under consideration (e.g. Malware Injection). 
The concrete findings show that our approach and analytical methodology are capable of detecting 
entanglements when applied to a set of entangled activities across the information space. The findings 
also prove that activities beyond the network have significant effects on the nature of the unfolding 
cyber-attack vector. The predictive features of events across the kill-chain were also presented in this 
research as opinion and emotion drivers on the social dimension, packet data details and social and 
cultural events on the economic layer. Finally, co-integration detected between events across and 
within dimensions of the information space proves the existence of both inter-dimensional and intra-
dimensional entanglements that affect the nature of events unfolding during the kill-chain (from the 
adversary’s point of view). 
The novelty of this research rests in the ability to hop across the information space for detecting 
evidential clues of activities that are related-to cyber-incidents. This research also expands the 
standard multi-dimensional information space to include SPEC factors as indicators of cyber-
incidents. This research improves the current information security management model, specifically in 
the monitoring, analysis and detection phases. This research provides a methodology that 
accommodates a robust evidence base for understanding the attack surface. Practically, this research 
provides a basis for creating applications and tools for protecting critical national infrastructure by 
integrating data from social platforms, real-world political, cultural and economic events and the 
cyber-physical.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 INTRODUCTION 1.1
The state of current cyber defences at military, industrial and operational level have consistently 
proven inadequate in countering the ever-growing sophistication of the adversary and modern cyber-
attacks. Powerful toolkits are readily and cheaply available to these attackers, and the networks are 
not prepared to handle these sophisticated attacks. Consequently, there is an increase in the 
application of proactive approaches to cyber situational awareness; such as measures to model 
patterns, groups and trends in security information (Doupé et al., 2011; Skopik et al., 2012; Leopold, 
2015). In cyber analytical processes, it has long been the practice of studying the attacker’s behaviour 
or pre-empting cyber-attacks by a critical analysis of cyber data (Wilson, Wiebe and Hoffman, 2005; 
Tartakovsky, Polunchenko and Sokolov, 2013). In addition to these techniques, mathematical and 
statistical models are being developed to model and understand network behaviour in various attack 
scenarios including correlated attack modelling for automating attack scenario recognition (George 
Mason University, 2010),  Markov-chains for anomaly detection (Barford et al., 2010), network 
anomaly detection with time series modelling of network packets (Münz, Li and Carle, 2007), 
Bayesian event classification (Kruegel et al., 2003), clustering and classification models for botnet 
detection (Raghava, Sahgal and Chandna, 2012) and graph models for links in networks (Canright and 
Eng??-Monsen, 2008). For the best part of it, these techniques can help defenders in real-time cyber 
incident scenarios. However, most of these techniques are either modelled after-the-fact or based on 
attributes from some past cyber incident. Given the evolutionary rate of cyberspace and cyber 
activities, it is no longer adequate to base cyber defence protocols on these pre-assumptions but take a 
proactive disposition to the problem of cyber-attacks. Until recently (Hernández et al., 2016), most 
cyber defence models offered a one-dimensional perspective to cyberspace as most of them were 
based on data from the network or the social layer. 
Although these working models and techniques are continually re-defined by information security 
experts (Fischer and Keim, 2014; Abdullahi, Arif and Hassan, 2015), the sources of information 
feeding these models and techniques remain limited to a single dimension of cyberspace. The 
implications of these methods are ‘after-the-fact’ cyber awareness loops where a cyber-attack must 
have happened or at the least ‘be happening’ before learning a new signature.  
This research argues that cyber-attacks are not independent of other events in the real world. 
Therefore, this research seeks to introduce a new perspective to analysing cyber-attacks based on a 
multidimensional structural approach to representing sources of information in cyberspace to build 
active predictive models for cyber-attacks. This research starts by characterising cyberspace as an 
integration of the physical and virtual realities of modern existence that consists of multiple smaller 
dimensions that make up the whole. This research presents the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain 
model from a multi-dimensional structural perspective by analysing the kill-chain across the various 
identified dimensions of cyberspace. In this thesis, we introduce these dimensions as sources of 
evidence for a multi-dimensional structural approach to pre-empting cyber-attacks. To achieve this, 
this research intends to capture the nature of entanglements between evidence on the various 
dimensions of cyberspace.  




Cyberspace is the virtual link between geographically distributed cyber personas which creates the 
need for a virtual meeting point. Information is continuously generated between these cyber personas. 
Methods for addressing the problems in cyberspace must examine the entanglements of these cyber 
personas, their characteristics, activities and events across the multiple layers in which they exist in a 
time and space spectrum. Given this dynamic state of cyberspace, it is no longer logical to restrict the 
analysis of cyber behaviours to ‘after-the-fact’ methods. Pre-empting attacks against information 
assets and attacks enabled by cyberspace has become much more complex. Cyberspace provides 
unlimited access to malicious resources and a cost-effective platform to plan, recruit, train and 
execute attacks.  
 WHY STUDY THE PREDICTION OF CYBER-ATTACKS? 1.2
Over the last three decades, cybersecurity analysts have held a defensive approach to the offensive 
tactics of cyber adversaries. These techniques have kept cyber victims consistently one step behind 
their attackers. Also, the problem of the global commons (Lukasik, 2000, 2011) and the evolution of 
cyberspace ensures that the same information available to the defenders are also available to the 
offenders which consequently creates an unending loop of attack  defend  relearn  attack. 
Reactive approaches to cyber defence typically utilise firewalls, anti-viruses, anti-spyware, and virus 
and exploit detection programs to counter, for the most parts, known signatures of cyber-attacks that 
have happened in some past time. In most cases, some of the damage impacts the defender’s network 
before mitigation strategies are put in place. If proper evidence represents events in cyberspace, there 
is a potential for modelling as an integration of webbed data, in which physical, social and virtual 
perceptions, interactions and relationships are linked in a time and space spectrum. 
 WHY USE ANALYTICAL AND STATISTICAL APPROACHES? 1.3
The case for analysis and statistics in cybersecurity is considerable covered in modern research (Lau, 
Xia and Li, 2012; Bar et al., 2016; Hernández et al., 2016; Shekhar, 2016). In the past, defenders 
invest heavily in threat prevention and identification (Forum and Reserved, 2011) as a reactive 
approach to cyber defence. This approach focuses on disrupting the cyber-attack kill chain (Engel, 
2014) at the reconnaissance or delivery phase (Yadav and Rao, 2015). This approach is adequate for 
mitigating singular component cyber threats (Wlodarczyk and Hacker, 2014) such as email spams, 
phishing attacks and malware attacks. However, they may not be sufficient for mitigating multi-
stepped, multi-dimensional attacks such as DDOS, APTs and similar advanced attacks.   
Staying one-step ahead requires an analytical approach to cyber defence. Defenders must, therefore, 
supplement cyber-attack prevention with a thorough strategy for pending threat detection by 
understanding the relationships that exist between entities operating in cyberspace. 
 PROBLEM DEFINITION 1.4
The proliferation of cyber-attacks has been proven to be entangled with various other events in 
cyberspace (Gandhi et al., 2011a). The entanglement of information in cyberspace provides a 
collection of webbed data that are linked to cyber-incidents and activities surrounding them. Research 
in cyber-situational awareness covers little on integrating multiple sources of evidence from uniquely 
identified strata of cyberspace to inform predictive models and proactive defence strategies. Given 
multiple sources of evidence from an entanglement of webbed data, we hope to develop techniques, 
methods and theories that best capture the nature of entanglements to predict cyber-incidents.  
 




 RESEARCH QUESTION 1.5
To date, frameworks and approaches that support cyber-incident prediction with such theoretical and 
practical synthesis of data across the various levels of the information space has been lacking in 
industry and research. The question of the entanglements that exist between events in the cyber-
physical-social realm has not been investigated in research. In light of the above stated gaps,the 
researchers questions of interest are as follows: 
 How can cyberspace be characterized to represent the various roles it plays in our daily lives. 
This characterization would help identify various streams through which data is generated? 
 What are the various types and sources of data that exist in cyberspace that are predictive of 
cyber events? 
 What is the nature of entanglements that exists between events across these various 
characterizations of cyberspace? 
 What models, frameworks or approaches can capture these entanglements ad exploit them for 
active prediction of events in cyberspace? 
 RESEARCH AIM 1.6
Develop an approach and theoretical framework for predicting cyber-attack threats in the entangled 
and complex Cyberspace by characterising and extracting relevant data related to cyber-incidents 
across the layers of cyberspace to feed statistical and mathematical models for enhancing predictive 
accuracy. The technical aim involves identifying weak and co-integrated signals that reduce the 
predictive error of subsequent stages of the attack kill-chain. 
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 1.7
a) Review the methods and algorithms for an integrated approach to pre-empting cyber-attacks. 
b) To determine the features that defines the nature of entanglements in cyberspace. 
c) Develop a multi-dimensional structural framework for integrating multiple sources of 
evidence in cyberspace to pre-empt cyber-attacks. 
d) Assess the implications of the research findings and an integrated approach for pre-empting 
cyber-attacks in practice. 
 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 1.8
The dynamics of cyberspace provides opportunities to conduct complex cyber-related operations in 
multiple complex domains for both attackers and defenders (Ben-Asher and Gonzalez, 2015). 
Cybersecurity defences must, therefore, be sensitive to spot emerging cyber-attack vectors, real-time 
anomalies in cyber-security data and signs of under siege attacks. To this effect, defenders must 
continually analyse the vast amount of data with predictive techniques to stay one step ahead. 
Effective cyber analytical technics would create models that properly describe the dynamic 
relationships and nature of entanglements between components across layers of cyberspace. 
Consequently, this generates a data and context-driven approach to cyber situational awareness that 
captures the behaviours of all cyber entities existing in a specific domain.  
The significance of this research rests in the ability to actively pre-empt a cyber-enabled incident with 
an approach for the untangling, identification, integration, representation and analyses of information 
from various levels of cyberspace for a proactive cyber situational awareness model. The possession 




of an approach that can actively track and decipher causal links between events in cyberspace would 
put the defenders ahead of the attackers and enable proper cybersecurity operations. 
 RESEARCH APPROACH 1.9
This research is broadly divided into four main activities. 
a) The development of a theoretical framework and Hypothesis that forms the foundation for an 
integrated analytical approach. 
b) Determine which measurement data in cyberspace are required to feed statistical models. 
c) Investigate and create new algorithms for combining selected mathematical, statistical and 
computational techniques that can reveal early warning signs in complex information space. 
d) Conduct practical and theoretical evaluations of methods. 
A theoretical framework for the analysis of cyber security data for cyber-attack prediction identifies 
the actors, events and techniques in the context of developing a cyber-security solution. Algorithms 
and methods previously applied are explored, compared and filtered down to a selected few based on 
a practical evaluation of performance. This is achieved by intensive qualitative research and a 
practical understanding of literature and techniques in the subject area. 
The experiment used in this research is based on benchmarked data from a hypothetical scenario of 3 
events. The scenario is designed to model the entanglement of activities within these three events and 
the entangled cyberspace framework is intended to pick up evidences of relationships between these 
events using appropriate methods. The scenario models the progression of activities across the various 
dimensions of cyberspace to the occurrence of a real-world cyber incident. 
The quantitative research performed on a series of formulated hypotheses based on selected prediction 
models and re-evaluated in context. The formulation of hypotheses is based on benchmark datasets in 
cyber security analysis and test questions related to possible correlation, co-integration and causation 
between identified variables. These hypotheses are tested, and the resulting models are applied to the 
prediction of a real-world cyber-attack incident. 
 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 1.10
Following the stated objectives of this research, the researcher puts forward the hypothesis below as 
the investigative focus of this study. Structurally integrated data streams from multiple dimensions of 
cyberspace using the entangled cyberspace framework are predictive of the cyber-attacks. The main 
hypothesis is further broken down into multiple hypotheses to meet the aims and objectives of this 
research as stated in section 1.7 of this report. 
1.10.1 Research Hypothesis 1 
The phases in the perpetration of a cyber-attack can be characterised across the various 
dimensions of cyberspace. 
1.10.2 Research Hypothesis 2 
Given a multi-dimensional cyberspace, there contains a set of multi-dimensional features across 
various layers of cyberspace that are predictive of cyber-attacks. 





1.10.3 Research Hypothesis 3 
The entangled cyberspace model proposed in this research is capable of identifying predictive 
features of a cyber-incident across the various dimensions of cyberspace. 
 
1.10.4 Research Hypothesis 4 
The entangled cyberspace model proposed in this research is capable of predicting cyber-incidents 
in cyberspace. 
 THE LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 1.11
Chapter 2 Literature Review: of this study explores literature in the areas of cyber security, 
situational awareness and predictive analytics with time-based techniques to develop and design a 
theoretical and hypothesised framework for active prediction of cyber-attacks.  This is achieved by 
providing a brief background on the current state of cybersecurity, an understanding of the current 
state of cyber-attacks and the existing defences to counter cyber-attacks. It goes further to characterise 
cyberspace to define the usefulness of data generated in cyberspace to the prediction of cyber-attacks.  
Additionally, chapter 2 develops the theoretical and conceptual framework for the prediction of cyber-
attacks in cyberspace. It further presents multiple hypotheses for the experimental design. The 
framework is put in the context of the cyber-attack kill chain and therefore offers a phased approach 
to the cyber-attack prediction problem. The Cyber-Physical-Socio-Economic space is presented as a 
model for characterising cyberspace as an entanglement of webbed data. Finally, it shows selected 
models in time series literature that are useful for analysing the structural data from cyberspace.  
Chapter 3 Hypothesized Model and Approach and the Theoretical Development of the 
Entangled Cyberspace:  develops the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this research. It 
critically discusses how the entangled cyberspace framework is developed using a combination of 
existing theories addressed in the literature. Thus, addressing how the current theories/models are 
used to ground the entangled cyberspace framework 
Chapter 4 The Research Methodology: reviews contemporary research methodologies to establish a 
combination of them useful to this research. This chapter also presents the strategy for data collection 
and the methods of analysis used. In this chapter, the techniques and methods used in this research are 
presented and critically discussed. Specifically, vector autoregressive models are presented as a model 
for verifying the hypothesised theoretical framework, which is then extended into the cyber testing 
environment. 
Chapter 5 Data Analysis: presents the analysis of data for the research experiments and begins the 
experimental design for the test of the multiple hypotheses developed in chapter three. The 
experimental design builds on suitable research methodologies identifies in the previous chapter. It 
begins by identification of variables useful for pre-empting cyber-attacks. It then describes methods 
and techniques for fusing data from various layers of cyberspace. Finally, it tests the usefulness of 
these variables to active cyber situational awareness using vector autoregressive models. Evaluation 
of these techniques is also presented to test the impact of cyber-attack prediction on active cyber-
situational awareness. 




Chapter 6 Discussion of Findings: critically discusses the finding identified in chapters two, four 
and five. This chapter also justifies the use of structural VARs in proactive cyber defence strategies to 
enhance cyber situational awareness. The research’s contribution to theory is a robust framework for 
understanding the entanglements of events in cyberspace, thus improving the quality of cyber 
situational awareness strategies. In practice, this research provides active techniques for identifying 
features useful to the prediction of cyber-attacks and a method for analysing these features. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion: rounds up the research process, evaluates the accomplishments and 
limitations of this research. It goes further to identify existing loopholes and recommends areas for 
further research in an attempt to close the research gap. 
 
Figure 1-1 visualizes the structure of this thesis and steps implemented in each chapter to achieve the 





Figure 1-1: Structure of Thesis 
  





2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 INTRODUCTION 2.1
 
This chapter explores the current literature in cybersecurity and information analysis in cyberspace. It 
begins with an introduction to cyberspace and the current landscape of cybersecurity. It further 
presents the effects of the new cyberspace individuals and modern existence. It also introduces a 
multi-dimensional characterisation of cyberspace and explores further the entanglements of 
information as it exists at various layers of cyberspace.  
This chapter, as a critical analysis of information analysis in cyberspace, explores the current methods 
and techniques for analysing information in cyberspace and the current applications of statistical and 
mathematical models to areas of cybersecurity. Additionally, this chapter investigates the usability 
and evaluations of these methods in the context to which they are applied.  This chapter further 
highlights data sources for information gathering as a pre-step to models’ specification methods for 
data identification, extraction, transformation and representation. 
Finally, the representation and analysis of multiple data vectors in multi-dimensional structural 
models are briefly introduced as a prelude to research methodology.  These methods incorporate the 
techniques of multiple series analysis, change-point detection, co-integration and granger’s causality, 
vector autoregressive models and structural equation models for the analysis of structural information.  
In conclusion, this chapter delivers a critical analysis of existing frameworks for cyber situational 
awareness and builds up the foundation for the construction of a structural framework for combining 
methods in building predictive models for cyber-attacks.  
 SEARCH STRATEGY 2.2
 
This chapter explores current literature in cybersecurity, cyber situational awareness, cyberspace 
characterisation and techniques for analysing time-dependent data. The literature review attempts to 
identify and synthesise all empirical evidence that meets set criteria to fulfil the aims and objectives of 
this research. The search themes include ‘cybersecurity and defence’, ‘cyberspace characterization’, 
‘analytics in cybersecurity’, ‘co-integration’, ‘causation’ and ‘autoregressive models’. The search 
themes were passed through various academic databases including ACM Digital Library, IEEE 
Xplore, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library and SpringerLink. Generalised search engines used also 
include Google Scholar, Scopus and Microsoft Academic. 
The search theme ‘Cyber Security and Defence’ was filtered to include only research published after 
1999. This strategy keeps the results returned from the search relevant to the current state of 
cybersecurity and defence over the last two decades. Furthermore, the researcher restricts results from 
Co-integration and Causation search to those after 1999.  
 
 STRATEGY FOR CONDUCTING THE LITERATURE REVIEW 2.3
Based on the research questions and objectives, 3 major areas of investigation were identified; 
characterizing cyberspace, identifying features that characterize events across the multi-dimensional 
cyberspace and predicting cyber-incidents. To capture relevant research around these topics, the 
researcher conducts a literature review to identify gaps in the areas of interest and investigate how 
past studies have implemented the techniques used in meeting the research objectives. The researcher 




investigate literature on characterizing cyberspace to develop a multi-dimensional representation of 
cyberspace based on the characterizing features of each layer. Additionally, the researcher reviews 
methods in time series analysis for predicting events recorded at equal space in time and identifies 
various model development and evaluation methods used in current research. The researcher also 
reviews other methods implemented in the various topic areas employed in addressing similar 
problems in the research space. The literature review is based on both legacy and current methods that 
address the problem area of interest.  
 CYBERSPACE IN MODERN DAY 2.4
 
Cyberspace has been defined by experts (Clark, 2010; Klimburg and Mirtl, 2012; United States 
Defense Force, 2013) as an artificial world where humans navigate in an information-based space. 
Critically, (MOD, 2016) recognises the importance of the interdependent nature of systems, people 
and networks in an operating space called cyberspace. Since the mid-1980s, cybersecurity experts 
have been observing an increasing gap between the evolution in the sophistication of the ‘attacker’ 
and the evolution of defences to counter these attacks. Given the constant development in 
contemporary modern technology, the increase in the number of interconnected devices in cyberspace 
has also increased. These discoveries have also led to an increase in attacker technique and 
sophistication. Unfortunately, while the attackers improve in their skills and attack execution tactics, 
the methods for countering these attacks have not experienced equivalent increase.  
There is no standard definition of the term ‘cyber’, but the term is mostly used as a prefix for ideas 
related to internet networks, information technology and virtual realities (COED). Information 
security experts (United States: US Army, 2010; United States Defense Force, 2013; Barnett, Smith 
and Whittington, 2014) mostly view the cyberspace as a network of internet and digital entities that 
support information flow. An interesting term cited in (Ning et al., 2016) refers to cyberspace as a 
virtual and physical abstraction with all the information resources that create the interconnections 
among cyber entities. As a dynamic, interdependent environment, which is geographically less 
constrained than other environments, access is possible through virtual applications running on digital 
devices that store, process and transmit data (Li et al., 2011).  
In the past decade, cyberspace has gradually replaced the physical reality, and these digital 
communication devices have been deeply embedded in human lives. The role of cyberspace has thus 
progressively evolved over the last two decades from being a simple enabler of daily live processes to 
a critical necessity for modern existence. Shopping, financial transactions, communication, crime, 
education, entertainment are traditional processes of everyday lives that are conveniently replaced by 
digital processes in cyberspace. Consequently, for all these processes being dependent on digital 
communications and networks, information is also continually being generated in time. 
From a cybersecurity perspective, at its core, the problem lies in a self-enabling cyberspace where all 
information to protect and harm information assets is provided by cyberspace itself. It is possible to 
access information to design a sophisticated cyber-attack (Olsen, 2013; Yadav and Rao, 2015). How 
these attacks may vary would be based on the skills and experience of the attacker. As a result, 
physical crimes and unlawful acts have found a way to exist in cyberspace anonymously. Terrorist 
groups, cybercriminals, government activists use cyberspace as an enabler for activities. Hathaway et 
al (Hathaway et al., 2012) provides logical reasoning to the problem. The traditional rules guiding 
community-based interactions are based on the assumption of some sort of physical presence of one 
or more of the entity (ies) in question. These rules have slowly become obsolete in cyberspace. Unlike 
our physical world where physical interactions occur during day-to-day processes, the need for a 
physical presence is simply cut off in cyberspace (Zetter, 2014).  




Cyberspace encompasses the people interacting, the devices connected and the information flowing 
within it. In recent times, the role of cyberspace has gradually evolved as an enabler of day-to-day 
lives. Cyberspace is a global village of inter-connected entities interacting through time. An 
interesting term cited in (Ning et al., 2016) refers to cyberspace as a virtual and physical abstraction 
with all the information resources that create the interconnections among cyber entities.  
 FROM PHYSICAL TO VIRTUAL REALITY 2.5
 
The physical reality is the state of things as they exist in the real world. Over the last ten years, 
cyberspace has gradually replaced the physical reality, and these digital communication devices have 
been deeply embedded in human lives (Ning et al., 2015). The role of cyberspace has thus 
progressively evolved over the last two decades from being a simple enabler of daily live processes to 
a critical necessity for modern existence. Shopping, financial transactions, communication, crime, 
education, entertainment are traditional processes of everyday lives that are conveniently replaced by 
digital processes in cyberspace. Consequently, for all these processes being dependent on digital 
communications and networks, information is also continually being generated in time. 
Cyberspace is the virtual link between geographically distributed cyber personas who create the need 
for a virtual meeting point. Information is continuously being generated between these cyber 
personas. Methods for addressing the problems in cyberspace must examine the entanglements of 
these cyber personas, their characteristics, activities and events across the multiple layers in which 
they exist in a time and space spectrum. Given this dynamic state of cyberspace, it is no longer logical 
to restrict the analysis of cyber behaviours to ‘after-the-fact’ methods. Pre-empting attacks against 
information assets and attacks enabled by cyberspace has become much more complex.  
 CHARACTERISING CYBERSPACE 2.6
 
As technology evolved over the years, so has the dependence of modern society on networked 
infrastructure for communication and connectivity. In a simplistic, naive definition, cyberspace is a 
collection of multiple computing devices connected by networks for storing, transmitting and utilising 
electronic information. An alternative way to understand the nature of cyberspace is to demystify its 
purpose or the role it plays in human existence. (Clark, 2010) summarises the three main objectives of 
cyberspace:  
 
i. Manipulation and exploitation of information. 
ii. Facilitation and augmentation of communication among people. 
iii. The interaction of people and information. 
From these encompassing definitions, we can extract some common uses of cyberspace as relevant to 
modern existence: connectivity, communication and beliefs.  
2.6.1 Cyberspace as a medium for inter-connectivity (The physical Space) 
 
The physical infrastructure and logical building blocks of cyberspace support capabilities for 
connectivity between linked devices. The nature and rules upon which cyberspace exist are defined on 
the logical layer. For the physical infrastructure, it is important to note the main components that 
support connectivity sensors, actuators and networks. Sensors capture physical data and are low-cost 
devices with limited storage and computational capacities. Actuators, automate, control and convert 
the collected physical data into action commands. Intelligent computer networks support the linking 




of digital devices and transmission of physical data through cyberspace. The physical 
objects establish connections and relations with other cyber entities in both real and digital worlds 
based on rules defined on the logical layer. Moreover, physical objects are owned and operated by 
human beings and therefore reflect social attributes that are in direct or indirect correlation with the 
affiliated persona.   
 
2.6.2 Cyberspace as a medium for communication (Social Space) 
 
Real-world personas control cyber-personas in cyberspace. The persona and cyber-persona are 
sometimes referred to as the offline and online modes respectively, of human beings in cyberspace 
(Ning et al., 2016). The logical infrastructure of cyberspace provides capabilities for interaction and 
communication between multiple cyber-personas which in turn creates greater capabilities 
for sharing and collaboration in cyberspace. Sharing refers to an integration of social attributes and 
social events, exchange of thoughts and the creation of social inter-/intra relationships owned by real-
world personas. Collaboration refers to a coming together of cyber-personas in real-time mainly to 
create intellectual content. This capability relies on communication infrastructure to support human 
learning and co-existence. Therefore, cyberspace as a medium for communication creates a social 
space of intelligent networks with streams of thoughts, perceptions, social affiliation and social 
relationships.   
2.6.3 Cyberspace as an Enabler of beliefs 
 
Given the social capabilities provided by the infrastructure of cyberspace, over the past three decades, 
cyberspace has also gradually become an influencer of beliefs. Real-world persons are affiliated with 
various social, political, economic and cultural ideas which shape ideologies. Cyberspace provides a 
medium for sharing ideologies and creating online communities based on ideological differences. 
Agents of ideological formation embedded in online social communities propagate ideas, notions and 
positions that support certain ideological perspectives.   
Finally, (Ning et al., 2016) summarises these functions of cyberspace in the formation of a cyber-
human hyper-thinking space consisting of data, information, knowledge and thoughts. Data collected 
by sensors, being exchanged during communication sessions from ubiquitous devices are expected to 
create context-aware information that can be further mined to generate useful knowledge. The 
convergence of connectivity, communication, interaction and knowledge enabled by human personas 
encompasses the ultimate function of cyberspace in modern existence.   
 THE INTER-CONNECTED WORLD 2.7
 
The theory of inter-connectivity in cyberspace holds that people, things, entities, processes are inter-
connected by the collaboration of the human, social and digital world (Ning et al., 2016). The cyber-
physical-social space is an interpretation of the theory of inter-connectivity in cyberspace in which 
physical perceptions, cyber interactions and social correlations are inter-connected through ubiquitous 
virtual reality. The underlying basic assumption is some form of inter-dependence between activities 
in the virtual reality, activities in the physical reality and activities in the social reality which is based 
on a perfect integration of the cyber-physical-social space with human, social and physical 
interactions.  
Cyberspace, artificial and virtual realities are a generalised form of digital abstractions that support 
inter-connectivity and interactions between cyber entities. Cyberspace is assumed to be independent 




of space and time constraints as its existence is a timeless virtual abstraction of the physical reality 
(Gotved, 2006). For example, the death of a person does not necessarily imply the death of associated 
cyber accounts.  Access to cyberspace is possible via digital devices on independent networks. The 
cyberspace ecosystem also provides infrastructure for massive information management services, 
resource management and service management through public interfaces mostly running on 
distributed databases. This ecosystem is also supported by uniform standards and protocols to enhance 
the flexibility of usage, ease of access and create a self-evolving computing eco-system. Although 
cyberspace operates as a global domain consisting of independent sub-networks of technological 
infrastructure and data that potentially connects all interacting entities, the physical barriers of the 
real-world dimension (territory, land) are obsolete. In this way, it can provide the maximum number 
of people with the means of access, production and creativity within its new information society. 
The physical space refers to real-world entities that interact directly or indirectly with cyber entities. 
The idea of physical space saturates modern existence as a concept for understanding the world 
around us and how we interact with its comprising entities. Thus, it encompasses all physical entities 
where physical interactivity is possible, heterogeneous interfaces, physical infrastructures and 
interactive environment required for seamlessly browsing through cyberspace. These include; all real-
world components and the physical infrastructure that support the existence of independent networks. 
The facets of the physical space: Location, Distance, Size and Route (Hornecker and Buur, 2006) 
attribute physical entities and their mappings in cyberspace. A physical object can be mapped into 
cyberspace using geographical attributes (IP Addresses, Longitude, Latitude) so that its location 
replicates where the thing exist in the physical dimension in relation to other physical entities in the 
same space. The amount of time required to exchange information between two physical objects is a 
function of the distance between the two objects, the size of data being transmitted and the channel of 
communication (Feria, 2010).  
The social space is an integration of social attributes, inter-personal relationships controlled by 
physical people and other physical objects. A physical entity creates direct and indirect relationships 
with other physical entities or cyber entities, therefore, establishing an eco-system of semantic 
relationships that mirror human social behaviour (Ning et al., 2016). Physical people map 
characteristics or attributes of their personas into the social space as cyber personas. The personas and 
cyber-personas characterise human activities, social events, behavioural conventions, political 
administrations, public services for human social participation in cyberspace. A single physical user 
may be associated with multiple cyber personas however each cyber persona can be associated with 
one individual. Social interconnectedness enables the creation of online communities characterised by 
the active social presence, social participation, relationship creation, and collaboration and belief 
affiliations. These online communities sometimes mirror traditional real-world communities where 
members share and express similar political, cultural, social and economic ideologies.  These three 
subdomains converge to a cyber-physical-social ecosystem held together by four main features; 
interconnectivity (Granovetter, 1982), interaction (Fu, 2016), integration (Maurizio, 2002) and 
intelligence (Freitas, 2013). These are considered to be enablers of the cyber-physical-social eco-
system. 
Interactivity refers to a two-way effect created when two or more entities meet each other. Entities in 
cyberspace can establish interactivity with other entities within their cyberspace dimension or with 
entities in other dimensions. For example; a web application accepts an input from a human, or a 
mobile phone establishes a one-touch payment process. The ease of access to cyberspace and robust 
infrastructure supporting distributed networks creates the platform for easy and speedy multiple 
interactive sessions between these cyber entities. 




Inter-connectivity refers to a state of being connected or the linking of two or more entities in a given 
space (Fu, 2016). It is made up of multiple simple interactive processes happening simultaneously. 
Although this concept is often used when referring to the linking of two digital devices in an internet 
network, interconnectivity in cyberspace broadly indicates that physical objects, people, cyber 
personas and social dynamics establish seamless communication or relationship links between and 
within each other. This implies that entities may be linked via physical connections or social 
relationships and interactions across the various dimensions of cyberspace. This logical infrastructure 
provides the foundations for transmitting information across large distributed networks and the 
creation of online social communities for collaboration and sharing.  
Integration refers to the fusing of two or more entities in a coherent and unified manner. There may 
be combinations across different dimensions of cyberspace. For example, cyber-cyber, social-social, 
physical-physical, cyber-social, cyber-physical or social-physical. Integration in cyberspace may refer 
to the coming together of multiple entities in cyberspace under a uniform standard protocol or the 
fusion of data flowing from multiple interacting sources using a global schema and mapping.  
Intelligence refers to the self-enabling ability to acquire process, interpret and apply knowledge. The 
seamless integration of knowledge across the cyber-social-physical spaces precedes large-scale 
dynamic collection and processing of information, which allows for self-learning, adaptive behaviours 
and self-evolution of entities in cyberspace. Intelligence exists across all dimensions of cyberspace in 
forms of human intelligence (Johnson and Bouchard, 2005), machine intelligence (Legg and Hutter, 
2007) and emotional intelligence (Picard, Vyzas and Healey, 2001). 
Interconnectivity provides the structure for connecting and linking with other entities in cyberspace 
while interactions provide communication support between entities that lead to the seamless creation 
of data and information streams in cyberspace. Cross-domain data are fused by integration which can 
further be analysed for actionable intelligence. 
Over the last twenty years, the majority of the global human population has become actively involved 
in the production and consumption of information. The interaction, interconnection and integration of 
entities in our physical and virtual worlds have created a new platform for dynamic information 
exchange via a distributed communications network. Thus, these interactions, in turn, created logical 
interdependences between interacting and inter-connected elements. 
Data is continually generated in all dimensions of cyberspace through interactions, activities, 
relationship formation and events. Interactions are achieved through effortless ease of access to 
cyberspace while interconnections are established in local and global domains during which real-time 
data is collected, sanitised and stored for future intelligence analysis. Activities in the physical, social, 
real-world or cyber dimensions are initiated by entities within contextual domains creating historical 
maps of event-based correlations (Hong et al., 2003). Relationships are formed based on common 
social, cultural, political, economic or technological beliefs creating associations between entities. 
Information collection, processing and storage are possible through high-performance digital devices 
that self-enable knowledge creation and dissemination. The social space is a complex interactive 
structure made up of individuals, organisations and entities connected by one or more specific types 
of inter-dependencies such as friendships, interests, likes, dislikes, sexual relationships, political, 
economic and religious affiliations, relationships of beliefs, kinships, etc. Widely accessible and open 
source social technologies are increasingly being used by humans to share thoughts, perceptions, 
opinions and beliefs about real-world events in real-time. Social media platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube produce streams of information capable of creating proactive intelligence. (Debatin 
et al., 2009);(Lau, Xia and Li, 2012);(Hernández et al., 2016). Cyberspace creates a platform for 
individuals to operate multiple personalities with which they can share true opinions freely, beliefs 




and associations (Personas and Cyber-Personas) (MOD, 2016). A typical example is the formation of 
online hacker communities’, e.g. hacktivists, cyber soldiers as a platform to plan, coordinate and 
execute cyber-attacks. 
 
Data in the social space exist as a series of interconnected events that captures the real-world personas 
as well as the cyber personas of online users. Such data are open source and publicly accessible 
The physical space consists of real-world dimensions that are mapped into cyberspace. These could be 
the digital devices through which cyberspace is accessed or real-world perceptions of geographically 
distributed cyber entities. Data collection is enabled by using sensors, actuators and context-aware 
networks (Ning et al., 2016). Methods for collection, storage and knowledge extraction on Human-
Machine interaction data being generated in real-time for example; network traffic flow (Cleveland 
and Sun, 1995) can be used to monitor network access  (Eterovic et al., 2014), spot malicious 
behaviours such as denial of service attacks (Jin and Yeung, 2004; Chen and Hwang, 2006), build 
models for automating security protocols (Sofiyanti, Fitmawati and Roza, 2015) and understand 
network behaviour (Münz, Li and Carle, 2007; Bou-Harb, Debbabi and Assi, 2015). Typically, 
software applications hosted on the world wide web could be configured to collect and store 
interaction data and user data (Tsai and Chan, 2007). End-user behaviour could be inferred using 
event logs for evidence gathering (Singh and Roy, 2010) and anomaly detection techniques (Breier 
and Brani\textbackslashvsová, 2015). Activity log data collected from mobile devices or activity 
devices could be used in health intelligence. 
Additionally, data in the real-world dimension such as GPS tracking data, weather data and transport 
traffic data could be integrated for informed intelligence to trace events such as cyber terrorism or 
cyber activism (Whiting et al., 2015). Due to the sensitivity of information generated in the physical 
space and the risk involved with activities around it, data on this domain is not open or publicly 
accessible. This major challenge could hinder efforts at developing generalised techniques for 
knowledge extraction (Baggili and Breitinger, 2015). 
The decentralisation of networks creates an open market for ideas and beliefs that are often shaped by 
immediate surrounding events. The complexity of the relationships between real-world events and 
cyber events provides a new dimension for analysis. Historical and current correlations between 
social, political, economic and cultural events (Gandhi et al., 2011a) could provide actionable 
intelligence for cyberspace operations. Additionally, global financial events generate profound effects 
across various dimensions of cyberspace and the real-world (Pandey and Snekkenes, 2014). As a 
result, traditional protests or rallies are frequently organised and executed in cyberspace (Olsen, 2013) 
by grievance-bearing groups.  Commodities trade for example the global prices oil and gas, gold 
cobalt; may also affect global events in the cyberspace and the real-world (Bronk and Tikk-Ringas, 
2013).  
Similarly, in a contest of competing narratives, the concept of ‘news’ becomes relative and what is 
accepted as truth could be considered important when dealing with global events. There is sufficient 
evidence to prove that useful intelligence can be gathered from a systematic analysis of unstructured 
open source information especially information from the media (Sousan et al., 2010). For example, 
studying past social events in news media and publications to explore factors in the social and cultural 
dimensions that act as antecedents to cyber incidents (Sharma et al., 2010).These enablers of the 
cyber-physical-social ecosystem are also enablers of the various components of the theory proposed in 
this thesis.  
 




 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 2.8
This section defines the CONOPS associated with the proposed approach. Here the researcher lays out 
a series of sub-framework that characterize the proposed system. This section is a review of how a set 
of frameworks can be employed and integrated to achieve the parts of the research aim and objectives. 
2.8.1 What is a cyber-attack 
 
To reach a definition of ‘cyber-attacks’ that captures the complexity of the activity, it is essential to 
the scope of the problem of cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are propagated over information 
communication networks with the intention of manoeuvring or disrupting the natural order of things 
in the selected network. The aim is to manipulate or alter the medium of communication or the 
rational logic of the system through malicious means. Once a system is infected with malicious code, 
the adversary gains control and can remotely take control of the system to perform unwanted tasks 
within the network. Consequently, if an adversary has access to a single node in the network, the 
infected node can also be used to affect other nodes in the network.  
To manipulate a system, the adversary would expect some flaws or bugs in the applications, software 
or hardware in the network which he/she hopes to exploit. The motives of the adversary and the 
means of attack execution provide variety in the definition of a ‘cyber-attack’. 
Generally, the various definitions of cyber-attacks in research (Gervais, 2012; Hathaway et al., 2012; 
Klimburg and Mirtl, 2012; Barnett, Smith and Whittington, 2014; DCDC, 2015a), summarize a cyber-
attack as any offensive attempt by individuals, groups, organizations or nation states targeted at 
information and communication networks by any malicious means. This definition highlights some 
essential characteristics of a cyber-attack.  
2.8.2 The Cyber-Attack Kill Chain 
Lockheed Martin first published the cyber kill-chain as part of an intelligence-driven cyber defence 
model (Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin, 2011) for identification, prevention and mitigation of cyber 
intrusions in target networks. Cyber-attack kill-chains have over the years evolved to a sophisticated 
model for incident response, digital forensics, malware analysis and understanding the activities in 
various types of cyber-attacks from the attacker’s perspective. Inherently, modelling the kill-chain is 
modelling and analysing the offensive actions of the adversary. It is important to note however that 
the cyber kill-chain is a circular and non-linear model where the adversary iterates over many steps, 
making continuous lateral movements inside the target’s network. The cyber kill-chain model states 
that, for an adversary to carry out a successful attack, he must follow six necessary steps; 





Figure 2-1: The Cyber Kill-Chain Process 
 
The sequential chronological occurrences of events in the kill-chain provides an experimental 
sequence to event identification in the theoretical development. 
2.8.3 Attack Trees 
Attack trees are implemented as probabilistic models showing the path which a target or an asset may 
be attacked. The attack trees introduced by (Schneier, 1999), what sorts of attack to expect,  are useful 
for understanding the goals of an attack, who the attackers are and where to best deploy resources to 
mitigate attacks. Attack trees represent attacks and counter-measures in a tree structure where the root 
node is an attack goal and the leaf nodes are possible attack vectors. The nodes represent different 
ways to achieving the same goal (at the root node) or different steps to achieving the same goal. 
Attack trees are increasingly implemented in practice due to their ability to quantitively measure the 
effectiveness of threat analysis and improve decision making around cyber threat monitoring and 
prevention (Mauw and Oostdijk, 2006; Roy, Kim and Trivedi, 2010). 
 
2.8.4 The Multi-Dimensional Cyberspace 
 
In this section, we discuss the components of a new three-dimensional model for characterising 
cyberspace. The new characterisation includes the physical dimension and the social dimension as 
presented by (Clark, 2010; United States: US Army, 2010; Klimburg, 2011). The economic dimension 
is a new dimension added to capture the effects of political, financial and cultural indicators on cyber 
incidents as suggested in (Gandhi et al., 2011a). In relation to the cyber-attack kill-chain, the multi-
dimensional cyberspace provides transverse movements of events that support channel hopping of the 
sequential events in the kill-chain. 
 
 




2.8.4.1 The Physical Dimension 
 
Ning et al. (Ning et al., 2016) describe the physical dimension as a combination of the real world as 
perceived from a linear dimension and physical objects as they exist in cyberspace. Although Clark 
and Klimburg (Clark, 2010; Klimburg, 2011) restricted the physical dimension to all physical objects 
and hardware mapped into cyberspace via sensing and digitisation, some studies have advocated the 
real-world association to entities in cyberspace. For example, a physical object can be digitised and 
mapped into cyberspace with a unique IP address. However, it is also possible to map all IP addresses 
to a physical geo-location in the world which has attributes like weather, traffic, political and 
economic events, financial markets, commodity markets, economic indicators etc. Therefore, the 
physical dimension is not limited to include the hardware devices that support access to cyberspace 
but also attributes that define geographical characteristics of these entities and technical infrastructure 
that defines the structure of connectivity between them. 
 
 The Network: Sensors and activity monitor support activities on the network layer. 
Interconnected computing devices in which these devices are perceived and controlled by 
sensors and actuators to establish a communication link between them. These include all the 
hardware (servers and computers), infrastructure (wired, wireless, and optical), physical 
connectors (wires, cables and routers) and digital devices interacting in cyberspace. 
 The Real-World: The geographic or real-world components of cyberspace refer to the 
physical location of elements of the network. These are the characteristics that define a 
physical location of a network object. It is essential to differentiate the real-world components 
from activities on the economic dimension. While activities in the economic dimension relate 
to events that affect economic, political, social and cultural dynamics, real-world components 
are seen as a naturally occurring phenomenon. Therefore, the geographical components are 
not restricted to the physical dimension. 
2.8.4.2 The Social Dimension 
 
The social dimension comprises of the persona and cyber-persona components (Clark, 2010; 
Klimburg, 2011; United States Defense Force, 2013). The social dimension is an integration of social 
attributes and inter-relationships owned by human beings and another related physical, cyber entities 
in cyberspace. The personas and cyber-personas characterise human activities, social events, 
behavioral conventions, political administrations, public services for human social participants in 
cyberspace. Social interconnectedness establishes the existence of the social dimension by enabling 
the creation of online communities characterised by the active social presence, social participation, 
relationship creation, and collaboration and belief affiliations. 
 
 The Cyber-Persona: The components of the cyber-persona define online identities and 
characteristics of the people in a network as they exist and interact in cyberspace. These 
elements refer to the digital footprints of individuals as they interact with other aspects of 
cyberspace. Individual cyber-personas are attributed directly to an actual person or persons 
incorporating some cyber characteristics, e.g., email address, IP address, social accounts, etc. 
A single individual may possess multiple cyber personas, and a single cyber-persona can have 
multiple users. 
 The Persona: The persona refers to the offline mode of the cyber-social dimension (Ning et 
al., 2016). The persona components define the identities and characteristics of the people 
interacting in a network from a real-world perspective and the characteristics that define them 




as they exist in the real world. For example, a person may have attributes like a geographic 
location, a financial service provider, a home address or a work address. 
2.8.4.3 The Economic Dimension 
 
The economic dimension characterises cyberspace as an enabler of our socio-political-economic-
cultural existence. The socio-political-economic-cultural dimension is characterised by activities 
attributed to human beliefs, norms, laws and co-existence. As a result, it captures the state of human 
experience as they exist as individuals or communities. It reflects how activities on the real-world 
economic and political hemisphere affect the events in cyberspace (Sharma et al., 2013). Current 
research has made attempts to quantify the association between socio-political-economic-cultural 
factors and events in cyberspace. For example (Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan, 2004) studies 
the effects of various types of cyber-attack announcements on stock market prices and  (Gandhi et al., 
2011; Karatzogianni, 2008) identifies the effects of social, economic, cultural and political indicators 
on the occurrence of cyber-attacks. Although there has been little focus on the direct impact of stock 
and commodity market price fluctuations on the event of cyber-attacks, there is sufficient evidence 
supporting their influence across multiple layers in cyberspace (Sharma et al., 2010; Bollen and Mao, 
2011; Sanzgiri, Hughes and Upadhyaya, 2013; Hernández et al., 2016). Recent activities in 
cyberspace also prove how economical (Olsen, 2013), political (Leigh and Harding, 2011; Harding, 
2014; Zetter, 2014) and cultural (Bartlett, 2015) dimensions of society lead to cyber-incidents. 
 
 The Broadcast: The realistic real-time content generation of real-world incidents supports the 
existence of this layer. This layer also relates to information about events in the real world. A 
unique characteristic of this layer is its real-timeliness and newness of information generated. 
These are facts or ‘knowns’ and include information from certified media sources. While 
some may argue that Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms can also act as 
news dissemination actors (Kwak et al., 2010), the news is seen to be biased in such aspects 
by the uncertainty of the information sources. 
 The Markets: This layer captures the effects of money, finance and trade on our modern 
existence and how they may act as antecedents to cyber defence events. Therefore, we seek to 
identify what market forces influence cyber defence incidents. Markets in this context refer to 
all financial, trade and money context of the real world reflected in cyberspace. For example, 
fluctuations in exchange rates, commodity prices, stock prices, crude-oil prices, money 
supply, money demand, inflation rates, deflation rates may have direct or indirect impacts on 
economically or politically motivated cyber-attacks.  Moreover, (Bollen and Mao, 2011) 
proves that elements in cyberspace can influence stock market prices as well as market 
valuations being influenced by denial-of-service attack announcements on the market 
valuation of firms (Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan, 2004). Similarly, (Bronk and Tikk-









Figure 2-2: The Multi-Dimensional Cyberspace 
 
 
In conclusion, we can refer to cyberspace as a multi-dimensional space with multiple independent 
dimensions that make up the whole. In an attempt to accurately represent cyberspace, the researcher 
denotes cyberspace as Ω. Where Ω refers to all data and information flowing across the various 
dimensions of cyberspace. Therefore cyberspace: 
 





Equation 2-1:  Multi-Dimensional Representation of Cyberspace: Compact View (Source - Author) 
 
 
Given a multi-dimensional cyberspace with J dimensions, let 𝟏… .𝑱 represent indicators from the 
corresponding dimensions of cyberspace. Therefore, we can represent data from these dimensions as: 


















Data from each dimension can further be decomposed into an (n X m) matrix where m is the number 
of features or indicators observed within each dimension and n is the number of chronological 
observations for each indicator from time 𝒕𝟏…𝒕𝒏. Therefore, 𝟏 is an (n X m) matrix where m is the 
number of features for the first identified dimension of cyberspace and n is the number of 
chronological observations recorded at the given time interval. 
2.8.5 Data and Information in Cyberspace 
 
This section provides a conceptual breakdown of data and information available as evidence sources 
in cyberspace. 
2.8.5.1 Data From the Physical Space 
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The physical space acts as a gateway to all cyber-attacks. Data analysis on the physical space, most 
notably the network layer seems to have dominated literature in the past decade. Various types of data 
that are extracted from the network layer of cyberspace have extensive coverage in literature. 
Time series models are commonly applied to network traffic data to predict network flow (Barford et 
al., 2002; Kim and Reddy, 2008), to spot denial of service attacks (Kim & Reddy, 2008), in building 
intrusion detection systems (García-Teodoro, Díaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009) and 
classifying network traffic packets (Mahoney, 2003). Moreover, weblog data is another source of data 
for proactive cyber defence models to network traffic flow data. For example, probabilistic latent 
semantic analysis (Tsai & Chan, 2007) detects cyber defence threats in weblog data files. End-user 
behaviour can also be inferred using event logs for evidence gathering (Singh & Roy, 2010) and 
anomaly detection techniques (Patcha & Park, 2007). Similarly, the use of classification and 
correlation (Gabra, 2014) techniques on IDS alert logs support cyber forensics and real-time cyber 
threat assessments. Consequently, data and information from sensors such as the Internet of things 
(Atzori, Iera, Morabito, & Nitti, 2012) also fall within the physical layer of cyberspace. Data on the 
physical layer may also include some real-world attributes, e.g., weather data, GPS tracking data and 
some traffic data to trace events such as cyber terrorism or cyber activism (Whiting et al., 2015). 
Unlike the social layer, one major disadvantage of using data on the physical layer is that legalities 
and access guard most of it is not as open. Consequently, attempts to perform analysis on this layer 
has always been restricted to contexts analysis. Therefore, results are not readily generalizable 
(Baggili and Breitinger, 2015). 
2.8.5.2 Data From the Social Space 
 
The social space is a complex interactive structure made up of individuals, organisations and entities 
connected by one or more specific types of inter-dependencies such as friendships, interests, likes, 
dislikes, sexual relationships, political, economic and religious affiliations, relationships of beliefs, 
kinships, etc. Widely accessible and open source social technologies are increasingly being used by 
humans to publish thoughts, perceptions, opinions and beliefs about real-world events in real-time. 
Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are a rich source of data for proactively countering 
cyber-attacks. For example, to encourage online user privacy awareness, (Debatin et al., 2009) uses 
Facebook data to measure users’ online exposure to vulnerabilities. By studying users’ ritualisation, 
routines, gossips, rumours, this study could examine the relationship of Facebook privacy issues with 
invasion of privacy. 
Additionally, (Bou-Harb, Debbabi and Assi, 2015) crawled cyber-crime related messages from 
Twitter and context-related blog articles to identify notorious hacker groups and their related twitter 
feeds, blogs and blog activities. Also, cyber terrorist groups have also been spotted using text mining 
and analysis techniques. Hernández (Hernández et al., 2016) employs user sentiment analysis on a 
daily collection of tweets in two different contexts; Twitter as a platform for expression of user views 
and Twitter as a platform to present content related defence threats on the web. Statistical analysis of 
these data is used to predict the possibility of a future attack. 
Data on the social layer of cyberspace exist as a series of interconnected events that captures the real-
world personas as well as the cyber personas of online users. Consequently, data and information 
from social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and micro-blogging platforms that allow users 
to freely share views, perceptions, and opinions about related matters, feeds into cyber-attack counter 
models. One distinct advantage of using data from the social layer is the free and open accessibility it 
provides. 
 




2.8.5.3 Data From the Economic Space 
 
The complexity and the interconnectedness of real-world events and cyber events uniquely 
characterises the economic space. Similarly, time series models are also equally applied to stock 
market data as generated in real-time. Although there is little research on the effects of stock market 
prices on cyber defence events, research has covered the integration of stock market data with data 
from other layers of cyberspace (Bollen and Mao, 2011). 
Sufficient evidence supports the extraction of cyber threat intelligence from a systematic analysis of 
unstructured open source information, e.g., text/news articles (Tsai & Chan, 2007). Similarly, 
studying past social events in news media and publications reveal factors in the social and cultural 
dimensions that act as antecedents to cyber-attacks (Whiting et al., 2015). The usefulness of financial 
prediction markets in information defence risk management is another example of this concept 
(Pandey & Snekkenes, 2014b) with methods such as (Pandey & Snekkenes, 2014a) suggests.  
2.8.6 The Socio-Physical-Economic Cyber Kill Chain 
 
The cyber-kill chain model presented by (Hutchins, 2011) presents a phased approach to orchestrating 
cyber-attacks. The cyber-kill chain model identifies the steps which the adversary must complete for a 
successful attack on victim’s networks and is part of the intelligence-driven defence model for 
identification and prevention of cyber-attacks. The chain begins with intelligence gathering and ends 
with the cyber-attack. The cyber kill-chain frameworks prove that cyber-attack happens in phases and 
stopping the adversary at any of the phases breaks the attack chain therefore significantly reducing the 
probability of success. 
In a multi-dimensional cyberspace, as discussed in section 2.8.42.8.4, the deconstruction of the phases 
of the cyber-kill chain across the dimensions of cyberspace produces a socio-physical-economic kill-
chain where each activity on each phase of the kill chain is uniquely identified as occurring on one or 
more dimensions of the multi-dimensional cyberspace. The socio-physical-economic kill chain 
framework integrates two logical sub-frameworks; the cyber-attack kill chain (Hutchins, 2011) and 
the multi-dimensional cyberspace as discussed above.  
The cyber-attack kill chain introduced by Lockheed Martin represents a generalised sequential 
process that cyber-attacks follow from conception to execution.  The resulting combined framework 
outlines the various life-cycle phases in a cyber-attack from cyber-attack trigger to cyber-attack 
execution as they happen across the dimensions of cyberspace.  
Predictive cyber defence models should incorporate the underlying factors or antecedents that lead up 
to the occurrence of a cyber-attack. Therefore, a multi-dimensional structural approach capable of 
representing the complex dynamics of cyberspace is used.  
The socio-physical-economic cyber-kill chain presents the cyber-attack kill chain from a multi-
dimensional perspective aimed at understanding the cyber-attack lifecycle across the various layers of 
cyberspace, from the adversary’s perspective. This framework aims to spot the indicators of cyber 
incidents at every stage of the kill chain. One way to determine the indicators of each event on the 
kill-chain is to plan a cyber-attack from the attacker’s perspective by analysing the tasks an attacker 
must carry out to complete each phase. In this research, we refer to phase indicators as evidence in the 
data characterising the kill-chain phase. Consequently, these evidences are unique for different types 
of cyber-attacks.  
 




2.8.6.1 The Antecedents 
There are events and situations in the environment that precedes the behaviour of a cyber-attack. A 
behavioural epistemology considers these preceding events and situations as antecedents. Antecedents 
in cyberspace prompt the occurrence of cyber-incidents in that they act as precursors. Consequently, 
we seek to identify what conditions in the dimensions of cyberspace serve as antecedents to the 
behaviour of cyber-attacks. Additionally, this approach to applied behavioural sciences leads to the 
identification of motivations of cyber-incidents as it reveals what antecedents’ adversaries respond to. 
Researchers explain that cyber-incidents are associated with Social Political Cultural and Economic 
events-which are the most promising antecedents of cyber-incidents in cyberspace (Gandhi et al., 
2011a; Ning et al., 2016). SPEC analysis of cyber events provides a medium for analysing the 
motivations behind certain cyber-attacks. Socially motivated cyber-incidents are seen as resulting 
rivalries between individuals or groups over incompatible goals, scarce resources or control. 
Culturally motivated cyber incidents result from differences in ideologies, beliefs and a sense of a 
territorial way of life that is unique to certain groups. Economically motivated cyber-incidents are 
preceded by economic, corporate or financial situations that lead to uprisings by certain groups. 
Overcoming the challenge of providing empirical evidence of the association between cyber-incidents 
and SPEC factors is an on-going research milestone for cybersecurity. 
Consequently, there is currently little research attributing the antecedents of cyber-incidents to any 
dimension of cyberspace; however theoretical research on the subject (Gandhi et al., 2011a) have 
claimed these antecedents to be clustered on the physical dimension-the real-world layer and the 
economic dimension-the media and the market layers. One attempt to quantitatively prove the 
association between SPEC events and cyber-attacks is presented by  (Gandhi et al., 2011a) use 
methods such as country level correlation and quadratic assignment procedure to analyse the 
relevance of social, cultural and economic factors to the occurrence of a cyber-attack. 
 
2.8.6.2 The Reconnaissance Phase (RP) 
 
The reconnaissance phase is characterised mostly by activities on the social and network layers of 
cyberspace. The reconnaissance phase begins with a target or target systems about which an adversary 
must gain the maximum amount of information possible by any means necessary. This involves the 
identification, selection and profiling of a target. The ‘target’ may be an individual/individual or an 
organisation and may be passive or active. Passive reconnaissance is carried out un-noticed by the 
target. However, active reconnaissance may alert the target that something may be going on. The 
various means by which information about targeted systems may be acquired includes: 
 Open source reconnaissance: The adversary seeks to gather intelligence from publicly 
available information collected, exploited and used with a time-dependent advantage. For an 
adversary, this information may include public information on target’s employees, company 
profile, network domains and IP addresses, people associated with the target, social media 
presence, news articles and broadcasts, government documents freely available online. As 
most of this information is usually given to the public via the world-wide-web, 
reconnaissance efforts here are done on the social layer of cyberspace. The adversary surfs the 
web for publicly available information on target systems. For example, an adversary may 
infer that a target company runs a Windows-based company-wide system having discovered 
over twenty job ads for ‘A Windows Administrator’ or ‘C++ or C# Developers’ over the past 
three years. An adversary may also infer the level of cybersecurity importance for a given 
company by observing the percentage of its staff on LinkedIn who have some sort of security 
training or awareness.  





 Network Reconnaissance: The adversary also seeks to create a near approximate blueprint of 
the target network. For an adversary, these include the number of active IP addresses on 
target’s network range, the allocated IP addresses that are currently active and the operating 
systems and services running on each host in the target’s network range. Given that in most 
cases, the adversary can only obtain this information through physical access to the target’s 
network, most of the activities can be detected on the target’s network layer. For example, an 
adversary may perform a ping sweep or a port scan on a target network which can be spotted 
with techniques outlined in (Adams and Heard, 2014). However, adversaries may also take 
proactive steps to stay hidden, disguised or manipulate system logs to erase any trace of their 
digital existence on the target network.  
 
The passive social reconnaissance and the active reconnaissance are usually apart by a given time lag 
(t-p) with the social reconnaissance as the preceding event. Here, we categorically define a complete 
‘cyber-attack reconnaissance’ as a social reconnaissance event followed by an active network 
reconnaissance at a time interval k. Given the possible data characteristics of the social and physical 
layer with the known activities of the adversary at the stage, it is possible to characterise what patterns 
represent the event of the reconnaissance stage. Although the social reconnaissance may not be a 
strong indicator of the start of the attack kill chain, a social reconnaissance in combination with a 
network reconnaissance or a network reconnaissance by itself, typically flags off the start of the 
cyber-attack kill chain. The reconnaissance phase of the cyber-attack kill chain is a targeted research 
project with the aim of identifying, selecting and confirming operational and security loopholes in a 
cyber network. Combined information on target systems exposes vulnerabilities of the target and 
provides intelligence on how best to carry out a certain attack mission with the target’s system 
framework. Based on a certain set of target network system and attack resources, an adversary can 
infer a probability of success for a given number of attack vectors and attack paths.  
2.8.6.2.1 Identifying Indicators of The Reconnaissance Phase on The Cyber Kill-Chain 
 
The ability to identify characteristic evidence of an active reconnaissance requires a prerequisite 
knowledge of the activities an attacker must undertake to ensure a successful reconnaissance. As 
earlier mentioned, reconnaissance is simply information gathering that supports the attacker’s attempt 
in future stages of the kill-chain. Active reconnaissance techniques such as ping sweeps, banner 
grabbing, port scans, vulnerability scans have unique indicators on the target’s network. In most 
cases, active reconnaissance requires direct interaction with the target’s network. 
Port scans and ping sweeps represent a sizable portion of active reconnaissance techniques employed 
by attackers. Pingsweeping is a technique for mapping a range of IP addresses to live hosts while port 
scanning is a technique for discovering weaknesses and vulnerabilities on live hosts by sending port 
probes. Although network administrators sometimes use port scans for exploration or testing, ping 
sweeps and port scans often refer to scans carried out by malicious attackers to determine weaknesses 
in a target’s network. 
For this research, we utilise Bailey, Roedel and Silenok’s  (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 2003) 
three basic classes of scans based on the pattern of attacker movement within the network, target’s 
destination and target ports. A vertical scan targets several destination ports on a single host. A 
vertical scan is a function of the number of unique destination ports and the number of unique source 
IP addresses communicating in a network per unit time. Consider the following equation, 




𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
 
Equation 2-2: Vertical Scans in Network Traffic (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 2003) 
  
For normal traffic, for any given time frame, we expect this figure to be as close to the mean or 1 as 
possible. On the other hand, consider a horizontal scan, which targets the same port on several hosts. 
The horizontal scan is, therefore, a function of unique destination IPs within the network and unique 
destination ports connected to within the network.  
 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
 
Equation 2-3: Horizontal Scans in Network Traffic  (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 2003) 
 
 
Finally, block scans combine both vertical and horizontal scanning techniques in large sweeps of IP 
address range. Moreover, (Nam and Kim, 2006) explicitly describes the scanner detection rule as: 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒
 
Equation 2-4: Block Scans in Network Traffic  (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 2003) 
 
 In this regard, we can define a port scan as a function of the number of unique sources IP addresses 
and the number of unique destinations addresses. Finally, (Kinable, 2008) presents a hypothesis that 
measures the connection fail ratio of a network at any given point in time as a function of the number 
of inbound connections and outbound connections. The CFR of a network is given as: 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
Equation 2-5: Connection Fail Ratio of Network Connections  (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 
2003) 
 
Attackers, however, are well aware of these detection techniques and employ some methods to avoid 
detection. This presents a challenge for establishing reliable results based on the techniques used 
above. One common way to avoid detection is to increase the amount of time between probes since 
most detection systems perform analysis within a time-spaced window. This way, the attacker can 
spread out the attack thereby normalising the overall effect on the network over a long period. An 
attacker can also perform coordinated attacks using IP decoys appearing as different scans originating 
from several IPs. Identifying decoys in a network analysis the number of source IPs targeting the 
same set of hosts where these source IPs are within the same network (Bailey Lee, Roedel and 
Silenok, 2003). 
 
2.8.6.3 THE WEAPONISATION PHASE (WP)  
 




The weaponisation stage is characterised mostly by activities on the social and network layers. The 
goal of this phase is to develop a cyber weapon that executes the intended cyber-attack on a target. 
The payload developed in this stage is based on the outcomes of the reconnaissance stage. A cyber 
weapon is a collection of one or more payloads, each of which exploits a specific vulnerability of a 
target on the network layer, with the goal of disrupting, destroying or manipulating its target. The 
forensics of the attack weapon is comprised of various characteristics; which depends on the 
adversary’s intended purpose, to flood communication, gain access or gain control.  
The weaponisation can also be called ‘the blind spot’, as it happens outside the reach of analytical 
purview. In addressing this limitation, this model uses an inference-based approach, based on prior 
network knowns. Information from previous patterns in network behaviour in combination with 
common knowns feed the model at this stage.  The goals are: 
a. To understand the pattern of vulnerability and attacks within the target’s network. 
b. Conduct a zero-day and a non-zero-day vulnerability assessment on each node in the network 
and the target network. 
c. Construct a weaponisation probability tree for each node in the network and the whole 
network. 
The weaponisation phase probability tree is a combination of tree analysis and inference-cased 
techniques used to estimate probability functions. For each node in the target network, a 
weaponisation phase probability tree or attack weapon probability tree is constructed as seen in figure 
2-3 below. 
a. Construct a node feature table. This includes all hardware, software, application, usage, 
access features, open ports and network features of a machine linked in a network.  
b. Calculate the probability of exposure of each node. This involves extracting the keywords 
from each node feature and passing them through vulnerabilities databases, exploit databases 
and cyber-attack databases for a match. 
c. Weight each return against the total number of unique versions of applications, software 
running within the network. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Weaponisation Probability Tree (Source: Author) 
 
A recommended starting point for the weaponisation inference is to gain an understanding of what an 
adversary needs to access a target network based on the adversary’s intention. The adversarial tactics, 
techniques and common knowledge framework describe multiple approaches to designing attack 




vectors with which an adversary may take to fulfil intentions. Based on the number of tools available 
to the adversary and the potential ease of access to these tools, an estimated weight of attack 
technique percentage probability is created. For Example, the table below shows adversary techniques 
and corresponding weighted percentage probability of use. 
 







1 Advanced Persistent Attack 25 15% 
2 Escalate Privilege 14 8.7% 
3 Evade Network Defences 32 19.8% 
4 Access Database or Credentials 8 5% 
5 Discovery 16 10% 
6 Lateral Movement 14 8.7% 
7 Execution 16 10% 
8 Collection 11 6.8% 
9 Data Exfiltration 9 5.6% 
10 C&C 16 10% 
Table 2-1: Attack Plan Vectors. Source (Kick, 2014) 
Another approach to weaponisation inference is based on scan statistics. Historical evidence shows 
that understanding network scan statistics is a critical aspect of any cyber situational awareness model 
(Wu and Shao, 2005; Kim and Reddy, 2008; Adams and Heard, 2014). Network scan analysis is 
especially useful for detecting malicious activities within a network. Although (Panjwani et al., 2005) 
demonstrates that over 50% of cyber-attacks at the time are not necessarily preceded by some form of 
scanning activity, during a network reconnaissance stage, the combination of a port scan and a 
vulnerability scan or a port scan, a vulnerability scan and an ICMP scan is a strong indicator of 
possible attacks (Panjwani et al., 2005). Based on ‘what was scanned’, defenders may produce a 
chronological sequence of scan probes for dynamic vulnerability assessment. For each observed 
vulnerability and port scan, an estimate of the probability that the vulnerability would be exploited is 
created. 
In addition to the class of scan performed (port scan, vulnerability scan, ICMP scan), another feature 
that may prove useful in determining the adversary’s weaponisation tactics is the type of scan 
performed (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita, 2011). Vertical scans perform multiple scans on a 
single host. This may occur when an adversary is interested in a specific machine in a network. 
Horizontal scans perform a single scan on multiple hosts. In this case, the adversary aware of an 
existing vulnerability and tries to detect susceptible hosts in a network. Block scans perform both 
vertical and horizontal scans in a sweep of the entire network. In this case, the adversary creates a pre 
vulnerability assessment of the target’s network. The combinations of the class and type of network 
scan performed create some scenarios for adversary intent.  
The use of scan statistics for weaponisation inference is limited in that only adversary activities in 
network reconnaissance can be spotted. An adversary may utilise other forms of reconnaissance, for 
example, social engineering, physical access, insider threats. Also, an adversary may not always need 
a network reconnaissance to execute an attack. Once these the occurrence of the combination of these 
events have been established, defenders may assume that the adversary may have found a 
vulnerability which will be exploited at a future time ’t’. The usefulness of inferring the adversary’s 




weaponisation end-game is subject to time, particularly, the timing of the cyber-attack (Axelrod and 
Iliev, 2014) and the nature of the vulnerability lifecycle (Marconato, Nicomette and Ka??niche, 2012).  
 
2.8.6.3.1 The Vulnerability Lifecycle 
 
These categories are based on the strategic timing of activities carried out by the adversary to succeed 
and by the defender to mitigate.  
 Vulnerability Birth Date: A human programming mistake or a loop-hole in application and 
software source code leads to a vulnerability to be exploited by adversaries. 
 Exploit Availability: Adversaries in the deep web society find this vulnerability and create 
exploits and conduct quick short-term attacks against selected targets.  
 Vulnerability Discovery date. This refers to the date the vulnerability is discovered. The 
vulnerability is discovered either by security experts or adversary hackers. If the vulnerability 
is discovered by security experts, the incident is reported to necessary security vendors, and 
details of the vulnerability are released to the public only after a patch has been issued. 
However, if the vulnerability is first discovered by an individual or a black hat hacker, the 
vulnerability is most likely to be exploited before its existence is disclosed.   
 Vulnerability Disclosure date. This is the date the vulnerability is disclosed to some groups of 
the public. At this stage, the vulnerability existence is not yet publicized to the public. The 
exact dates of vulnerability disclosure dates are captured in the Open Source Vulnerability 
Database.  
 Vulnerability Publicity date. Media outlets like CNN, NYTimes, BBC, C|NET, 
ComputerWorld, HackReads, Hackmeggedon, and eWeek. However, security vendors are 
already aware of the vulnerability and are likely to release a fix. This, in turn, reduces the 
motivation of the adversary to attack. 
 Vulnerability Exploitability date. This is when an exploit code for the vulnerability is created 
and publicised on websites. The details of vulnerabilities will be given out on specific 
websites such as Packet storm or mailing list websites such as NEOHAPSIS. 
 Vulnerability Patch date. This is when a patch or fix is available. This is obtained directly 
from the vendors' websites. 
2.8.6.3.2 The Timing Of Cyber Attack  
 
As pointed out by (Axelrod and Iliev, 2014) when an adversary creates a weapon to exploit a 
vulnerability on a target network, the adversary decides whether to use that payload immediately or 
wait for a specific time in the future. This wait may be due to some strategy being implemented by the 
adversary or the weight of stakes involved. The adversary may be individuals, hacker groups or nation 
states. Per (Axelrod and Iliev, 2014), there is a trade-off for an adversary between waiting until the 
stakes are high enough to rip the maximum benefits from the use of an exploit and waiting too long 
enough that the target identifies and patches said vulnerabilities. The adversary’s decision on the 
optimum time to use an exploit against a target is based on certain factors. 
a. The adversary’s perceived stakes: This is what an adversary or defender stands to lose or gain 
depending on the success or failure of a cyber weapon. An adversary is concerned with the 
possible gains or losses if the cyber weapon is used at a given time to exploit a vulnerability 
while the defender is concerned with the potential gains and losses if the cyber weapon 
successfully infiltrates and attacks the network. 
b. Adversary stealth 




c. Adversary Persistence 
d. The perceived value of Cyber Weapon 
e. The adversary’s skill level 
f. Defender’s Pro-activeness 
g. Defender’s mean time to recovery. 
 
For the proactive defender, assuming all open vulnerabilities have been patched in time on the way to 
estimate this time is to evaluate the meantime to exploitation (Leversage and Byres, 2008) or predict 
the exploitability of vulnerabilities in cases of a zero-day attack (Kao et al., 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Proactive Targeted Defender 
This cycle of vulnerability discovery to network attack is slightly different for targeted attacks and 
random attacks. For targeted attacks as seen in Figure 2-4 above, the attacker is interested in a specific 
target and therefore scans that target network for any possible open vulnerability. It is only after this 
scan has been completed and the attacker is armed with critical information on the target network’s 
topology, that a cyber weapon to exploit is created. In the case of targeted cyber-attacks, one major 
challenge of the weaponisation phase is the minimal knowledge on adversary’s strategy. Adversaries’ 
game plans are usually identified and spotted after-the-fact, and defenders are stripped of the luxury 
of anticipation. However, by constructing a predefined set of ‘givens’ based on past events in the kill-
chain, target profile, vulnerability assessment, an attack weapon probability tree is constructed. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Proactive Random Defender 
For random attacks with random targets as seen in Figure 2-5 above, the attacker possesses an exploit 
and goes searching for any possible vulnerable target. Here, the attacker is well armed with a cyber 
weapon before discovering the vulnerability on the target’s network. The implication of this is a 
significant reduction in the time available to defenders to spot scan activities and patch vulnerabilities. 
In the case of a proactive random defender, time t4 to t6 is very crucial for both attackers and 




defenders. Defenders try to patch vulnerabilities before the attacker has time to deliver the cyber 
weapon while attackers are trying to go unnoticed in conducting their malicious activities. 
However, there is also the possibility of a zero-day attack in which case; the defender is unaware of 
the existence of said vulnerability. This is difficult to spot as data on vulnerability is only available 
after the payload has been used, in which case it is no longer considered a zero-day and the 
adversary’s motivation to use it is significantly reduced. Cyber network vulnerabilities are grouped 
into one of five categories during their existence (Jumratjaroenvanit and Teng-Amnuay, 2008).  
 Discovered Zero-day vulnerabilities: here, the adversary discovers an unknown vulnerability 
in the target’s network and secretly works on a payload to exploit that vulnerability while 
ensuring the existence of the vulnerability is not disclosed.    
 Active zero-day Vulnerability: Here, a patch for a known zero-day vulnerability has been 
released by security or software vendors. However, internal network and systems 
administrators fail to apply the patch to vulnerable systems a considerable time before the 
adversary has the chance to utilise the payload.  
 Passive zero-day Vulnerability: This is very like the pseudo-zero-day vulnerability except, 
this vulnerability has not been exploited yet. The system or network administrators have 
failed to apply the appropriate patch, and the vulnerability has a high risk of being exploited.  
 Active Open Vulnerability: Here, system, software and application vulnerabilities have been 
publicised and the exploits are openly known. However, security and software vendors are 
unable to produce a suitable patch for said vulnerability in the time leading up to the eventual 
exploitation of the target’s network.   
 Passive Open Vulnerability: Here, the vulnerability may be known or unknown to network 
administrators and security vendors. However, the exploit codes to exploit said vulnerability 
has not yet been produced.  
 
Zero-day vulnerability is a vulnerability of which a security patch has not been released and is 
therefore open to exploitation by unknown adversaries. In such cases, the defender may or may not be 
aware of the existence of such vulnerability, but most likely has little or no idea of how an adversary 
would design a payload to exploit said vulnerability. When an adversary successfully exploits a zero-
day vulnerability before a security patch is released, the target is said to be a victim of a zero-day 
attack.  
2.8.6.3.3 Identifying indicators of weaponisation on the cyber kill-chain 
 
At this point, the attacker has enough information on what is needed to infiltrate the target network. 
The attacker has found an entry point and goes about developing a cyber weapon to achieve this 
purpose. Unfortunately, the weaponisation phase is a blindspot in the kill-chain and represents an area 
where the target has no control of mitigating. However, from a target perspective is possible to 
probabilistically infer attack vectors from indicators identified in the reconnaissance phase. This 
method assumes that the target is aware of the activities carried out by the attacker in phase 1. For 
example, what ports were scanned, which employee’s information was searched etc. Based on this 
information, target constructs multiple hypotheses on feasible attack vector scenarios which in turn 
splits the kill-chain into multiple plausible paths. 
Estimating the likelihood of expectation for different cyber threat vectors is a form risk analysis on a 
target’s network. All plausible attack vectors for a given cyber-attack must be identified and a 
probability of expectation value assigned to each one. For example, assuming it is known that ports A, 




B and C were scanned, and port B is associated with SQL database servers, the target maps all ways 
an attacker may infiltrate the servers through an SQL vulnerability. This strategy requires prior 
knowledge of exploits, vulnerabilities and attack vectors associated with the identified servers. A 
target can also infer the possibility of a zero-day attack as seen in figure 1 above. As a cyber-attack 
progresses, this strategy reduces the outcome space by assigning a certain amount of probability to 
each attack vector scenario which in turn provides multiple hypothesis for the attack kill-chain.  
 
2.8.6.4 The Delivery Phase 
 
The delivery phase is characterised mostly by activities on the network and real-world layers. The 
delivery state involves all activities that support the movement of an exploit from the adversary to the 
target, or the transmission of the cyber weapon to the target’s territory. The delivery stage is very 
critical to both the adversary and the target as it is the basis of a clean, efficient cyber-attack. The 
method of delivery can vary from email attachments, USBs to malware injections. At this stage, the 
defender may estimate the chances that a cyber weapon has successfully infiltrated the system or the 
defensive capacity of the network by estimating the chances that a cyber weapon will successfully 
infiltrate the network. The delivery stage is linked to the physical and information layers of 
cyberspace. On the physical layer, it may be transmitted as malware in scripts that silently insert 
themselves into a host computer, from which it spreads to the entire network, DNS cache poisoning or 
as a flood of data packets sent specifically to crash target’s network e.g. in Denial of service attacks. 
On the information layer, delivery mechanisms could be phishing emails or email attachments. 
Unfortunately, the delivery stage leaves traces of adversary activity on the target network. Therefore, 
the adversary performs this task anonymously. It is therefore almost impossible to specifically 
identify who the adversary might be. However, there are constants in a target network that may help 
defenders predict the occurrence of such delivery mechanisms. Multiple classifier systems use 
Markov chains in detecting injection attacks (Roy, Singh and Sairam, 2011; Alnabulsi, Islam and 
Mamun, 2014) and attack propagation methods in networks  (Bar et al., 2016). Another approach is a 
probability-based model to estimate the delivery mechanism based on target network characteristics. 
It is possible to estimate, given past occurrences of cyber-attacks and target network characteristics 
what delivery mechanism a network is most susceptible to give the operating system and application 
platforms running on a network.  
The signatures that characterise the delivery stage are based on the permits of information flow within 
a target network. For example, an insider attack may be able to use a USB stick to deliver malware 
because the administrative protocols allow the transfer of data from unidentified external storage 
devices. The task of delivering a cyber weapon to target network may be via wired or wireless 
communications. A cyber weapon may successfully be delivered via emails because the network has 
no email or spam filtering available. Sometimes files run without administrative approval which may 
lead to download and installation of exploit by an unknowing network participant. Once indicators 
have been observed, to predict the probability of delivery success, all points of entry are first 
identified within a target network. The characteristics of the delivery stages are assumed to be on the 
adversary’s network layer and the target’s network layer.  
2.8.6.5 The Exploitation Phase 
 
The exploitation phase is characterised mostly by activities on the network, real-world and 
information layers. On successful delivery of the cyber weapon, the target completes the required 
steps that execute the weapon in the target network, thus triggering the exploit. This phase is 




characterised by the modification and degradation of the cyber layer in such a way that 
confidentiality, integrity and availability have been compromised. The objective at this stage is to 
install and execute the cyber payload. Therefore, certain pre-conditions must be met. Firstly, the target 
should have running the operating system or software, which the cyber exploit was made for. 
Secondly, the vulnerability to be exploited must have a status of ‘open’ at the time of exploitation, i.e. 
the operating system or system application should not be upgraded in such a way that it renders the 
cyber exploit useless. Lastly, the delivery must be done in such a way that its movement across the 
target’s network is not spotted by anti-virus or other protection software. In such a case that the cyber 
exploit is spotted, vulnerabilities are immediately patched, and exploit is rendered useless. At this 
stage, an adversary uses an exploit kit to mitigate the chances of failure of one specific exploit on a 
vulnerability. An exploit kit is a combination of multiple exploits crated for multiple versions of 
software and multiple software and applications. If any version vulnerability of any software or 
application exists on targets network, the cyber exploit will be successful.  On the information layer, 
open source databases e.g. Exploits Database provides categories of exploits based on target point of 
vulnerabilities. For example, there are remote exploits, web application exploits. DOS & POC 
exploits and privilege escalation exploits.  
 
 
SN EXPLOIT CATEGORY PERCENTAGE 
OCCURRENCE 
1 Web Application Exploits 58.3% 
2 Remote Exploits 17.5% 
3 Privilege Escalation Exploits 14.5% 
4 DOS & POC Exploits 9.4% 
Table 2-2: Exploits Categories Source (Author) 
 
 CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT 2.9
The concept of the employment suggests the tactics, technique, procedures and methods used in 
achieving the research aims and objectives. The following sections outline and discuss the theories 
behind the techniques used in implementing the entangled cyberspace framework. 
2.9.1 Time Series 
Time series analysis assumes an internal structure within data points chronologically recorded over 
some past time period. Therefore, it deals with understanding the dynamic consequences of events 
over a period of time. Chronological data are often generated during monitoring, observation or 
tracking process of a phenomenon or metric. Quantitative time series analysis methods make use of 
patterns in historical data defined as functions of the observations to infer future values of the variable 
of interest. A time series recording observations of a single variable is referred to as a univariate time 
series while observations of more than one variable are referred to as multi-variate. A time series can 
also be continuous or discrete. A continuous time series has observations measured at every instance 
in time, whereas a discrete time series has observations recorded at discrete intervals.  For example, 
stock market prices, weather readings can be measured as continuous time series while population 
growth; product sales can be measured as discrete time series. A time series is typically affected by 
four major components: the trend, the cyclical component, the seasonal component and the irregular 
components. Therefore, a time series can be decomposed into its individual components as: 




Yt = St + Tt + εt 
Equation 2-6: Time Series Components (Additive Model) 
Where Yt is the time observation at time period t, St is the seasonal component at time period t, Tt is 
the trend component at time period t and εt I sthe errors or irregular terms at time period. This model 
can also be expressed as a multiplicative model as: 
Yt = St  ×  Tt  × εt 
Equation 2-7: Time Series Components (Multiplicative Model) 
Multiplicative models are appropriate for non-stationary time series. The multiplicative model can 
also be derived by taking the logged values of the components in the series: 
 
log (Yt) =  log (St) +  log (Tt) +  log (εt) 
Equation 2-8: Time Series Components (Logged Model) 
A time trend exists when there is a pattern of long-term change in the observed data. A trend may be 
an increasing or a decreasing trend. For any chronologically observed variable, a time trend is defined 
as a function of current values, past values and white noise.  
Yt = Yt−p + εt 
Equation 2-9: Time Trend Equation 
 
Where Y is a chronological variable of interest, t is the current time, p is the amount of time into the 
past (lags) in observation and εt is the noise term related to Yt.  
A seasonal pattern exists when a time series in influenced by seasonal factors. For example, a pattern 
of occurrence every quarter of the year. Seasonality is usually for a fixed or known period. 
(Granger, 1980; Sims, 1980; Hamilton, 1994; Luetkepohl, 2011; Enders, 2014) extensively cover 
methods for fitting time series data for forecasting in research. Time series equations are based on the 
popular difference equations - an expression relating a single variable Yt, to lagged values of itself 
which is an auto-regressive (AR) process with the order of p. Univariate time series are fitted to AR 
process denoted as:   
 
Yt =  δ + ϕ1Yt−1 + ϕ2Yt−2 +⋯+ϕpYt−p + At 
Equation 2-10: Univariate AR Process 
Where Yt are the chronological values for the time series, At is the white noise and δ =  (1 −
 ∑ ϕi
p
i=1 ) μ, with μ as the process mean. An auto regressive model is simply a linear regression model 
of current values of a series Yt against past values of itself Yt−p. Analysis of AR models are done 
using the standard linear least squares techniques (OLS) (Montgomery, Peck and Vining, 2001) 
representing current values of the time series as the dependent variable and its lagged values as the 
explanatory variable. The linear model here states that the current values of the time series the sum of 
its lagged values multiplied by the beta coefficients. 




Equation 2-11: Univariate AR Process (OLS Representation) 




The beta coefficients 𝛽𝑖, are estimated by minimizing the errors of prediction 𝑡. The limitations of 
Ordinary least square methods lie in its inability to handle collinearity between variables and its linear 
dimension of analysis.  
Another technique for fitting univariate time series models is the Moving Average Model: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝐴𝑡 − 𝜃1𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝐴𝑡−2 −⋯− 𝜃𝑞𝐴𝑡−𝑞 
Equation 2-12: Standard Moving Average Model 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the time series, 𝜇 is the process mean, 𝐴𝑡−1 are error terms, and 𝜃1… 𝜃𝑞 are the 
parameters of the model. The value q is called the order of the moving average model. A moving 
average model is conceptually a linear regression of current values of a series 𝑌𝑡, against the random 
shocks of prior values of the series. The Moving Average Model assumes that random shocks at each 
time point in the series are from the same normal distribution with mean (𝜇) = 0 and a constant 
standard deviation = (𝜎2). Furthermore, Moving Average Models allow for the propagation of errors 
from past to future values of the series with iterative non-linear fitting procedures as opposed to linear 
least squares methods. 
 
Box and Jenkins (Box, Jenkins and Reinsel, 2008) popularized the Box-Jenkins model, an approach 
that combines the Auto-Regressive model and the Moving Average Model, Auto-regressive Moving 
Average Models (ARMA) processes. The Box-Jenkins model is fitted as: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛿 + 𝜙1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑌𝑡−2 +⋯+𝜙𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴𝑡 − 𝜃1𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝐴𝑡−2 −⋯− 𝜃𝑞𝐴𝑡−𝑞 
Equation 2-13: Box-Jenkins ARMA Model Representation 
Where the terms and parameters stated in the model have the same meanings as the AR and MA 
model above.  
The Box-Jenkins model assumes stationarity with mean (μ) = 0 and a constant standard deviation = 
(σ2). Random shocks account for integration in time series vectors which have a linear or non-linear 
long-term persistent influence on future values of the series (Enders, 1995). The Box-Jenkins 
recommendation for getting stationary time vectors from stochastic processes is differencing to the 
integrated order of the series, producing an ARIMA model (Auto Regressive Integrated Moving 
Average) (Enders, 2004). A time series sequence with no deterministic component, by which a 
stationary AR process is derived after differencing d times is said to be integrated order of d denoted 
as xtI(d)(Granger, 1969). In other words, if the series must be differenced d times to achieve 
stationarity, it is said to be I(d). A first order differenced time series can be derived by: 
 
 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 
Equation 2-14: First-Order Differenced Time Observations 
Where ∆ denotes a change in the series 𝑌𝑡. ARIMA models are most commonly used in fitting 
forecast models due to its flexibility to include both AR and MA models.  
Although once limited to the social sciences, time series analytical methods have been lately deployed 
in other fields ranging from biology to forensics. In cyber security, time series analysis become 
relevant in problems of anomaly detection (Liu et al., 2015), change point detection (Tartakovsky, 
Polunchenko and Sokolov, 2013) and Network traffic analysis, (Dua and Du, 2013). Challenges 
associated with employing time series methods to cyber security solutions are related to the 
representation of variables in a time series model. For example, a scenario that models a prediction 
function for network cyber-attacks would have to specify a prior representation for the event of a 




cyber-attack. This can be represented as the number of incoming packets to a network (Tartakovsky, 
Polunchenko and Sokolov, 2013) or as any detected anomaly in network traffic. The representation of 
the outcome variable is a major determinant of the performance of time series and prediction models 
(Enders, 2014).  
Furthermore, in developing causal models from linked events (Winskel, 2011) or networked graphs 
(Sofiyanti, Fitmawati and Roza, 2015), researchers use methods that integrate numerous formats of 
data from various sources. These sources act as predictor variables for a given explanatory variable. 
However, in the case of cyber security analytics or prediction, the time series model is limited to 
handling quantitative variables. Therefore, variables would have to be re-interpreted or transformed 
into quantities to fit into the model. 
A multivariate stochastic process is a k-dimensional vector process with a real-value function y: Z × 
Ω → R K such that, for each fixed t ∈ Z, y(t, ω) is a K–dimensional random vector. The realization is 
a sequence of vectors yt(ω),t ∈ Z, for a fixed ω. It is a function Z → R K. A multiple time series is 
assumed to be a finite portion of a realization. The underlying stochastic process is therefore called a 
data generation process (DGP). 
 
 
2.9.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Dependence is measured as any observed relationship, whether causal or not between tow random 
variables. Correlation is a form of dependence that measures the strength of the linear relationship 
between two random variables A and B. In correlation analysis, we estimate the correlation 
coefficient R between two variables which measures the strength of the relationship that exist between 
the two variables. Additionally, the correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1 which also indicates 
the direction of the linear association. The correlation between two variables can either be positive 
(above 0) or negative 9below 0). For example, a correlation coefficient of 0.98 indicates a strong 
positive relationship between the two variables while a correlation coefficient of -0.3 indicates a weak 
negative relationship. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient p (Pallant, 2009), requires the dependence 
between the two variables to be represented by a linear relationship. Given two random variables X 
and Y, the Pearson’s population correlation coefficient is given as: 




𝐸[(𝑋 − 𝜇𝑋)(𝑌 − 𝜇𝑌)]
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌
 
Equation 2-15: Pearson's Population Correlation Coefficient 
Where E is the expected value operator, 𝜎𝑋 and 𝜎𝑌 are the standard deviations of X and Y 
respectively, 𝜇𝑋 and 𝜇𝑌 are the expected means of X and Y, and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝑌) =  





variances 𝜎𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑌 of X and Y measures the variability or spread of the variable scores around the 
sample mean. The covariance is therefore a simultaneous measurement of the variability of (X, Y) 
pairs around the mean of X and the mean of Y. 
In addition to the Pearson’s correlation measure between two random variables, Charles Spearman 
provides a nonparametric measure of statistical dependence between rankings of two variables by 
describing how well two variables are related by using a monotonic function (Spearman, 1904). While 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is restricted to the assumption of a linear dependence between the 
two variables, the Spearman’s Rank Coefficient (Spearman, 1904) assess both linear and non-linear 
relationships between the two variables X and Y.  




For a given sample size N of two random variables X and Y, the N raw scores 𝑋𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖 are 
converted to ranks 𝑟𝑔𝑋𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑔𝑌𝑖 and the spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 𝑟𝑠  is computed as: 




Equation 2-16: Spearman's Ranked Correlation Coefficient 
Where 𝜌 is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient applied to the ranked variables, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑔𝑋, 𝑟𝑔𝑌) is the 
covariance of the ranked variables and 𝜎𝑟𝑔𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑟𝑔𝑌 are standard deviations of the ranked variables. 
The Spearman’s rank coefficient is usually defined as the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between 
two ranked variables. Additionally, the Spearman’s ranked correlation coefficient is shown to be less 
sensitive to non-normality in data (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012). 
Most correlation measures are not sensitive to the scale on which the variables are measured and are 
unaffected by any scaling transformation applied to the data. However, most correlation measures are 
sensitive to the manner in which samples are taken and the size of the sample. For example, 
correlation measures may show different results for a large biased sample collected from a certain part 
of the population as opposed to a small unbiased sample collected from a representative population. 
When measuring dependence between two random variables, it is important to consider the sampling 
population and the sample size (Engle and Yoo, 1987).  
 
2.9.3 Normality and Parametric Assumptions 
 
Many statistical tests such as regression, t-tests, analysis of variance and most parametric tests 
assumes normality of data observations i.e the population from which the sample data is drawn are 
normally distributed. Normality is the behaviour of data that is consistent with the normal behaviour 
of that population. For example, the changes in the prices of Apple stock prices are, under normal 
circumstances, expected to follow a long-term equilibrium around the mean at any given point in 
time. Consistent drifts from the long-rum equilibrium suggests that the trends in share prices are not 
stable. It has been shown in literature (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012) that when the assumptions of 
normality do not hold, it is difficult to draw accurate and reliable conclusions from the estimated 
parameters of analysis.  
Theoretically, for each mean and standard deviation combination, a normal distribution based on 
proportions can be determined. The percentile bell curve for a standard normal distribution is shown 
below. 





Figure 2-6: Bell Curve For Standard Distribution 
A percentile is a measure indicating a value below which a given percentage of observations within 
the sample data fail to meet certain conditions. For example, the 20
th
 percentile is the point at which 
20% of the observations within any given context of analysis, should fall. The graph above shows a 
normal distribution should have 68% of the data points should falling within 1 standard deviation of 
the mean or 95% of the data falling within 1 standard deviation of the mean or 99.5% of the data 
falling within 3 standard deviations of the mean. 
There are broadly 2 main methods for determining if a distribution is normal: a) Graphical/Visual 
methods b) Statistical testing methods. Although, visual inspections of statistical distributions as a 
basis for establishing normality have been proven to be unreliable, they are a good way of 
determining the distribution of data. There are several graphical methods for inspecting the 
distribution of a data: the frequency distribution (histogram), the stem-and-leaf plot, boxplots, 
cumulative frequency plots (P-P plots), quantile probability plots (Q-Q plots) and the standard bell 
curve. Visual representation of data simply shows the distribution of data in a sample but gives to 
formal justification for establishing normality.  
Statistical tests for normality are considered more reliable as they put a measure to the degree of 
normality in a sample data. The normality tests are usually supplementary to visual tests but are more 
precise since probabilities are calculated. The main tests for normality are Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
(Massey, 1951) , Shapiro-Wilk Test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965), Anderson-Darling Tests (Anderson 
and Darling, 1954), Anscombe-Glynn Test (Anscombe and Glynn, 1983), D’Argostino skewness test 
(D’Agostino and Pearson, 1973). The most commonly used tests in literature however are the 
Shapiro-Wilk tests, the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test and the Anderson-Darling test. Most tests for 
normality estimate the probability that the sample observations were drawn from a normal 
distribution. Theoretically, the tests are conducted to test the differences between two groups of 
observations to determine if the two data sets are from the same group. The hypothesis tests are set up 
as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐻1: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 




For small sample sizes, most normality tests are meaningless while for large sample sizes, significant 
results would be returned even in cases of moderate deviations from normality. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is an empirical distribution function in which the cumulative distribution function of the 
test distribution is compared to the empirical distribution of the data. The Shapiro-Wilk test is based 
on the correlation between the data and an assumed normal distribution score. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is criticized for being too sensitive to outliers (Chen and Liu, 1993) and proven to have a 
lower probability to reject false null hypothesis therefore increasing the probability of Type II errors.  
2.9.4 Parametric Assumptions and Data Transformations 
 
Both normality and stationarity are pre-requisite assumptions to various time series analysis 
techniques. Transformations for normality are performed when the data does not meet the 
assumptions of normality. There are three main ways to normalize data; a) Mean Normalization b) 
Logarithmic transformation and c) square-root transformations.  
2.9.5 Co-integration Analysis 
 
In time series analysis, there is often the assumption of a long-run relationship between a group of 
variables of interest. For example, analyst may suspect that the stock prices of apple (AAPL) may 
move together with the company's sales figures. The idea of co-integration is that there is a common 
stochastic trend between the pair of variables.  The aim of co-integration analysis is the detection and 
analysis of long-run relationships amongst a set of variables. Furthermore, co-integration analysis acts 
as a pre-requisite for validity of theoretical assumptions e.g causal relationships. 
Given a pair of time series processes 𝑥𝑡and 𝑦𝑡, both I(d) where d ≠ 0, if there exist some linear 
combination of 𝑥𝑡and 𝑦𝑡, for example, 𝑦𝑡 − 𝛽𝑥𝑡, that is I(0),  then 𝑥𝑡and 𝑦𝑡are co-integrated with 𝛽 as 
a scaling factor. A linear co-integrating relationship exist between two integrated time series xtand 
yt  if there is some form of long-term true relationship between xtand ytthat holds for all t ……. t-n. 
Here, it is theoretically acceptable for the time series to be non-stationary provided they are both I(d) 
where d ≠ 0 and I(d)x = I(d)y. In testing for co-integration between two variables, a linear least 
squared regression equation is constructed to derive estimates of the generated error term. If 
Xt & Yt are non-stationary and co-integrated, then some linear combination of the two-time series 
vectors must return stationary εt. That is:   
yt = α + βxt + εt 
Then; 
εt = α − βxt − yt 
Equation 2-17: Non-Stationary Co-integrated Time Vectors 
Where εtis stationary with μt ≈ 0and variance = σ
2.  A vector auto-regressive model is an n-equation, 
n-variable summarised representation of the complex dynamics of a multi-dimensional system 
(Granger, 1980; Enders, 2014).  
Given that most time vectors are often non-stationary, they require differencing or de-trending to be 
transformed to a stationary state. The problem with differencing or de-trending in co-integration 
analysis is the risk of removing long-run relevant information. One possible way of proceeding is to 
represent the models as error correction models (ECM). It has also been shown (Galenko et al., 2009) 
that if a set of variables are co-integrated, there exist some error correction representation of for the 




set of variables. An error correction model is a multi-variate time series analysis technique most used 
for data where the underlying variables have a long-run and short-run stochastic trend. The model 
propagates deviations from the long-run equilibrium to the short-run dynamics. Therefore, Error 
Correction models estimate the speed at which the response variable returns to equilibrium after a 
deviation caused by changes in the explanatory variables. The error correction representation has an 
added advantage as it preserves both long-run and short-run relationships.  
Sagan (1964) first recommended error correction models as a solution to the problem of spurious 
regressions put forward by Yule (1936) and Granger & Newbold (1974) in time series analysis. Given 
two integrated non-stationary time series, there may exist statistically significant relationship between 
the two variables although these variables may be unrelated. Research provide three main methods for 
testing for true co-integration in dynamic models. 
One of these methods is the Engle and Granger two-step approach. Engle and Granger (Engle et al., 
2017) recommend estimating the Error Correction Model in one step and estimating the vector error 
correction model in a later second step. The first step of the Engle-Granger approach is testing for 
non-stationarity in the time series of interest. The standard unit root testing and the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test (Cheung and La, 1995) determine if the series are stationary and if the errors are 
linearly correlated. Given two non-stationary time series vectors integrated order 'd', where d > 0, the 
Engle-Granger approach estimates the Error Correction Model as follows: 
 
𝐴(𝐿)∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝛾 + 𝐵(𝐿)∆𝑋𝑡 +  𝛼(𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1) + 𝜐𝑡 
Equation 2-18: Engle-Granger Error Correction Model 
 
The variables are co-integrated by the Engle Granger’s representation if this ECM can be produced 
with the two variables. If the regression as tested in step 1 of the two-step approach is not spurious, 
the second step is estimating the model using the ordinary least squares methods. The residuals from 
the prediction equation 𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 are propagated to a regression of the first order 
differences of the variables plus a lagged error term as follows: 
 
𝐴(𝐿)∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝛾 + 𝐵(𝐿)∆𝑋𝑡 +  𝛼 𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡 
Equation 2-19: Error Propagation in First-Order Differenced Lagged Time Vectors 
The Engle-Granger approach is limited as it allows for a single co-integrating relationship between a 
pair of variables.  
Another method provided for co-integration testing is the Johansen test which allows for testing co-
integrating relationships between more than a pair of variables. It is a procedure for testing co-
integration between several I(1) variables that permits more than one co-integrating relationship. 
There are two types of Johannsen's test for co-integration: with trace or he maximum eigen value. The 
trace method assumes that the number of co-integrating variables is less than the number of variables 
in the model. The trace tests the alternative hypothesis that the co-integrating rank r is at least {1 …. 
k}. Where k is the number of variables in the system and r is the co-integrating rank.  The maximum 
eigen value test is the same as the trace test except the threshold for selection of r is r+1 rather than r 
as with the trace tests. The Johansen's test is limited as it is only applicable to large samples where N 
is at least 100 as shown by (Johansen, 2000). 
 
The Phillips-Ouliaris co-integration test (Phillips and Ouliaris, 1990) show that applying unit-root 
tests to co-integrating residuals do not produce the expected distributions for the dickey-fuller test 
under the null of 'no co-integration'. Phillips and Ouliaris prove that due to plausible spurious 




regressions, the distributions of these tests are affected by the number of deterministic trend terms and 
the number of variables being tested for co-integration.  
Co-integration analysis is superior for testing long-term relationships between variables of interest 
which implies that co-integration techniques are optimized for large sample sizes. Although there are 
methods that allow for short-run analysis, studies have shown the limitations of such applications. 
 
2.9.5.1 Dimensional Co-Integration 
 
In view of the multi-dimensional cyberspace discussed in section 2.8.4, co-integration may occur 
within dimensions or between dimensions in cyberspace. The potential of this is referred to in this 
research as dimensional co-integration. Dimensional co-integration is formally defined as the 
identification of co-integrating vectors within or between data dimensions in cyberspace. Dimensional 
co-integration can occur within dimensions of which we refer to as ‘Inter-dimensional Co-integration” 
or between dimensions of which we refer to as “Intra-dimensional Co-integration”. 
 
2.9.5.1.1 Intra-Dimensional Co-integration 
 
Given a multi-dimensional dataspace Ω with time series vectors representative of incidents in 
cyberspace across various dimensions of cyber space 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕, if the co-integrating rank r for 
any pairs of variables across 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕  is greater than 1, we say these variables are intra-
dimensionally co-integrated. 𝒓Ω > 𝟏. 
2.9.5.1.2 Inter-Dimensional Co-integration 
 
Given a multi-dimensional dataspace Ω with time series vectors representative of incidents in 
cyberspace across various dimensions of cyber space 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕, if the co-integrating rank r for 
any pairs of variables within 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒁𝒕  is greater than 1, we say these variables are inter-
dimensionally co-integrated. 𝒓𝑿𝒀, 𝒓𝑿𝒁, 𝒓𝒀𝒁, 𝒓𝑿,𝒀,𝒁 > 𝟏 
2.9.6 Vector Auto-Regressive Models 
 
Non-linear methods highlight the limitations of linear assumption between series. This limitation 
necessitated the need A vector auto-regressive model (Sims, 1980) is a generalisation of the univariate 
autoregressive model for forecasting a collection of variables therefore providing a mechanism to 
quantitatively summarize the complex dynamics of events in cyberspace on a time spectrum. Vector 
auto-regressive models provide empirical evidence of the responses of variables to various exogenous 
impulses. As Baille (1979), Sims (1980), Toda & Yamomoto (1995) and others argue in early 
influential papers, vector autoregressive models provide a coherent and credible approach to capturing 
rich dynamics in multiple time series simultaneously. Additionally, feedback relationships (Granger, 
1980) are allowed for in VAR. 
A Vector Autoregressive model is an n-equation, n-variable representation where each variable is 
predicted by its own lagged values plus the current and past values of the remaining n-1 variables 
(Zivot and Wang, 2006; Luetkepohl, 2011). The VARs eliminates the assumptions of a one-
directional linear dependency between variables that exist within the conventional AR (p) models. For 
four variablesy1,y2,y3,y4, we construct a 4-variable, 4-equation VAR (1) model to represent the 
evolution of these four variables over a period of time as explained by their lagged values at 1 step 
into the past. 





y1t = c1 + A11y1,t−1 + A12y2,t−1 + A13y3,t−1 + A14y4,t−1 + t1 
y2t = c2 + A21y1,t−1 + A22y2,t−1 + A23y3,t−1 + A24y4,t−1 + t2 
𝑦3𝑡 = 𝑐3 + 𝐴31𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝐴32𝑦2,𝑡−1 + 𝐴33𝑦3,𝑡−1 + 𝐴34𝑦4,𝑡−1 + 𝑡3 
𝑦4𝑡 = 𝑐4 + 𝐴41𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝐴42𝑦2,𝑡−1 + 𝐴43𝑦3,𝑡−1 +  𝐴44𝑦4,𝑡−1 + 𝑡4 
Equation 2-20: 4-Variable 4Equation VAR(1) Model 
 








































Equation 2-21: Variable 4Equation VAR(1) Model, Matrix Representation 
Where y1, y2, y3, y4 are stationary time-dependent vectors with mean = 0 and variance = 𝜎
2. 
 
Vector auto-regressive models are used for structural analysis of multivariate time series where each 
variable is a linear function of past lags of other variables. The VAR generates forecasts for each 
variable in the system, equation by equation using the principle of least squares. The parameters for 
each variable are therefore estimated by minimizing the sum of squares. Vector auto-regressive 
models are a unique case of the general VARMA models presented by (Lütkepohl, 2004). VARMA 
models multivariate time series with a Vector auto-regressive structure along with corresponding 
moving averages. VAR models eliminate the limitations of a unidirectional relationship common to 
the generalized OLS time series models.  
Vector Autoregressive models often used in analysing the effects of structural shocks to a system are 
normally subject to a critical determination of the lag length of the model. Braun and Mittnik (1993) 
demonstrated the inconsistencies of VAR models whose specified lag lengths are different from the 
true lag length. Lütkepohl (1993) also indicates the association between lag lengths and the mean 
square errors and auto correlation between variables in the system. Information criteria are statistical 
methods for measuring the goodness of fit of a model that penalizes for complexities. Various 
information criteria differ in the form of penalties given to different models. Ivanov & Kilian (2005) 
demonstrate how the use of information criteria can be applied to the lag length selection of VAR 
models. The three main information criteria analysed were the Akaike Information criteria, the 
Bayesian Information Criteria and the Hannan-Quinn information criteria. 
 








Equation 2-22: Akaike Information Criteria (Akaike, 1989; Cavanaugh & Neath, 2014) 









Equation 2-23: Bayesian Information Criterion or Schwarz Criterion (Konishi & Kitagawa, 1996; 
German et al, 2014) 
  












Equation 2-24: Hannan-Quinn criterion (Aznar & Salvador, 2002) 
 
Although recently, the techniques of structural vector autoregressive models have been used for 
predictions in random processes such as stock prices Kuo (2016) predictions and crude-oil prices 
Zhao et al (2015), macro-economic variables Ayadin & Cavdar (2015), its methods remain limited in 
application in the area of cyber defence. In the context of a multi-dimensional cyberspace, VARs may 
be applicable to developing a structural approach for representing data from the multi-dimensions of 
cyberspace. VARs are equally efficient for performing impact-response analysis as a method for 
identifying cause and effects between variables of interest. This method has been extensively used in 
the financial sector as in Silignakis (2011), Olson (2014), Jin & An (2015) and have proven to 
accurately capture the stochastic dynamics in financial markets to a certain degree of certainty.  
It also important to understand the challenges that the application of Vector Autoregressive models 
poses in cyber defence. Data relevant to the prediction of cyber incidents are deposited in various file 
formats in cyberspace. The VAR model expects as input, stationary time-dependent numeric vectors 
(Zivot and Wang, 2006). The numeric quantification of the various types of formatted data in 
cyberspace so that the context of information contained is retained constitutes a challenge to 
multivariate analysis of data across cyberspace, for example, the measure of ‘cyber negativity’ or 
‘cyber positivity’ of a sentence or the representation of the details of a cyber-relevant video or image. 
Methods of transforming cyber data have been concentrated in the areas of natural language 
processing and analysis of text formatted data (Pang and Lee, 2008; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; 
Haddi, Liu and Shi, 2013). The techniques described by these researchers are fundamentally 
dependent on the presence of a prior human or computer-generated lexicon (O’Connor et al., 2010; 
Tang et al., 2014) and quantifications are limited to the existing classification of specific words in the 
lexicon. 
Several criticisms of the VAR approach to analysis of multi-dimensional data centre on the relative 
capacity of the model to handle high-dimensional data  (Benanke et al, 2005). The restrictions on the 
amount of variable to include in a single VAR model may lead firstly, to sacrificing information 
included to only a selected few, therefore relationships are only captured for variables included in the 
VAR.  
2.9.7 Vector Error Correction Models 
 
The VAR framework is suited to variables that are stationary in the levels i.e. I (0) VARIABLES. If 
the series are not stationary in the levels, then the framework needs to be modified for consistent 
estimation of the relationships among series. The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is a case of 
VARs for variables that are stationary in the differences i.e. (I (D) where D ≠ 0. In a system of 
multiple evolving I (0) variables, there may exist several independent co-integrating vectors in which 
linear combinations of these variables are co-integrating. An alternative terminology for the Vector 
Error Correction Model is the Co-integrated VAR model. The use of co-integration in the Vector 
Auto regressive framework, consider a data generation process with a K-dimensional VAR (p) 
process without deterministic trend terms. If the set of K-dimensional variable are I (1), the OLS 
regression analysis becomes invalid. However, there may be one or more equilibrium relationships in 
which the co-integrating rank of the K-dimensional vector r, can be estimated. Theoretically, VECMs 
are representations of co-integrated VAR by Granger's Representation theorem (Luetkepohl, 2011). 
The VECMs studies how deviations from the long-rum equilibrium are corrected. The Vector Error 




Correction Model restricts the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their 
long-run equilibrium relationships while allowing for short-run dynamics. This is achieved by 
including an Error Correction Mechanism in the model to correct a proportion of disequilibrium from 
one period to the next (Engle et al., 2017). The Error Correction mechanism is usually incorporated 
into VAR in the differences (Hyndman and Koehler, 2006) which further evolves into the Vector 
Error Correction Model. Given the standard VAR representation: 
 
𝑌1,𝑡 = 𝛽10 + 𝛽11𝑌1,𝑡−1 + 𝛼11𝑌2,𝑡−1 + 1,𝑡 
𝑌2,𝑡 = 𝛽20 + 𝛽21𝑌2,𝑡−1 + 𝛼21𝑌2,𝑡−1 + 2,𝑡 
Equation 2-25: VECM In the Differences 
 




 𝛾𝑌2,𝑡−1]. Provided that 𝑌1,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌2,𝑡 are co-integrated with  𝛾 as the co-integrating coefficient, 
[𝑌1,𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑌2,𝑡−1] will be stationary with mean = 0 and variance = 𝜎
2.  The longrun relationship 
between the two variables is therefore defined by 𝛾. 𝛽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽2 are called the error correction 
coefficients and measures the proportion of last period’s disequilibrium that should be corrected in the 
next period.  
 
2.9.8 Text Quantification Techniques 
 
This section describes theories supporting the text mining techniques as used in research to deal with 
text data. Text mining involves the application of techniques from areas such as information 
extraction, natural language processing, and information retrieval to quantitatively analyse text data 
(Jason, 2007). Text data is usually a sequence of unstructured data called documents such that useful 
information is hidden within a lot of useless information in context. Many text mining techniques 
have been applied in contemporary research areas such as economics and finance. This research 
attempts to complement the works of (Tsai and Chan, 2007; Hernández et al., 2016; Lippmann et al., 
2016) in applying these text mining techniques to areas of cyber research. Particularly, this research 
curates a number of these techniques with an emphasis on methods for quantifying text data for 
further numerical analysis. The following sections presents literature on various methods for text 
quantification. 
 
2.9.8.1 Frequency and dictionary-based techniques 
 
In contrast to complex quantitative methods found in contemporary research, (Blumenstock, 2008) 
has shown that a simply metric, the number of words in a text corpus is a reliable measure of 
information quality. (Blumenstock, 2008) shows that a simple measure of “text length” performs 
better in classifying featured articles versus random articles on Wikipedia. The word count is a 
derivative of the popular bag-of-words model an information retrieval technique used in natural 
language processing. The bag-of-words model is sometimes called the vector space model. This 
technique represents text data, such as a sentence or a document as a multiset of its words, with no 
reference to grammar, context or similarity. Simple derivatives of the bag-of-words model such as 
word frequency algorithm show the number of words in a document or text. In contrast to complex 




quantitative methods found in contemporary research, (Blumenstock, 2008) has shown that a simply 
metric, the number of words in a text corpus is a reliable measure of information quality. 
 
2.9.8.2 Opinion mining (Sentiment) 
 
In the last 3 decades, quantifying “how people feel” has become a new trend in an era of free and 
open source information. Opinion mining refers to techniques used to systematically identify, extract 
and quantify affective states and subjective information from what people say. Sentiment analysis 
seeks to extract ‘opinions” from human-generated text. This techniques adds to a body of research 
focused on processing and analysing information generated on the social dimension of cyberspace 
(Wilson, Wiebe and Hoffmann, 2005; Pang and Lee, 2006). Previous methods of obtaining such 
information relied heavily on questionnaires, surveys and interviews which bear the risk of 
inaccuracy. However, with the dawn of social platforms, information informally and willingly 
generated by users tend to capture deeper feelings as would be captured by traditional survey 
methods. An opinionated sentence is a sentence that expresses explicit or implicit positive or negative 
opinions. Quantitative measures of opinion include subjectivity, polarity, and sentiment. The 
sentiment of a text measures the degree or strength of its negativity or positivity as measured by its 
orientation (Pang and Lee, 2006).  
Furthermore, (Sproat, 2000) defines sentiment as the underlying felling, attitude or emotion associated 
with an opinion. This definition provides four main components of an opinion: the opinion holder, the 
opinion target, the sentiment of the opinion and the time of the opinion   
The basic task of most sentiment analysis is polarity classification or quantification. Sentiment 
analysis seeks to assign a value to a given text corpus measuring the degree of negativity, positivity or 
neutrality of the text corpus. A document’s orientation or polarity is a measure of whether a subjective 
text expresses a positive or a negative bias on its subject matter. Subjectivity refers to deciding 
whether a text as a factual nature in terms of accurately describing a given situation without 
expressing bias (Lui, 2015).  
   
2.9.8.3 Entropy   
 
Considering the information revolution, information represents one of the most important resources of 
human and societal development. Information and entropy characterize a system from the point of 
view of both order and uncertainty, in as such that if information measures truth and certainty, entropy 
measures chaos and uncertainty. Formally, information entropy is the sum of the negative logarithm 
of the probability mass function of each data value in a piece of information. Information entropy can 
also be seen as a measure of information randomness and uncertainty of truth in a piece of 
information or simple the quantitative measure of disorder in a system. There are three variants of 
entropy in the present day: in thermodynamics according to Clausius, in molecular systems as a 
measure of disorder, randomness or uniformity and in the theory of information according to Shannon 
(Claude E Shannon, 1948) as a numerical measure of credibility or truth of information transmitted 
through an information channel. Although these three variants of entropy have become important in 
their various fields, Shannon’s theory of communication has been most applied in areas if information 
sciences and text mining (Berger, Pietra and Pietra, 1996; Nigam, Lafferty and Mccallum, 1999; 
Scholz and Conrad, 2013; David and Thomas, 2015).  
In many information science tasks, the subject of study is a given language text with which a 
mathematical model for analysing the text must be formed. According to Shannon (Claude E 




Shannon, 1948), this model is built to preserve the sum of truth and uncertainty, thereby creating a 
model of text perfection. Shannon (Claude E Shannon, 1948) provides a mathematical formula for 
defining the entropy of a text: 
 




Equation 2-26: Shannon's Entropy 
Where 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of detecting any system unit in their multitude ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 1, 𝑝𝑖  ≥ 0, 𝑖 =
1,2,3. . 𝑁 
 
2.9.8.4 Emotion Detection 
 
Despite the wide applications of sentiment analysis in modern text mining, none of its methods 
supports the recognition of various emotions from the given opinion expressed in text format. Given 
some basic text, emotion recognition tasks seek to detect what emotions the writer expresses in the 
opinion of the text. In order to achieve this goal, emotion recognition algorithms create a basis for text 
labelling and classification based on certain expressions present in the text. Therefore, emotion 
detection from text may be seen as a multi-class classification problem, to which multiple algorithms 
are available in research. In the area of emotion classification, there are three main body of works 
currently popular in research: Profile of Mood States (Norcross, Guadagnoli and Prochaska, 1984), 
Paul Ekman’s six-dimensional classification (Ekman, 1992) and Robert Plutchniks eight-dimensional 
pairwise emotion classification (Plutchik, 1982).   
POMS is a psychological instrument that defines a six-dimensional mood state representation 
(Norcross, Guadagnoli and Prochaska, 1984). Profile of Mood States (POMS) defines 65 adjectives 
rated by the opinion expressed on a five-point ranking scale. Each adjective contributes to one of the 
six categories. For example, feeling tired will positively contribute to the fatigue category. The higher 
the five-point rank for the adjective, the more it contributes to the overall score for its category. 
POMS combine these ratings into a six-dimensional mood state representation consisting of 
categories: anger, depression, fatigue, vigour, tension and confusion. Each dimension is therefore 
characterised by the presence of a set of emotional adjectives and each individual feeling is accessed 
by the intensity of the opinion expressed.   
Pluchnik’s wheel of emotions research shows that there is a total of 34,000 unique emotions that can 
be used to access various intensities of human feelings. However, these 34,000 emotions were 
reduced to only 8 primary emotion dimensions: anger, fear, anticipation, surprise, joy, sadness, trust 
and disgust. Robert Plutchnik extends Ekman’s classification and defines a wheel like diagram with a 
set of eight basic, pairwise contrasting emotions: joy and sadness, trust and disgust, fear and anger, 
surprise and anticipation.  
 





Figure 2-7: Pluctchik's Wheel Of Emotion Classification 
Colneric & Demsar (Colneric and Demsar, 2018) approach the problem of emotion detection with by 
combining the concepts trained recurrent neural networks to labelled data of 73 billion tweets based 
on Plutchnik’s eight dimensions of emotions and Ekman’s six-dimensional classifications of emotions 
to predict emotions from text. Trained recurrent neural network are a set of popular sequence models 
usually employed in natural language processing tasks. In traditional neural networks, it is assumed 
that all inputs and outputs are independent of each other (Bishop, 2006). For example, it is assumed 
that the previous word in a sentence is independent of the next word in the sentence. RNNs are 
recurrent because they perform the same function for every element of a sequence, with the output 
being dependent on the previous computations in the sequence. Previous studies in emotion detection 
and classification were based on Profile of Mood States (POMS). Plutchnik’s classification is an 
expansion of the POMS six-dimensional mood state and the Ekman’s six-dimensional emotions.   
Researchers have criticized RNNs as being difficult to train and do not yield reliable results when 
applied to new data in a new linguistic context. Additionally, RNNs are limited in their ability to look 
back in the sequence beyond a few steps backwards.  
 
2.9.8.5 Lexical Analysis (Context Relatedness) 
 
Context relatedness measures a text’s similarity to a given context of analytical interest. For example, 
calculating how similar a text is to cyber-related activities requires measuring the amount of words in 
the text that are related to cyber activities. This technique is following a dictionary method which 
operates on a document-matrix DM derived from the text document. There are two main steps 
involved in matching a given text to a context of analytical interest. The first step defines a list of 
keywords or words that capture the context of interest. For example, let a dictionary for ‘flu-related’ 




complaints be DM = {vomit, ache, pain, sneeze, cold, fatigue}. One could then represent the context 
relatedness (as it relates to a flu incident) of each document in D as: #vomit + #ache + #pain + 
#sneeze + #cold + #fatigue. The second step represents each document in terms of the normalized 
frequency of words in the dictionary. The normalization step is necessary as it considers the amount 
of information generated within the context of analysis. I.e. the ratio of context related words to the 
amount of words used in document. Similar methods have been applied in natural language 
processing tasks such as emotion detection (Calefato, Lanubile and Novielli, 2017) where specific 
adjectives are rated by subject. The presence and intensity of certain adjectives in the given text 
simply classifies the text under related subjects. These methods are only as effective as the wordlist of 
adjectives used in the classification task. Wordlists that are not robust enough may lead to under 
performance of classification model while wordlists that are too robust may lead to models that 
misclassify texts.  
The goal of building a lexicon is to extract a set of terms that capture the context of lingual analytical 
interest. From an existing sample of ‘domain-related’ texts, we hope to extract a set of terms that are 
seen to appear frequently and have higher degree of importance in these texts. Typically, when 
building domain-specific lexicons, two design approaches are considered and most often combined: 
selecting and categorising terms within some predefined categories (Kipper et al., 2006; Society, 
2016) and weighting terms based on the domain of analysis (Baccianella, Esuli and Sebastiani, 2010) 
and usefulness of terms in a document corpus to the topic of interest (Jurafsky and Martin, 2017).  
The first step in most lexical creation tasks is the candidate terms generation. This step involves 
creating a wordlist or dictionary of terms that are known to appear frequently in discussions of 
interest. Keyword-based extraction of terms is most common in this step and has been instrumental to 
creating traditional lexicons (Ntoulas, Pzerfos and Cho, 2005; Olteanu et al., 2014) for natural 
language and information retrieval tasks such as sentiment analysis (Baccianella, Esuli and Sebastiani, 
2010). For example, (Nielsen, 2011) creates a wordlist of positive and negative words for ranking text 
documents on a scaled range of -1 to 1 (-1 indicating a strongly negative text document and +1 
indicating a strongly positive text document). (Allahyari et al., 2017) applies a similar simplistic 
approach to a multi-class text classification task. Similarly, (Rose et al., 2010) keyword-based 
approach provides context to the terms used for lexical analysis by creating a network of lexical-
semantic relations between words in a document corpus where the meaning of each term in the 
lexicon is defined only within the context of its relationship with other terms.  
Simple keyword-based candidate term selection approach is further extended to include methods for 
term scoring. For each term that makes it into the candidate set, scoring techniques evaluate the 
relative importance of that term in relation to other terms in the candidate set (Kaji and Kitsuregawa, 
2007) or to a set of pre-defined domain context terms. For example, quantifying the relationship 
between the terms ‘vulnerability’ and ‘malware’ in a document set. Popularly in research, terms are 
numerically scored by two main techniques: frequency-based scoring techniques (Blumenstock, 2008; 
Rose et al., 2010; Zhang, Jin and Zhou, 2010)  and  scores based on associative dependence (Debole 
and Sebastiani, 2003), (Khan, Qamar and Bashir, 2016), (Jurafsky and Martin, 2017). 
However, since term scoring is based on semantic relationships between words in a text document 
(independent of any externally perceived meanings), most of these techniques are highly sensitive to 
the domain of analysis and the sentence in which they occur. For example, consider these two phrases 
that belong to the same text corpora taken from two different sub-reddits0: ‘MySQL Database 
developer needed urgently for a 2-month project in Belfast.’ and ‘New MySQL database vulnerability 




found on Windows operating system. Yet again!!’ Assuming a single domain of analysis, the term 
‘database’ in the midst of other domain-related terms such as: [‘vulnerability’], [‘operation’ and 
‘system’], [‘MySql’], should have a higher-ranking score than the same word in the previous phrase. 
In this thesis, we aim to develop a generalizable lexicon that can be applied on most social platforms 
to automatically detect cyber-related messages using a standard set of discussions in various cyber-
related online contexts. Our data is representative of these cyber-related contexts and characterize the 
occurrence of cyber discussions on a variety of social platform types. 
 LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 2.10
 
The literature above covers studies in cyberspace characterization, the cyber-attack kill-chain, time 
signal analysis and inter-connectedness on cyberspace. The literature reveals a gap in the availability 
of an integrated approach to simultaneous multi-dimensional analysis of analysis of events that may 
be linked to cyber-attacks. Most scholars have focused on a mono-dimension analysis or incorporated 
evidence has been limited to the network layer of the physical dimension. Some researchers (Ning et 
al., 2015), have hinted the existence of inter-connected relationships between events in cyberspace 
while other researchers (Gandhi et al., 2011a), have put forward arguments for a cultural, political and 
economic dimension to cyber-attacks. These ideas have always been treated as individual approaches 
to developing sustainable proactive cyber defence strategies. Literature also identifies a gap in the 
type of proactive defence strategies being implemented in industry. It shows that most of these so-
called proactive approaches are implemented after the fact i.e. optimized to deal with defending and 
mitigating against cyber-attacks. The is a glaring lack of methods that help put defenders ahead of 
their adversaries. To this end, this research seeks to implement a framework that integrates these 
multiple approaches with the aim of developing a multi-dimensional framework capable of 
simultaneously analysing various events in cyberspace.  
  




3 CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIZED MODEL AND APPROACH AND THE THEORETICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTANGLED CYBERSPACE 
 INTRODUCTION 3.1
This chapter gives an account of the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this research. It starts 
by briefly discussing the relevance of theory to information systems (IS) research. This chapter 
critically discusses how the entangled cyberspace framework is developed using a combination of 
existing theories discussed in the literature. Thus, it addresses how the existing theories/models are 
used to ground the entangled cyberspace framework. The entangled cyberspace is based on three 
theoretical foundations: (a) A multi-dimensional cyberspace which is a translation of a perceived 
characterization of cyberspace (United States: US Army, 2010; Klimburg, 2011; Barnett, Smith and 
Whittington, 2014), (b) the cyber-attack kill-chain for conceptualizing activities involved in the 
propagation of cyber-attacks (Hutchins, 2011; Yadav and Rao, 2015) and (c) Vector autoregressive 
models for multiple time-based event analysis (Sims, 1980; Luetkepohl, 2011).  
Furthermore, this chapter gives a clear account of how the combination of these models converges to 
address the issues the entangled cyberspace framework attempts to solve in the area of proactive cyber 
defence. The framework is an integration of strategic and operational concepts in alignment with the 
capacity for technical analysis. Additionally, the hypothesis to be tested with the experimental data is 
also critically discussed. In conclusion, this chapter delivers a critical analysis of how the existing 
frameworks and models come together to deliver the research objectives.  
Following a critical review of contemporary literature in subject areas of interest, this section 
develops the theoretical framework as a foundation on which the concepts put forward in this research 
are tested and evaluated.  
The overview of the literature review produces the following conceptual points underpinning this 
research: 
i. The various characteristic uses of cyberspace creates a stratification of cyberspace based on 
the roles individual components of cyberspace play in modern existence. 
ii. These divisions create a multi-dimensional cyberspace, with each dimension acting 
independently as well as part of a whole. 
iii. Cyber-attacks are orchestrated following the phases of the traditional kill-chain model 
developed by Lockheed Martin (Hutchins, 2011). 
iv. The phases in the kill-chain may vary or evolve for different scenarios of cyber-attacks 
(Konikoff, Harris and Petersen, 2013; Yadav and Rao, 2015). 
v. There are indicators of various phases of the kill-chain beyond the physical dimension of 
cyberspace (Ning et al., 2015). 
vi. Events that characterise various phases of the kill-chain occur across multiple dimensions of 
cyberspace (Clark, 2010; Klimburg, 2011). 
vii. Finally, the inter-dependence between these events characterise the nature of entanglements 
in cyberspace. 
 
The current state of interdependence consolidates the argument in favour of a proactive approach to 
effectively capture the nature and usefulness of such inter-related network of events. Therefore, the 
finding from the literature review demands the formulation of a new model or system that would 




complement existing reactive and defensive approaches to keep defenders ahead in the game. This is 
where the entangled cyberspace fits in, where its purpose within the proposed context is as follows: 
 
i. The Entangled Cyberspace will integrate data across multiple dimensions of cyberspace. 
ii. The Entangled Cyberspace will use structural multivariate analytic techniques to provide real-
time analysis of the interconnectedness between these dimensions of cyberspace. 
iii. The Entangled Cyberspace will provide early warning indicators of a given type of cyber-
incident. 
iv. The Entangled Cyberspace will provide indicators of cyber-kill chain events present across 
the various dimensions of cyberspace. 
v. The Entangled Cyberspace will provide useful active intelligence for noticing early signs of 
cyber-incidents. 
 
The sole purpose of the entangled cyberspace framework is to capture the nature of entanglements in 
cyberspace in such a way that it pre-empts cyber-incidents. The cutting-edge aspect of the entangled 
cyberspace would be the dynamic structural causal analysis of events across multiple dimensions of 
cyberspace. The tasks above highlight the role of integration, analysis and intelligence of multiple 




Figure 3-1: Compact Conceptual TECS Framework 
 
This research has argued that the roles of integration and intelligence are extremely crucial for the 
creation of the entangled cyberspace (TECS) model, which needs to be continually updated with new 
evidence from events in cyberspace that are predictive of subsequent stages of the kill-chain. The 
availability of real-time information will form the basis for dynamic testing and selection of predictive 
features. Unfortunately, there is little literature covering any specific methods for dynamic selection 
of features in a cross-dimensional, multi-phased structural model. Hahn, Thomas, Lozano and 
Cardenas (Hahn et al., 2015) went as far as providing a multi-layered framework for analysing the 
kill-chain in cyber-physical systems. The framework incorporates two main elements:  
a) A logical system reference architecture that expresses the architectural composition 
of multi-layered cyber systems, 
b) A multi-layered kill-chain for analysing attacks and threats in multi-dimensional 
domains.  
Thus, the success of the above combination framework prompted this study to rely on features that co-
integrate on a cross-dimensional domain in the context of a cyber-attack execution. This research also 




employs some cyber forensic techniques, which de-constructs cyber incidents with the aim of 
understanding the kill-chain, identifying attackers, attackers’ motives, means and tactic. Altogether, 
the literature prompted this study to believe that cyber defenders should direct their intelligence 
operations towards predictive operations and gathering information that keeps them one step ahead of 
the attackers. 
The entangled cyberspace refers to a seamless integration of multiple sources of evidence across the 
various dimensions of cyberspace, which characterises the different phases of the cyber-kill-chain on 
a time spectrum. 
The implementation of the entangled cyberspace framework requires multiple sources of evidence be 
integrated and tested in a structural model. To achieve this, dimensional data observations collected 
across the dimensions of cyberspace are structurally represented in a VAR/VECM model. Data 
observations are assumed to measure activities that characterize different phases of the kill-chain. The 
phases included in each entangled cyberspace model are dependent on the cyber-attack scenario under 
consideration. Although the model is built around a generic cyber-attack kill chain (Hutchins, 2011), 
different variations of the model may exist as variations in cyber-attack phases affects the evolution of 
TECS. The entangled cyberspace assumes a linear dependence between identified features in a multi-
dimensional cyberspace. The identified features are further assumed to be predictive of the event of a 
cyber-attack on the network layer of cyberspace. 
 MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE IN 3.2
CYBERSPACE 
 
In this section, the researcher proposes a complex structural approach to identifying sources of 
evidence from a multi-dimensional cyberspace for proactive cyber defence. To do this, the researcher 
characterises cyberspace based on the multi-dimensional framework discussed in this research and 
considers data generated from these dimensions as information sources for proactive cyber defence 
models. The rationale behind this approach arises from the need for a multi-dimensional perspective 
to cyber defence techniques. Moreover, the integration of multiple sources of information into a single 
model provides a means to study the complex dynamics of events and the nature of entanglements 
across the various layers of cyberspace.  
 
3.2.1 Data from The Social Dimension 
 
The social dimension is a complex interactive structure made up of individuals, organisations and 
entities connected by one or more specific types of inter-dependencies such as friendships, interests, 
likes, dislikes, relationships, political, economic and religious affiliations, relationships of beliefs, 
kinships, etc. Widely accessible and open source social technologies are increasingly being used by 
humans to document thoughts, perceptions, opinions and beliefs about real-world events in real-time. 
Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are a rich source of data for proactively countering 
cyber-attacks. For example, to encourage online user privacy awareness, (Debatin et al., 2009) uses 
Facebook data to measure users’ online exposure to vulnerabilities by studying users’ ritualisation, 
routines, gossips, rumours, this study could examine the relationship of Facebook privacy issues with 
invasion of privacy. Boub-Harb (Bou-Harb, Debbabi and Assi, 2015) also crawled cyber-crime 
related messages from Twitter and context-related blog articles to identify notorious hacker groups 
and their related twitter feeds, blogs and blog activities. 
Additionally, (Lippmann et al., 2016) also apply machine learning techniques to cyber-related 
discussions form social platforms such as Reddit, stack exchange and Twitter to automatically 




identify malicious discussions online. Similarly, Burnap, (Burnap and Williams, 2016) applies similar 
machine learning techniques to Twitter data to automatically identify hateful text directed at minority 
groups online. Hernández  (Hernández et al., 2016) employs user sentiment analysis on a daily 
collection of tweets in two different contexts; Twitter as a platform for expression of user views and 
Twitter as a platform to present content related defence threats on the web. Statistical analysis of these 
data is used to predict the possibility of a future attack. 
Data on the social layer of cyberspace exist as a series of interconnected events that captures the real-
world personas as well as the cyber personas of online users. Consequently, data and information 
from social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and other micro-blogging platforms that allow 
users to freely share views, perceptions, and opinions about related matters, feeds into cyber-attack 
counter models. One distinct advantage of using data from the social layer is the free and open 
accessibility it provides. However, many researchers have identified data from social platforms as 




3.2.2 Data from The Physical Dimension 
 
The physical dimension is a bit less complex than the social layer but acts as a gateway to all cyber-
attacks as over 90% of all cyber-attacks eventually takes place on the network layer of cyberspace. 
Data analysis on the physical dimension, most notably the network layer seems to have dominated 
literature in the past decade. Various types of data that are extracted from the network layer of 
cyberspace have extensive coverage in literature. Time series models are commonly applied to 
network traffic data to predict network flow (Barford et al., 2002; Kim and Reddy, 2008), to spot 
denial of service attacks (Kim and Reddy, 2008), in building intrusion detection systems (García-
Teodoro et al., 2009) and classifying network traffic packets (Mahoney, 2003a). Moreover, log data is 
another source of data for proactive cyber defence models to network traffic flow data. For example, 
probabilistic latent semantic analysis (Tsai and Chan, 2007) detects cyber defence threats in weblog 
data files. End-user behaviour can also be inferred using event logs for evidence gathering (Singh and 
Roy, 2010) and anomaly detection techniques (Patcha and Park, 2007). 
Similarly, the use of classification and correlation (Gabra, 2014) techniques on IDS alert logs support 
cyber forensics and real-time cyber threat assessments. Consequently, data and information from 
sensors such as the Internet of things (Atzori et al., 2012)  also fall within the physical layer of 
cyberspace. Data on the physical layer may also include some real-world attributes, e.g., weather data, 
GPS tracking data and some traffic data to trace events such as cyber terrorism or cyber activism 
(Whiting et al., 2015). 
Unlike the social layer, one major disadvantage of using data on the physical layer is accessibility. 
Consequently, attempts to perform analysis on this layer has always been restricted to context analysis 
with limited possibilities of generalisation and extension (Baggili and Breitinger, 2015). 
 
3.2.3 Data from The Economic Dimension 
 
The complexity and the interconnectedness of real-world events and cyber events uniquely 
characterize the economic dimension. Similarly, time series models are also equally applied to stock 
market data as generated in real-time. Although there is little research on the effects of stock market 




prices on cyber defence events, research has covered the integration of stock market data with data 
from other layers of cyberspace (Bollen and Mao, 2011). 
Sufficient evidence supports the extraction of cyber threat intelligence from a systematic analysis of 
unstructured open source information, e.g., text/news articles (Tsai and Chan, 2007). Similarly, 
studying past social events in news media and publications reveal factors in the social and cultural 
dimensions that act as antecedents to cyber-attacks (Whiting et al., 2015). The usefulness of financial 
prediction markets in information defence risk management is another example this concept with 
methods such as (Pandey and Snekkenes, 2014) suggests. This research uses this dimension to 
practically demonstrate claims made by (Gandhi et al., 2011a) of a link between cyber-events and 
political, cultural, and socio-economic events. 
Data representation is the transformation of real-world experiences and perceptions into a 
computational domain that should provide useful information. Data integration is the unique problem 
of combining data from different sources on a common attribute in such a way that it retains valuable 
information from these various sources. The integration method uses a vector auto-regressive 
structural framework for analysing the evolution of multiple time series simultaneously. 
 
Figure 3-2: First Conceptual Framework for the Entangled Cyberspace (Source: Author) 
 
 
 IMPLEMENTATION OF ENTANGLED CYBERSPACE THEORY 3.3
 
Following the theoretical development of the entangled cyberspace theory, this section presents the 
techniques, methods and models for a practical implementation of the developed concepts. This 
section presents the structural models with which evidence from the various dimensions of cyberspace 




would be fitted and evaluated. The researcher constructs a vector autoregressive model for each 
identified dimension of cyberspace and presents the hypotheses for testing the theories within the 
developed structural models.  
Given a multi-dimensional cyberspace with J identified dimensions (in this study the researcher uses a 
3-dimensional cyberspace, J=3), we represent information from these dimensions as Ω1 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ Ω𝑗 
and construct a basic VAR model for each dimension as:  
 
 
The physical Dimension 






x1 = gx,11x1,t−1 +⋯+ … + gx,1nxn,t−1 + εx,1t




xn = gx,n1x1,t−1 +⋯+⋯+ gx,nnxn,t−1 + εx,nt
 
Equation 3-1: VAR(p) Representation of the Physical Dimension 
 
The Social Dimension 






𝐲𝟏 = 𝐠𝐲,𝟏𝟏𝐲𝟏,𝐭−𝟏 +⋯+ … + 𝐠𝐲,𝟏𝐧𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛆𝐲,𝟏𝐭




𝐲𝐧 = 𝐠𝐲,𝐧𝟏𝐲𝟏,𝐭−𝟏 +⋯+⋯+ 𝐠𝐲,𝐧𝐧𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛆𝐲,𝐧𝐭
 
Equation 3-2: VAR(p) Representation of the Social Dimension 
 
The Economic Dimension 






𝐳𝟏 = 𝐠𝐳,𝟏𝟏𝐳𝟏,𝐭−𝟏 +⋯+ … + 𝐠𝐳,𝟏𝐧𝐳𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛆𝐳,𝟏𝐭




𝐳𝐧 = 𝐠𝐳,𝐧𝟏𝐳𝟏,𝐭−𝟏 +⋯+⋯+ 𝐠𝐳,𝐧𝐧𝐳𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛆𝐳,𝐧𝐭
 
Equation 3-3: VAR(p) Representation of the Economic Dimension 
 
Where 𝑿𝒕 refers to a set of time series observations from the physical dimension, 𝒀𝒕 represents a set 
of time series observations from the social dimension and 𝒁𝒕 represents a set of time series 




















































































) are matrices of auto-regression 



















) are matrices accumulating the 
corresponding residuals which are uncorrelated through time. 
The equations above are a representation of the first theoretical model presented in Figure 3-2. The 
first hypothesis seeks to establish a link between sources of evidence within each dimension. 
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis One 
 
Given a set of multi-variate time series, observations of a set of variables representative of events on 
the physical, social or economic dimension of cyberspace, Xt, Yt and Zt, the inter-dimensional co-
integrating rank of all Xt, Yt and Zt is greater than or equal to 1. i.e. r >= 1. 
 
To extend the basic conceptual framework, the researcher integrates two independent frameworks: the 
traditional kill-chain model (Hutchins, 2011) and the multi-dimensional cyberspace (Clark, 2010). 




Equation 3-4: Phased Representation of the Cyber-Attack Kill-Chain 
 
The events at each stage of the kill-chain are hypothesized to occur on different dimensions of 
cyberspace. For example, a port or vulnerability scan of a target network is spotted on the network 
layer – the physical dimension of cyberspace. Therefore, with cyber-attack events occurring across a 
multi-dimensional cyberspace with J=3 dimensions, the researcher hypothesizes a multi-dimensional 
kill-chain that occurs across the various dimensions of cyberspace. Therefore, we can produce a cross-
dimensional multi-phased cyber kill-chain model as a multi-dimensional matrix of data vectors as 
follows: 
 
 Antecedents Recon Weaponize Delivery Exploit Install C&C Action 
Physical 
Dimension 
𝐾1𝐽1 𝐾2𝐽1 𝐾3𝐽1 𝐾4𝐽1 𝐾5𝐽1 𝐾6𝐽1 𝐾7𝐽1 𝐾8𝐽1 
Social 
Dimension 
𝐾1𝐽2 𝐾2𝐽2 𝐾3𝐽2 𝐾4𝐽2 𝐾5𝐽2 𝐾6𝐽2 𝐾7𝐽2 𝐾8𝐽2 
Economic 
Dimension 
𝐾1𝐽3 𝐾2𝐽3 𝐾3𝐽3 𝐾4𝐽3 𝐾5𝐽3 𝐾6𝐽3 𝐾7𝐽3 𝐾8𝐽3 




































Where 𝐾1𝐽1 is a structural representation of multi-variate time series vectors, predictive of the 
antecedents to said cyber-attack on the physical dimension. 




This research puts forward that events at each stage of the kill-chain can be characterized across the 
information space. The cross-dimensional matrix shown in table 3-1 above is a representation of the 
various possible dimension-phase combinations of the theorized approach. The matrix is a 
decomposition of the various phases of a hypothetical kill-chain. Each kill-chain must be put in 
context and sources of evidence identified accordingly across the information. Every cell in the 
corresponding matrix is a possible path identifying the evidence sources for events that characterize 
that phase of the kill-chain in a given cyber-attack scenario. This matrix is useful in tracking-in the 
context of a cyber-attack-where in the kill-chain an adversary is and what dimension of the 
information space characterises the adversaries activities at that phase. 
 
3.3.2 Hypothesis Two 
Given a set of multivariate time series, observations of a set of variables representative of events on 
the physical, social or economic dimension of cyberspace, Xt, Yt and Zt, the intra-dimensional co-
integrating rank between Xt and/or Yt and/or Zt is greater than or equal to 1. i.e. r >= 1. 
 
The resulting cross-dimensional multi-phased matrix representation is further analysed using a 
structural VAR/VECM model. The VAR/VECM model at each stage of the kill-chain is constructed 
using features that are predictive of activities that characterise the current stage of the kill-chain with 
early indicators for the next phase of the kill-chain. Incorporating the kill-chain produces a 
VAR/VECM representation of the physical-social-economic cyber kill-chain that is capable of 
filtering down to multi-variate predictive features represented in a structural VAR/VECM model.  
 
3.3.3 Hypothesis Three 
The events of the cyber-kill chain which represent activities of the attacker, can be attributed to 
either𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒁𝒕. i.e we can formulate a multi-dimensional physical-social-economic kill chain 
using events characterized as occurring on 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒁𝒕.  
 
 ENHANCED FRAMEWORK FOR THE ENTANGLED CYBERSPACE 3.4
 
As earlier stated, let 𝑿𝒕 represent information on the physical dimension of cyberspace, 𝒀𝒕 represent 
information on the social dimension of cyberspace and Zt represent information on the economic 
dimension of cyberspace, at each stage of the kill-chain, data is pulled from respective dimensions to 
construct a VAR(p) model at time t to t-n. As theorized above, assuming events on the cyber-kill 
chain occur across various dimensions of cyberspace, we derive subsets of 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕 across 
cyberspace. Following the model presented in Error! Reference source not found. above, we create 
the following structural model for a VAR/VECM representation of the cross-dimensional multi-
phased framework with a 9-phased cyber-kill chain as shown in section 2.8.2. The phases in any 
specifc kill-chain correspond with the number of individual activities an attacker needs to take to 
implement that attack. Therefore, the number of phases for various attack kill-chains may vary 
slightly. 
  




The enhanced entangled cyberspace theory is built taking the logical sequence of a cyber-attack 
perpetration into consideration. It implements the traditional kill-chain across the various dimensions 
of cyberspace by constructing a structural predictive model at each phase of the kill-chain. Therefore, 
each phase of the kill-chain is attributed to a single dimension as a major source of evidence. 
 CONCLUSION 3.5
 
This chapter has discussed the development and mapping of the entangled cyberspace framework in 
alignment with theory. It further discusses the techniques for practical implementation of the vector 
autoregressive models for simultaneously investigating multiple time-based evidences from multiple 
dimensions of cyberspace. This chapter provides a mapping from a summarized view of the entangled 
cyberspace model; as it may be useful to strategic decision makers in cyber security to an in-depth 
view of implementation as will be useful to technical analysts. In summary, this chapter deconstructs 
the process of untangling the complex dynamics of events in given webbed data. 
  




4 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 INTRODUCTION 4.1
 
This chapter provides validation to the research approach followed in investigating the behavioural 
approach through which cyber-incidents can be predicted in cyberspace. This chapter contains 
detailed description of the research methodology, statistical methods and technical solutions used in 
developing the conceptual framework, testing the theoretical models and implementing the research 
artefact. The theory of the entangled cyberspace is built on a structural, behavioural predictive model 
and demonstrated by testing and evaluating the models on real-world datasets simulated to contain the 
theorised entanglements. In this research, the general methodological approach is the development of 
an experimental scenario to test the concepts of the developed framework. This research builds an 
experimental environment with simulated datasets provided to capture the nature of an entangled 
cyberspace. This research works under the assumption that the developed model can pick up the 
nature of entanglements built into the experiments. The experiments and scenarios are set up using 
benchmark datasets simulated outside the framework of this research but containing the intended 
entanglements of interest. Using an externally developed benchmark dataset to test the conceptual 
model ensures the absence of bias as datasets have been developed outside the research point of view 
and therefore not forced to contain relationships of interest. 
This research employs a behavioural research paradigm and a design science research paradigm. The 
behavioural research paradigm focuses on understanding the behaviour of actors in the entangled 
cyberspace. Actors such as the attackers, the targets and the analysts portray certain behaviour in 
various scenarios that affect the nature of inter-relationships in the entangled cyberspace. Any 
solution involving these actors must also address frameworks for describing, explaining and therefore 
predicting behaviours of these actors. Incorporating a behavioural paradigm into the research 
environment ensures that behavioural elements that act as evidence for establishing relationships 
between entities in cyberspace are appropriately captured by our model. The design science paradigm 
ensures that all research artefacts are useful in addressing the intended objectives of the research. This 
research is based on a mixed methods approach that ties both paradigms together using both 
qualitative and quantitative analytical approaches to test and evaluate the theory put forward. 
 
 
 OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW 4.2
 
This chapter provides a critical review of the plausible research methodologies that apply to the 
objectives put forward in this research. The research approach used in this thesis is a combination of 
methods to achieve the research aims and objectives. The aim stems from the overall goal of building 
predictive capacity that contributes to the area of cyber situational awareness, incident readiness and 
proactive cyber defence.  
4.2.1 Aim 
Develop an approach and theoretical framework for detecting early warning signals of cyber-attacks 
and therefore predicting cyber-attack attacks in the complex cyberspace. This is achieved by 
characterising and extracting indicators of cyber-attacks across the dimensions of cyberspace to 
accurately feed statistical and mathematical models for prediction. The theoretical aim of this research 
involves conceptualising the nature of entanglements in cyberspace. The technical aim of this research 




involves building a complex structural model to handle the challenge of untangling the entanglements 
in cyberspace. Furthermore, the researcher hopes to develop a research artefact to demonstrate the 
theories in the conceptual framework. 
4.2.2 Objectives 
a) To characterise cyberspace as a collection of multiple dimensions that are part of a whole. 
b) To determine the features that define the nature of entanglements in cyberspace. 
c) Propose a multi-dimensional structural framework for integrating multiple sources of 
evidence in cyberspace to pre-empt cyber-attacks. 
d) Evaluate the methods and algorithms for an integrated approach to pre-empting cyber-
attacks. 
e) Assess the implications of the research findings and an integrated approach for pre-empting 
cyber-attacks in practice. 
This chapter discusses in detail the methods employed and provides a suitable justification for their 
use. The methods employed for addressing each of the stated objectives are broken down and 
critically discussed. 
 
4.2.3 Methodological Review 
 
This project aims to develop a comprehensive, intelligence-driven and accurate approach for pre-
empting cyber-attacks with the goal of achieving intelligent cyber situational awareness and proactive 
cyber defence. In response to the research demand, the researcher analysed various research 
methodologies, eventually opting for a mixed method approach. The mixed method approach enables 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods; thus, its efficiency has been proven in social 
sciences (Creswell, 2003). The mixed method approach was selected for several reasons. 
The quantitative methods seek to employ deductive reasoning by understanding the causes of a 
phenomenon thus attempts to verify its effects on its surrounding environment through mathematical 
and statistically valid methods (Creswell, 2003). In the context of this thesis, quantitative methods are 
important drivers for this research as they provide a method for evaluating said dependences in 
cyberspace (Hevner et al., 2004). Quantitative methods also form the basis for the identification of 
entanglements in cyberspace, i.e. to evaluate the cyber-attack predictive capacity of the entangled 
cyberspace and its ability to increase cyber situational agility. 
The combination of both methods (qualitative and quantitative methods) offer opportunities for 
exploiting the design science approach offered by (Barnett, Smith and Whittington, 2014). This 
approach will also ensure that the researcher’s philosophical standpoint is represented in the research 
and backed-up with concrete proof. It ensures that the technical artefact is based on philosophical 
aspects of real-world problems and is geared towards addressing these problems.  
Also, included in the research methodology is the epistemology; the body of knowledge the researcher 
includes in the theory. Such theories of knowledge include Objectivism or Subjectivism which inform 
the researcher’s philosophical standpoint on some philosophical research systems such as positivism, 
interpretivist or critical theory (Creswell, 2003). (Creswell, 2003) describes interrelated levels of 




decisions based on the above perspectives, which sets up the steps for the research design with three 
basic questions: 
a. What are knowledge claims being made by the researcher especially from a theoretical 
perspective? 
b. What strategies of inquiry will inform the procedures and techniques used in the research? 
c. What methods will be employed for data collection, integration and analysis? 
 RESEARCH PARADIGMS FOR IS RESEARCH 4.3
 
 
One common logic used to streamline Information Systems research paradigms is the differentiation 
between behavioural science and design science (Davis, 2000). While design science research seeks to 
produce technological artefacts to solve organisational problems, behavioural sciences focus on the 
development and justification of theories to understand why things are the way they are. Behavioural 
science is therefore referred to as the ‘problem understanding paradigm’ while design science is 
referred to as the ‘problem-solving paradigm’.  
 
 Behavioral Sciences Design Sciences 
Origin Natural Science Artificial Science 
Paradigm Problem Understanding Paradigm Problem Solving Paradigm 
Objective Develop and justify theories that 
explain or predict human phenomena 
surrounding the analysis, design, 
implementation, management, and 
use of information systems  
Create innovations that define ideas, 
practices, technical capabilities, and product 
through the analysis, design, implementation, 
management, and use of information 
systems. 
Object Human-Computer-Interaction IT Artefact Design 
Table 4-1: Design Science and Behavioural Science 
 
4.3.1 Behavioural Science Research Framework 
 
Behavioural research focuses primarily on understanding patterns of behaviour in a given system. 
According to (March and Smith, 1995), behavioural sciences is one of the many domains of natural 
sciences. Natural sciences include traditional research into physical, biological, social and behavioural 
domains aimed at understanding reality. According to (Leary, 2012), the behavioural scientist’s job is 
to detect and explain phenomena. Natural scientists develop sets of concepts or specialised language, 
with which to characterise phenomena. These developed concepts are further used in higher order 
constructions such as laws, models and theories, to make claims about the real nature of reality. 
Theories – deep, principled explanations of phenomena, are the crowning achievements of natural and 
behavioural science research. Products of behavioural sciences are evaluated against the norms of 
truth or explanatory power. Claims must be consistent with observed facts, the ability to predict 
observations based on a study of past behaviour is an example of explanatory success. (Leary, 2012) 
identifies three main goals of conducting behavioural science research. 
 
4.3.1.1 Describing behaviour 
 




Behavioural research sometimes focuses primarily on describing patterns of behaviour, thought, or 
emotion. For example, natural science researchers conduct large studies of randomly selected 
respondents to determine what people think, feel and do. Public opinion polls, such as those that 
dominate the news during elections, that describe people’s attitudes and preferences for candidates. 
Research in clinical psychology and psychiatry investigates the prevalence of certain psychological 
disorders. In the field of marketing and sales, researchers study consumers’ preferences and buying 
practices. 
 
4.3.1.2 Predicting Behaviour 
 
Researchers are sometimes interested in predicting people’s behaviour or the behaviour of a system 
after a certain period. Personnel psychologists try to predict employees’ job performance from 
employment tests and interviews. Similarly, psychologists attempt to predict academic performance 
from scores on standardised tests to identify students who might have learning difficulties in school. 
Likewise, some criminal forensic psychologists are interested in understanding variables that predict 
which criminals are likely to be dangerous if released from prison. Economists are also interested in 
predicting the behaviour of the macroeconomic indicators at some point in the future to guide policy 
decision. Financial analysts also predict movements of financial time series to guide investment 
portfolios. The tests to be used must be administered, analysed, and refined to meet certain statistical 
criteria. Then data are collected and analysed to identify the best predictors of the target behaviour. 
Prediction equations are calculated and validated on other samples of participants to verify that they 
predict the behaviour successfully. All along the way, the scientific prediction of behaviour involves 
behavioural research methods. 
 
4.3.1.3 Explaining Behaviour 
 
Some researchers in the field of behavioural sciences regard ‘explanation’ as the most important goal 
of scientific research. Although description and prediction are quite important, scientists usually do 
not feel that they understand something until they can explain it. We may be able to describe patterns 
of violence among prisoners who are released from prison and even identify variables that allow us to 
predict, within limits, which prisoners are likely to be violent once released. However, until we can 
explain why certain prisoners are violent, and others are not, the picture is not complete.  
Furthermore, research in natural sciences descriptive, correlational or experimental. Descriptive 
research seeks to describe thoughts, feelings, and trends and seeks to answer the question of why 
systems, people or individuals act the way they do. Correlational research seeks to investigate 
relationships and dependence among a certain set of identified features in a system. The experimental 
research investigates cause and effects of changes in patterns, behaviours or trends. 
 
 
This research combines these two behavioural frameworks discussed above to produce a holistic 
approach to addressing behavioural effects in the research experiment. The rationale behind 
combining these frameworks are as follows: 
i. To properly conceptualise the behaviour of interest as relevant to the research aims and 
objectives. 
ii. To properly identify all actors involved in a specific behaviour of interest. 




iii. To properly capture the dynamics of the domain in which the actors act and the observed 
behaviour occurs. 
iv. To ensure that experiments are geared towards understanding, explaining and describing all 
external and internal factors that enact, enable, cause and affect the behaviours of interest. 
v. To properly identify all behaviours and actors linked to behaviours of interest under 
observation. 
 
 Identify Describe Predict Explain 
Behaviour A Cyber-Attack The Cyber-Kill 
Chain 
The type of 
Cyber-attack 
 
















   
Scope Inter-related    
Table 4-2: Combined behavioural framework 
The table above characterises the concepts built into the experiment. 
 
4.3.2 Design Science Research Framework 
 
(Hevner et al., 2004) design science approach for information systems research has produced a seven-
point guideline in which they write that knowledge and understanding of a design problem and its 
solutions are acquired in the building and application of an artefact, as shown in the table below: 
Design Science 
Guideline 
Description Research Alignment 
Design as an 
Artefact 
Design science research use produce a viable 
artefact in the form of a construct, a model a 
method or an instantiation. 
This research presents a 
framework for a holistic 
approach to pre-empting 
cyber-attacks in a multi-
dimensional cyberspace. 
Furthermore, this research 
produces a technical artefact to 
demonstrate the theories put 
forward.  
Problem The objective of the design science research is to This research addresses a 




Relevance develop technology-based solutions to important 
and relevant business problems in the real-world. 
fraction of the problem of 
proactive cyber situational 
awareness by providing a 




The utility, quality and efficacy of a design 
artefact must be rigorously demonstrated with a 
well-executed evaluation method. The evaluation 
methods proposed can be further broken down into 
the following groups: 
 Observational: using case studies in 
business environments or field studies. 
 Analytical: Examining the artefact for 
static qualities such as complexity, fit of 
artefact, or its performance. 
 Experimental: Using controlled 
experiments or simulation where one can 
run the artefact with simulated data. 
 Testing: Black Box or White Box testing. 
 Descriptive: Use of information from 
knowledge base to build argument for 
artefact’s utility or in the form of 
scenarios. 
This framework is tested using 
the well-established cyber kill-
chain, by predicting each phase 
on the kill chain. 
Each component in the 
framework is tested real-life 




Effective design science research must provide 
clear and verifiable contributions in the areas of 
the design artefact, design foundations and/or 
design methodologies. 
 Design Artefact –The ability to reuse the 
artefact itself to solve other unsolved 
problems. 
 Foundations: To create new constructs, 
models, methods etc. to also extend or 
improve existing foundations. 
 Methodologies: to produce new ways to 
evaluate and create new contributions to 
design science. An example is a 
framework for predicting and explaining 
why a particular information system will 
or will not be accepted in a given 
organisational setting (Venkatesh, 2000).  
The project would contribute 
specifically to the area of cyber 
situational awareness and 
predictive analytics in cyber 
defence. It combines various 
established tools and 
techniques to create a unified 
process for pre-empting cyber-
attacks in cyberspace.  
Research Rigor Design Science research relies upon the 
application of rigorous methods in both the 
construction and evaluation of the design artefact. 
The literature review is based 
on verified academic and 
professional sources. The 
methods, techniques and data 




used in this research have been 
proven and tested in academia. 
Communication 
Of Research 
Design science research must be presented 
effectively both to the technology-oriented as well 
as the management-oriented audiences. 
The research consists of Data 
summary facts and figures 
based on analysis of datasheets 
and variables explained in the 
data analysis. 
Table 4-3: Design Science Research Framework 
Concerning the points outlined above, (Hevner et al., 2004) explains that, although the creation of an 
innovative, purposeful artefact for a specific domain is applied usefully, the artefact must also yield 
utility for the specified problem. Therefore, a thorough evaluation of the artefact is crucial. Novelty is 
similarly crucial, since the artefact must be innovative, solving an unsolved problem or solving a 
known problem more efficiently and/or effectively. This concept differentiates design science 
paradigm from the practice of design. The artefact must be rigorously defined, formally presented, 
coherently and internally consistent. The process by which the artefact is created uses a search process 
whereby a problem space is constructed, and a mechanism proposed or enacted to find an effective 
solution. Finally, the results of the design science research process must be communicated effectively 
to all kinds of audience interacting directly with the artefact. 
 
4.3.3 Combining Behavioural and Design Science 
 
In an attempt to ensure that IS research is thoroughly constructed to meet human needs, March and 
Smith also recommended the combination of natural/behavioural science and design science. 
Researchers often face the challenge of conceptualising, representing and selecting appropriate 
techniques for solving real-world problems. If IS research is to make significant progress IS research 
methods must include in its process, mechanisms for developing an understanding of how and why IS 
systems do or do not work for target populations. Therefore, the following framework for undertaking 
IS research that combines both sciences is proposed. 
 
 Build Evaluate Theorise Justify 
Constructs: conceptualisation 
of a domain space used to 
describe the problems that 
exist within that domain and 
specify their solutions 
    
Models: a set of propositions 
or statements expressing 
relationships among various 
specified constructs.  
    
Methods: a set of steps 
(algorithm or guideline) used 
to perform a given task. 
    
Instantiation: the realisation of 
an artefact in the problem 
domain.  
    
Table 4-4: IS Research for Behavioural and Design Science 




It is important to state that behavioural science is at the core of developing the theory of complexity in 
cyberspace, while design science develops the lab experiments, test beds and research artefact to put 
the theory of the Entangled cyberspace into practice. Consequently, combining both research 
paradigms are based on evidence form (March and Smith, 1995), who pointed out the importance of 
collaboration between both sciences. (March and Smith, 1995) propose that: 
 Design science creates artefacts, giving rise to phenomena that can be the targets of 
behavioural science research. Group decision support systems foster user behaviours that are 
the subject of behavioural science investigations. 
 Since artefacts have no dispensation to ignore or violate natural laws, their design can be 
aided by an explicit understanding of natural phenomena. Thus, natural scientists create 
knowledge which design scientists can exploit in their attempts to develop technology that 
meet human needs. In conclusion, (March and Smith, 1995) provide an example with a 
healthcare example pointing out that the explanation of why a drug is effective in combating a 
disease may not be known until a considerable time lag after the drug is in common use.  
 SOCIAL-POLITICAL-ECONOMIC-CULTURAL (SPEC) EVENT ANALYSIS 4.4
 
The most significant component of cyberspace are the humans involved. Current cyber prediction 
models are restricted to analysis on the network layer of cyberspace, but as shown in (Gandhi et al., 
2011a), these methods fail to account for the impact of human behaviour in the process of a cyber-
attack. Evidence (Gandhi et al., 2011a; Bronk and Tikk-Ringas, 2013; Hernández et al., 2016) has 
shown that more and more cyber-attacks in recent times are linked to social, political, economic and 
cultural events. The adversary’s level of sophistication and their motivations are essential to 
predicting, preventing, tracing and attributing cyber-attacks. As a result, SPEC factors have the 
potential to be early predictors of surety events in cyberspace. 
Consequently, methods for analysing correlations between these types of events in cyberspace have 
become useful for providing valuable insights regarding agents, motivation and means of cyber-
attacks. For example, (Bollen and Mao, 2011) found a connection between social media discussion 
and fluctuations observed in the stock market. Hernández et al. (Hernández et al., 2016) also predicted 
cyber incidents by analysing twitter discussions. Lastly, (Chakraborty et al., 2016) was able to predict 
socio-economic events by analysing news articles and extracting events. SPEC events present an 
analytical taxonomy along SPEC interdependence dimensions. 
 
 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 4.5
 
This section explains the process used in developing the scenario on which the experiment in this 
research is based. Maier et al. (Maier et al., 2016) highlight the importance of uncertainty in the future 
due to rapid changes in the physical reality which has led to the need for methods which requires 
uncertainties to be described with the aims of scenarios that represent coherent future pathways based 
on a different set of pre-assumptions. Eriksson et al. (Eriksson, Olofsson and Ekvall, 2003) describe a 
scenario as a picture of the future conditions of an object within its environments. The ‘conditions’ in 
this instance refers to characteristics of the results of a given sequence of events (situations) and 
factors which disturb the natural evolution of these occurrences. (Bishop, Hines and Collins, 2007) 
describes a scenario as a description of plausible situations and what they might lead to. Generally, 
(Börjeson et al., 2006) presents three main categories of scenario studies based on questions a user 
may want to pose about the future.  




Explorative scenarios answer the question ‘what can happen?’. The aim of designing explorative 
scenarios is to explore situations that are regarded as possible to happen from a variety of 
perspectives. Typically, a set of scenarios are developed to span a wide scope of developments. 
Explorative scenarios are used for long-term observations and allow for structural and profound 
changes in the modelled system.  
Normative scenarios answer the question of how a specific target can be reached based on how the 
system is treated. The aim of designing normative scenarios is to test how a certain target can be 
reached by adjusting the current situation or by changing the structural blocks on which the system 
depends.  
Predictive scenarios present a detailed and quantitative indication of how the system will change 
under a certain set of conditions. This type of scenario development experiments usually answers the 
question ‘what will happen?’. These types of scenario development are done in an attempt to predict 
the future. Predictive scenarios are usually developed under the assumption that the laws governing a 
given predicted system would remain constant and unchanged over the predictable time. This scenario 
is explored as part of this research as it concerns the forecasting of the future behaviour of a system 
under certain conditions.  
Additionally, the (Maier et al., 2016) puts forward a set of processes for developing a scenario. These 





Description Research Application 
1 Scenario Domain 
Definition 
This defines the domain around 
which the scenario is built. 
The scenario covers events in 
cyberspace as analysed from its three 
identified dimensions Physical, Social 
and Economic. 
2 Description of Key 
Events 
This outline the key events that 
link the scenario to theory. 
Three events were designed to model 
entanglements in cyberspace using 
simulated data. 
3 Description of Key 
Measurements 
This identifies the key 
measurements for the 
justification of the proposed 
theory. 
The key measurements for the 
confirmation of theory include co-
integration across the layers of 
cyberspace and a measurement of 
causality. 
Table 4-5: Framework For Scenario Development. Source (Maier et al., 2016) 
The aims of the scenario development process are as follows: 
a. To model representative data from the multiple dimensions of cyberspace. 
b. To simulate inter-dependent relationships between representative data across the 
multiple dimensions of cyberspace. 
c. To test for co-integrating and causal relationships between representative data across 
the multiple dimensions of cyberspace. 
d. To predict the occurrence of a cyber-attack on the physical dimension. 
e. To develop a generalised form of the Entangled Cyberspace using a predictive model 
for APT cyber-attack using features from the multi-dimensional Cyberspace. 
 




4.5.1 Validating the Scenario 
The proposed scenario would need to address each of the ‘5Cs’ listed above to ensure that scenario 
environment is representative of real-world operating environments across all domains. This will, in 
turn, lead to a validated approach. The key goals of the scenario are: 
 To simulate inter-dependent relationships between representative data across the multiple 
dimensions of cyberspace. 
 To extract some features across all dimensions of cyberspace that are predictive of a cyber-
attack on the network layer. 
 To predict with certain precision, the occurrence of a cyber-attack in the Network Layer of 
cyberspace.  
The mission of this experiment is to predict the occurrence of a cyber-attack on the network layer of 
cyberspace. It should also be able to handle the different formats of data and integration requirements 
needed. The objective of developing this scenario is to create a representative environment for an 
Entangled cyberspace to test new predictive models for cyber-attacks in cyberspace. Therefore, this 
scenario is designed with some basic assumptions. Firstly, the scenario is designed based on the pre-
assumption of inter-dependence between features in the scenario design. Secondly, the scenario 
assumes a sequential course of events leading up to a cyber-attack on the network layer of cyberspace.  
 
4.5.2 The Scenario 
The scenario used in this thesis is based on the Vast IEEE 2011 mini-challenge one and mini-
challenge two (Cook et al., 2011). In this thesis, the researcher uses a mirrored scenario designed 
around a fictional company, Delish Corporation in the fictional city of Zuma. Delish Corporation was 
founded by Mr Darren Peters and has operated in the Zuma area for eight years since it started 
operations in 2009. Delish Corporation is an agricultural company dedicated to providing consumer 
products across its various outlets. Over the past five years, Delish has recorded huge amounts of 
profits with their stock market prices hitting an all-time high in 2013. The scenario is further broken 
down into three sub-events surrounding the subject: An epidemic spread in the city of Zuma, a stock 
market crisis relating to Delish Corporation stocks and a data exfiltration attack on Delish 
Corporation. Each event in the selected scenario are linked to each other. The scenario data is 
designed (Cook et al., 2011), to contain information about linked activities. Although previous legacy 
datasets for building cyber defence models such as DARPA (Mahoney, 2003b; Thomas, Sharma and 
Balakrishnan, 2008), KDDCUP (Gehrke, Ginsparg and Kleinberg, 2007; Zhang and Wang, 2013) and 
VERIS (Creswell, 2003; Liu et al., 2015), activities within these datasets are mono-dimensional, 
limited to the network layer of the information space. This data is different from other datasets prior 
presented in that it cuts across the information space. The dataset provides a representation of 
theorized entanglements which makes it suitable for the experimental design.  
 
4.5.2.1 Event 1: The Epidemic Spread 
 
Zuma is an urban city with a population of 9 million people. During the last few days, health 
professionals at local hospitals have noticed a dramatic increase in reported illnesses. Observed 
symptoms are flulike and include fever, chills, sweats, aches and pains, fatigue, coughing, breathing 
difficulty, nausea and vomiting, diarrhoea, and enlarged lymph nodes. More recently, there have been 
several deaths believed to be associated with the current outbreak. The problem made national 
headlines when a former military veteran dies from these poisoning symptoms. His death sparks an 
unexpected reaction in the populace who are demanding an answer from state officials. 





4.5.2.2 Event 2-Delish Stock Prices Crash 
 
Delish Corporation is a Limited Liability company listed on the stock market. Delish has enjoyed 
souring prices and maximum returns over the last three years. However, in the last eight months, there 
has been a gradual decrease in the recorded market capitalisation index of the company’s shares. 
Additionally, there was a major incident in the officially recorded stock market prices sometime 
between February 2017 and May 2017. The incident sent the prices of Delish corporation shares 
slumping suddenly. The sudden change in the value of the company’s shares sets of a continued 
decreasing trend in the Company’s share prices over the next five months. Financial officials have 
attributed this fall in prices to the negative press, reduced client loyalty, reduced client trust and loss 
of investor confidence in Delish Corporation.  
 
4.5.2.3 Event 3- Cyber Attack On Delish Corporation 
 
To support its production, marketing, sales, logistics and distribution, Delish Corporation operates a 
fully integrated IT infrastructure. The company operates a central server for storing data such as 
transaction figures (both online and in-store), customer account details, credit/debit card details, 
emails etc. The company’s IT infrastructure is managed by an in-house cyber-savvy team, responsible 
for Monitoring, Detecting and Preventing any perceived cyber incident of the company’s servers or 
any subnetwork. The team is also responsible for responding and mitigating the risks of cyber 
incidents in the event of their occurrence. 
Critical assets relating to product patents and trade secrets are stored on specific hosts within the 
organisation’s network. Lately, an IT staff has complained about the increasing rate of anomalies in 
the company’s weblog and network traffic. Due to the critical timing of these inconsistencies, this was 
brought to the attention of the company’s CEO, Mr Darren Peters. Mr Darren suspects a connection of 
this incident to the recent crash in the company’s market shares and orders a re-evaluation of the 
company-wide network. 
 
The activities in the scenario presented represents a series of linked events as described in sections 
4.5.3.1-4.5.3.3. The scenario is based in the following assumptions of connections between these 
events: 
 Delish Corporation is the major player of all agricultural and eco-related activities within the 
metropolitan city of Zuma. 
  The operational activities of Delish Corporation have slowly over the preceding years led to 
land, air and water poisoning in the metropolitan area. 
 Delish Corporation operates a fully integrated IT network infrastructure that supports its 
business operations. 
 There has been previous complains and legal actions against the activities of Delish within the 
metropolitan area. 
 This has led to a negative public perception of the company that affects the values of their 
stock prices. 
 Disgruntled members of the community launch a cyber-attack on delish corporation networks 
mainly to disrupt its activities and make a political and economic statement. 




 DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUES ADOPTED IN THIS THESIS 4.6
 
This section discusses the techniques used for collecting data used in this research. A critical process 
for any research project is data identification and collection through inquiry methods that are guided 
by the purpose of the research and which are influenced by the investigation of the researcher. The 
data collection method used in this research is accordingly chosen based on the research objectives. 
This research uses data collected from scenario simulations, lab experiments and data simulations. 
Lab experiments were created for each event (event 1, event 2, and event 3) in the scenario. Data for 
event 1 and event 2 of the scenario was generated by scientifically simulating co-integrated time 
series (Galenko et al., 2009). Social media data for event two was based on a benchmark data set in 
(Schreck and Keim, 2013). Timestamps that fell outside the timeframe of the scenario analysis, were 
ignored for this experiment. Data for event three was generated in a cyber range that simulates the 
network infrastructure defined in the scenario.  The cyber range was designed and developed so the 
inter-dependence between features in cyberspace can be identified and validated. A holistic 
experimental process that ties the three events together is followed by application of quantitative 
methods for testing inter-dependence in time series.  This section further expatiates on the data 
gathering, collection and simulation techniques used in this thesis. 
4.6.1 Using Simulated data for research 
 
One of the major challenges in analytical research is the acquisition of large representative data sets 
that model a given hypothetical theory. Simulations, as defined by the Webster Dictionary refers to an 
imitation, well-constructed, to pass for the real thing. Data simulation refers to the imitation of 
relationships amongst features to create datasets that follow a particular distribution and are 
representative of behaviours researchers hope to test (Thesen and Travis, 1990). Data simulation 
provides more robust solutions by offering a certain level of knowledge and control in the 
experimentation process. In research design, (Thesen and Travis, 1990) conclude that simulations are 
useful for: 
 Serving as a tool to help address the complex interaction of data construction, analysis and 
statistical theory. 
 Improving researchers’ understanding of basic research principles and analytical techniques. 
 Investigating the effects of a given behaviour on another behaviour. 
 Exploring the accuracy of novel analytical techniques applied to data  structures. 
In this research, the researcher first creates data according to given theoretical models and further 
examines how well the concepts can be detected using the techniques proposed in this research.  
Building good simulated data is the most critical step and is often challenging. As (Sharma et al., 
2010) point out, simulated data which are too clean or too fitted will provide misleading or 
inconclusive results. On the other hand, simulated data with large errors and numbers of outliers, 
which do an not correctly model the behaviour of interest, will also provide misleading or wrong 
results. Benchmarking is proposed as a solution to generating realistic datasets from simulation 
efforts. The process of benchmarking compares the simulated dataset to real-world problems that are 
widely accepted and understood to improve the data’s credibility. This may be done by considering 
historic events in the field of research, applications of such techniques and specific industry under 
consideration. Additionally, precedent examples in the bench, mark or historically significant cases 
that are characteristic of the problem under investigation may also be considered. 




4.6.2 Lab Experiments 
Laboratory experiments are controlled activities that create and observe the behaviour or event of 
interest. The logic of laboratory experimentation is that it is controlled therefore enabling researchers 
to precisely measure the effects of exogenous variables on endogenous variables, thus establishing 
cause and effect relationships. Consequently, predictions about future behaviour of variables in the 
system can be made under certain assumptions. The lack of data for cyber defence research is a 
looming problem identified by multiple researchers. This stems from the industry’s unwillingness to 
share information related to cyber incidents. Factors for this mistrust have been identified as 
protection of business integrity, protection of business revenue model, protection against cooperate 
espionage and corporate sabotage amongst many others. This has led to the need for an elaborate 
solution to understanding cyber-physical networks. The logic behind Laboratory experiments in the 
area of cyber defence is to re-create cyber-physical networks in a controlled environment and re-
construct network behaviour under certain circumstances. For example, observing the pattern of 
network traffic in the event of a request overload. Controlled environments created for cyber defence 
research are called ‘Cyber Ranges’ or ‘Cyber Testbeds’ and may be physical or virtual. This research 
uses data collected in a physical, cyber range, constructed to reproduce a distributed denial of service 
attacks and port scan attacks as outlined in the scenario design.  
 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 4.7
 
This section outlines the process adopted in designing the experiment. This section outlines the 
process adopted in designing the experiment to prove the concepts presented in this research. The 
experiment is designed to address the identified research problem of detecting early warning signs of 
cyber-attacks and therefore pre-empting cyber incidents in cyberspace. The experimental design 
begins with an outline of its intended aims and objectives. It further presents the development of the 
experimental scenarios and the experimental sequence. Additionally, this section critically evaluates 
the experimental testing environments and its alignment to the overall research aims and objectives.  
4.7.1 Experiment Objectives 
 
This experiment aims to test the predictability of cyber-incidents in cyberspace using a multi-
dimensional structural integration approach by fusing data streams across multiple dimensions of 
cyberspace. The experiments objectives are designed to address the overall research aim. The main 
objectives are as follows: 
1. Identify indicators of each phase of the cyber-kill chain on the multi-dimensional cyberspace 
with the aim of pre-empting the last phase of the kill-chain. 
2. Characterise the Cyber-Physical-Social-Economic Kill-Chain in the multi-dimensional 
cyberspace using structural statistical techniques. 
3. Identify the variables that actively contribute to pre-empting the phases of a cyber kill-chain 
during the perpetration of a cyber-attack. 
4. Test the efficiency of the proposed entangled cyberspace model in pre-empting cyber-attacks. 
4.7.2 Design and Development of Research testing environment 
 
This part of this section covers all aspect of developing the testing environment that meets the 
research requirements. The social-physical-economic cyber kill-chain, the multi-dimensional 
cyberspace and Vector Auto-Regressive Models informed the development of this research’s testing 
environment directly by providing the main factors and components required for constructing the 




entangled cyberspace models. Additionally, the events described in the scenario section 4.5.2 of this 
research inform the experimental development by identifying the features and capabilities to be 
included in the testing environment. This section will provide more insight into the testing 
environment, its components and infrastructure.  
Systems Requirements: The required system can be described as an advanced intelligent predictive 
system, using multiple sources of evidence to deliver high-quality information in an inter-connected 
space. This system which has the potential to improve cyber situational awareness to cyber-attack 
defenders has three main components: 
 The multi-dimensional cyberspace which is further divided into the physical, social (Barnett, 
Smith and Whittington, 2014) and economic (Gandhi et al., 2011a) dimensions with multiple 
sub-layers each as explained in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 The cyber-attack kill chain which models the steps an adversary must take achieve a 
successful attack on a target network. The cyber-attack modelled in this research is a Data 
Exfiltration attack as explained in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 Statistical predictive techniques. The default structural analytical tool used is the Vector 
Autoregressive Models (Luetkepohl, 2011). However, the model is robust to accommodate 
optimal solutions at each phase of the kill-chain. Therefore, additional structural techniques 
such as Vector Error Correction Models (Sims, 1980) are also considered in the model. 
The system provides predictive solutions that captures the subject's cyber operating environment in 
the context of the entangled cyberspace while optimising the nature of available evidence and the 
observed nature of entanglements. The system is also designed to enhance cyber situational awareness 
level of the cyber defender from a multi-dimensional perspective. It is hypothesized that active 
components in the system come together to provide a predictive capacity that keeps defenders ahead 
of the threat using evidence from multiple domains. 
 
4.7.2.1 Requirements For Testing Environment 
Based on the discussion provided so far in this chapter, to test the Entangled Cyberspace Theory, the 
following requirements should be considered while developing the testing environment: 
1. A computer network infrastructure that reflects the physical assets described in the scenario. 
2. A chosen timeframe for analysis of scenario events. 
3. Simulated network and system control capabilities. 
4. Simulated network data, e.g. network flow, ids logs and security logs - with real activity 
within the chosen time frame collected from the computer network infrastructure. 
5. Simulated social forum activity within the chosen time frame. 
6. A simulated economic, political or cultural activity within the chosen time frame 
7. Identification of the simulated phases of the cyber-attack kill-chain across the dimensions of 
cyberspace. 
To achieve the above stated, the system requires highly sophisticated technologies and analytical 
capabilities that can provide real-time analysis of evidence sources in the context of the cyber-attack. 
This is achieved by integrating different types of technologies and tools that offer real-time analytical 
capabilities. The use of a predictive analytical environment is crucial for cyber defenders as such a 
platform would allow evidence feeds to be integrated across multiple domains on a time-dependent 
scale. Due to these requirements, the researcher includes the following components in the system: 
 
 A social micro-blogging platform with active participants: This platform is set up to simulate 
discussions amongst participants that should be predictive of cyber-incidents. These 




discussions are set to take place on the social dimension of cyberspace capturing the thoughts 
of participants on a specific topic. Simulating the dynamics of cyber-related discussions is 
paramount, especially within the given time frame.  
 A target network: The simulation of a target network gives the researcher the ability to act in 
a real-world look alike network with similar network activities occurring. Such network 
activities provide the researcher with knowledge of signatures that characterise the different 
phases of the kill-chain on the network layer of cyberspace. The network simulates a target's 
network and the infrastructure and services running within it. 
 A financial crisis: The simulation of a financial crisis about a specific subject of analysis 
gives the researcher the ability to generate synthetic financial data using a combination of 
tools. The first necessity is a sample of real financial stock market prices as a training model 
from which our synthetic financial data would be generated. The main objective of including 
financial data is to represent activities on the economic dimension of cyberspace.  
 An Attacker: The attacker in this experiment is the enemy. The enemy may be an individual 
or group of individuals. The main objective of including the attacker in the experiment is to 
penetrate the testing environment while leaving behind subtle indicators for identification by 
research tools. The expectation lies in the ability of the theoretical model to identify these 
indicators in the test environment. 
 
4.7.3 Operations of Testing Environment 
 
The operating environment within which the experiment is designed is explained in this sub-section. 
The environment is designed to simulate all inter-connected events within the stipulated time frame 
analysis. The environment models three major events: epidemic spread in the fictitious city of Zuma, 
Delish Corporation stock price crisis and a data exfiltration attack on Delish Corporation. 
 
4.7.3.1 Evidence Identification and Monitoring On the Social Dimension (Epidemic Spread) 
 
The system operates under the assumption of an embedded social platform for capturing discussions 
in social networks related to a subject interest. Cyber analytics teams are responsible for identifying 
such communication channels and providing a clear access to information generated on these 
platforms. Cyber defence strategies should utilise all skills, tools and technologies to gather 
intelligence from all enemy domains and provide real-time actionable intelligence. Also, cyber 
analysts in the system are in charge of implementing a security management framework that includes 
proactive techniques such as prevention, monitoring, analysis and detection to stay ahead of adversary 
tactics. On the other hand, there is also a responsibility on the part of cyber operators to identify and 
monitor all end-users of a cyber network in social forums and communication channels. Such 
endeavours require a certain degree of social forum analysis techniques such as proposed by 
(Matusitz, 2011; Schreck and Keim, 2013). The available communication channels in the simulated 
system are assumed to be sufficient in capturing the required inter-relationships between entities in 
the system. Also, the communication feeds used in this research is simulated to provide the necessary 
intelligence that covers activities on the social, physical and economic dimensions of cyberspace in 
the context of the scenario. 
Additionally, communication feeds on the social dimension have been proven to contain specific 
types of users that are relevant to security analysts: those who use these platforms as a means of 
expression of views on personal, political, social and economic issues and those who use these 




platforms as an outright means to coordinate security attacks. The operating assumption is that 
communications are monitored, captured and analysed to detect these trends and infer links to data 
collected on other dimensions of cyberspace. In this exercise, a set of users (social personas) will 
fulfil the role of providing social dynamics in the form of discussions that will be integrated into the 
experimental system. 
 
4.7.3.2 Evidence Identification and Monitoring on the Economic Dimension (Stock Market 
Crises) 
 
At this stage of the experiment, the researcher seeks to integrate political and/or economic data into 
the experimental environment. As earlier mentioned in section 2.8.4, types of data from the economic 
dimension include financial and political trends which can be represented with data such as stock and 
commodities market data, news articles data etc. To capture the dynamics needed in this scenario, a 
real-world stock market crash is integrated into the test environment. The timeline of this market 
crash is adjusted to fit the timeline of the test environment. Donier and Bouchaud (Donier and 
Bouchaud, 2015) present a plausible explanation for the observed fall in the chosen market prices and 
tested techniques for analysing these trends. Such claims and methods are taken into consideration in 
the experimental research environment. In line with the scenario, the stock market price crash 
represents a crash in delish corporation’s company’s stocks. This event incorporates the economic 
dimension into the research experiment and aims to create a link between the crash and events on 
other dimensions of cyberspace.  
In addition to the time-based observed opening and closing prices, the number of shares traded within 
the security market during the experimental period is also provided. This feature quantifies the 
significance of changes in stock prices, therefore the significance of the stock crash. 
4.7.3.3 Evidence Identification and Monitoring on the Physical Dimension (Data Exfiltration 
Attack) 
 
The objective of this stage of the experiment is to utilise data from previous stages of the experiment 
to detect early warning signs of the attack scenario in context. The cyber-attack occurs on the network 
layer of the physical dimension of cyberspace. To simulate this scenario, a public website, 
‘delishcorp.com’ is setup intended to be accessible to members of the general public (Schreck and 
Keim, 2013). Sommers et al. (2004) make a case for developing the capacity to generate repeatable, 
realistic network traffic as being critical for cyber experiments. It is therefore important to incorporate 
real traffic generation from clients both inside and outside the experiment’s network, using available 
resources. Access logs are made available.  
In addition to the public website, the experimental system also simulates a fully functional computer 
network with acting hosts and services. The computer network is designed with a specific 
vulnerability for potential exploitation by external adversaries. The network operates under the 
assumption of a fully functional cyber defence team with monitoring, detection and analytical 
capabilities. A cyber-attack is conducted in the controlled environment while network traffic logs 
from all hosts are recorded simultaneously. The network traffic logs are consequently fed as new 
sources of evidence into the entangled cyberspace model to enhance the predictive capacity of the 
model.  
Furthermore, environmental factors such as weather readings are integrated into the experimental 
system to model the real-world layer of the physical dimension of cyberspace. The timeline of the 
weather readings is in sync with the social forum feeds. Finally, the operational theory is a predictive 




link between these identified features. The operating network system is designed with a defensive-
offensive approach in mind. Certain hosts will play the role of ‘nodes in an operational network’ 
while a single host will play the role of an external adversary. Within the operational network, 
defenders are assumed to be capable of providing defence capabilities to mitigate cyber-attacks. The 
adversary (the attacker), in this experiment, is in charge of penetrating and challenging the operational 
network. 
The data that represents the scenario described above is presented by IEEE Vast 2011 challenge. The 
scenario used is designed to mirror the experimental network environment like described in (Schreck 
and Keim, 2013). 
The timelines for each event and the integration of activities on the various layers across this timeline 
is further explained in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
4.7.3.3.1 Network System Components 
 
The development of the network testing environment requires tools and devices similar to those used 
in complex real-world networks. This research simulates these network behaviours in a virtual 
environment which is considered cost-effective and time-saving. The virtualization of hosts in an 
operational network provides a controlled environment for simulating real-world cyber-attack 
scenarios with minimal interaction with the external network. This approach has the advantage of 
addressing issues such as technological costs, time and legalities in cyberspace. To achieve the 
required features with the needed capabilities, the following components were integrated. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Scenario-Based Operating Network Architecture 
 
 
The figure above is an illustration of fresh delish network architecture with the following notations 
being associated with the network architecture. 
 The subnet domain for the network operating environment is 192.168.1.x/24. 




 An IP address (Internet Protocol Address) ‘x’, described as belonging to the subnet domain 
indicates that ‘x’ can be any number between 1-255. 
 IP addresses describe as 192.168.2.10-250 indicates the IP address ranges from 192.168.2.10 
through 192.168.2.250. 
 
The table below outlines the nodes on the network with detailed descriptions of their functions in the 
network. 
SN IP Address Node Type Description 
1 192.168.2.10-250 Office Workstations Individual workstations of staff. 
2 192.168.1.50 Firewall Log Server that captures system firewall 
logs. 
3 192.168.1.14 DC /DNS Server Server Running Critical Network 
Operations. 
4 192.168.1.7 File Server Server holding shared files used by 
employees. 
5 192.168.1.6 Mail Server The server that stores and routes all 
email that flows into or out of the 
network. 
6 192.168.1.5 Internal Web Server Th Server that hosts the company’s 
corporate intranet, including company 
news site and policy and procedure. 
7 192.168.1.4 Routing Database 
Server 
The server containing customer data, 
including shipping requests and 
routing information. 
8 192.168.1.3 HR Database Server The Server running the database for 
employee payroll and benefits. 
9 192.168.1.2 DC / DNS /DHCP 
Server 
Server running critical network 
operations. 
10 192.168.2.1 Firewall Firewall interface to office VLAN. 
11 192.168.1.1 Firewall Firewall interface to data centre 
VLAN. 
12 192.168.1.16 IDS System Snort IDS interface to the network. 
13 10.200.150.1 External Web Server A web server which hosts the 
company’s external website. 
14 172.20.1.1 Firewall Firewall interface to External Web 
Server. 
15 172.20.1.5 Firewall Firewall Interface to the internet. 
Table 4-6: Network System Components 
The following are common ports and services in the experimental network. 
 Port 80 – Non-Secured Web Traffic 
 Port 443 – Secured Web Traffic 
 Port 53: Domain Name Service 
 Port 25: Email Traffic 
 




4.7.3.4 Lab Experiments for generation of Network Data 
 
Section 4.7.3.4 outlines the procedure for creating the experimental network. The network was 
developed for this research with all the requirements as described in the experimental scenario. The 
system was exposed to cyber experts to ensure it simulated real network behaviour. In this research, it 
has been established that the main objective is to develop a system with monitoring and data capture 
capabilities in cyber-attack scenarios.  
Additionally, a theoretical foundation is also an important component of this development as it 
explains what artefacts are needed and what role they play towards the delivery of the solution. The 
development of the test environment is therefore based on the entangled cyberspace theory discussed 
in section 3.4. Consequently, the process model shown in Error! Reference source not found. is 
designed to implement the theory of the entangled cyberspace.  
 
4.7.4 Experiment Development 
A phased hypothesis testing approach is adopted in delivering the objectives of the experimental 
design. The experiment is conducted in eight phases, each representing the stages of the social-
physical-economic cyber-attack kill-chain presented in section 2.8.6.1 through section 2.8.6.5. 
Following the outline of the theoretical research model in section 3.4 which is based on the social-
physical-economic cyber-kill chain in section 2.8.6, the researcher forms the following hypothesis to 
test the conceptual model at each stage of the kill-chain. 
 
4.7.5 Experiment Sequence 
The experiment has been designed based on the system requirements discussed earlier in section 
4.7.2. The experimental sequence design relies on existing literature in areas of social network 
analysis, cyber kill-chain analysis, ethical hacking, networking and predictive analytics. Each stage of 
the experiment is set up to represent the corresponding kill-chain phase. The experiment begins at the 
first phase of the Social-Physical-Economic cyber kill chain (section 2.8.6); the antecedents. Data 
available from the economic dimension of cyberspace as postulated in the literature review in section 
2.8.5.3, which are characteristic of antecedents to cyber-attacks, is used as explanatory variables for 
the next phase of the kill-chain; the reconnaissance phase, in a structural predictive model. The 
experiment follows this pattern until the last phase of the kill chain; the attack phase. The experiment 
is designed to simulate the occurrence of the three main events described in the scenario, sequentially 
on the kill-chain and across the dimension of cyberspace. The research scenario development relies on 
these events to produce a real-world situation of inter-connectedness in cyberspace and its usefulness 
in pre-empting cyber-attacks. In this regard, the experiment is broken down into seven stages. 
Each stage of the experiment is designed to address the corresponding research hypothesis by 
introducing new sources of evidence, from a new dimension into the testing environment.  Figure 4-2 
shows the entangled cyberspace experiment that summarises the stages of the experiment, starting 
with identifying the antecedents in the experimental environment. Additionally, there is a provision 
for dynamic data integration, feature identification and feature selection at each stage of the 
experiment. Finally, a phased hypothesis testing approach is adopted in delivering the objectives of 
the experimental design.  
 





Figure 4-2: Experiment Sequence Diagram 
4.7.5.1 Stage 1: Pre-empting Antecedent Activities on the Economic Dimension 
Stage 1 of the experiment attempts to create a link between activities on the social dimension of 
cyberspace and activities on the economic dimension of cyberspace. This stage represents the first 
event on the Physical-Social-Economic cyber-attack kill-chain to occur on the economic dimension of 
cyberspace. The researcher builds a predictive model to test for co-integration between variables 
within and across both dimensions. ‘Antecedents’ is characterised by events on the social or economic 
dimensions (Gandhi et al., 2011a) that invoke the cyber-attack kill-chain. The researcher attempts to 
test the predictive capacity of social activities on economic events with features such as stock market 
prices and social form discussions. The experiment begins at this stage by testing for co-integrating 
relationships within the economic and social dimensions and between them. It goes further to 
construct a predictive model with stock prices as the endogenous variable predicted by a multi-
dimensional integration of social and economic dimension features.  
 
4.7.5.2 Stage 2: Pre-empting and Active Reconnaissance on the Physical Dimension 
  
Stage 2 of the experiment attempts to create a link between activities on the economic dimension of 
cyberspace and activities on the physical dimension of cyberspace. The aim is to build a model that 
actively predicts an active reconnaissance on the network layer of the physical dimension. To do this, 
the researcher builds a predictive model to test for co-integration between variables within and across 
both dimensions. The researcher attempts to test the predictive capacity of economic activities on the 
network layer with features such as stock prices and network flow data. The experiment begins at this 
stage by testing for co-integrating relationships within the economic and physical dimensions and 
between them. It goes further to construct a predictive model with network flow features indicative of 
an active reconnaissance (Bailey Lee, Roedel and Silenok, 2003; Kinable, 2008) as the endogenous 
variable predicted by a multi-dimensional integration of physical and economic dimension features.  
4.7.5.3 Stage 3: Pre-empting Cyber-Attack Weaponization Phase on the Social Dimension 
Stage 3 of the experiment attempts to create a link between activities on the social dimension of 
cyberspace and activities on the physical dimension of cyberspace. This stage of the experiment 
assumes that the proliferation of cyber weapons in cyberspace can be detected on the social dimension 
(Hernández et al., 2016). Using features on the social dimension to represent the ‘in progress creation 
of a cyber weapon’, the aim is to build a model that actively predicts this proliferation on the social 
dimension. To do this, the researcher builds a predictive model to test for co-integration between 
variables within and across both dimensions. The researcher attempts to test the predictive capacity of 
physical activities on the social dimension with features such as ‘cyber-relatedness’ and polarity of 
social forum discussions. The experiment begins at this stage by testing for co-integrating 
relationships within the social and physical dimensions and between them. It goes further to construct 
a predictive model with social forum features indicative of a weaponisation phase as the endogenous 
variable predicted by a multi-dimensional integration of physical and social dimension features.  
4.7.5.4 Stage 4: Pre-empting the Cyber Delivery Phase on the Physical Dimension 
Stage 4 of the experiment attempts to create a link between activities on the social dimension of 
cyberspace and activities on the physical dimension of cyberspace. This stage of the experiment 




assumes that the ability of theoretical model to identify a cyber weapon delivery within a computer 
network. With a combination of features from the social and physical layers, the researcher attempts 
to investigate co-integrating relationships between activities on both layers. Using features on the 
physical dimension to represent the injection of a cyber weapon into a victim’s network, the aim is to 
build a model that actively predict this event with features from other dimensions of cyberspace. To 
do this, the researcher builds a predictive model to test for co-integration between variables within 
and across both dimensions. The researcher attempts to test the predictive capacity of physical and 
social activities on the physical dimension with features such as derived from network flow data (Sans 
Institute, 2012; Almukaynizi et al., 2017). The experiment begins at this stage by testing for co-
integrating relationships within the social and physical dimensions and between them.  
4.7.5.5 Stage 5: Pre-empting the Exploitation Phase on the Physical Dimension 
Stage 5 of the experiment attempts to predict a cyber exploitation in a victim’s network. At this stage 
of the experiment, the researcher combines data from three dimensions of cyberspace in a single 
model. The previous stage of the experiment dealt with data on the physical dimension as endogenous 
variables. This stage assumes a co-integrating relationship between data on the physical dimension 
and/or other dimensions of cyberspace. At this stage, we incorporate data from the three identified 
dimensions of cyberspace and apply a feature selection algorithm (Bonev, Escolano and Cazorla, 
2008) to filter the relevant exogenous variables for the system. The endogenous variable is derived by 
methods described in (Khater and Overill, 2015) to represent the actual execution of exploit injected 
into the victim’s network in the previous stage.  
4.7.5.6 Stage 6: Pre-empting the C&C Phase on the Physical Dimension 
Stage 6 of the experiment attempts to predict the C&C phase of the cyber kill chain by actively 
identifying the activities of botnets in the victim’s network. The researcher begins by characterising 
activities of botnets on a victim’s network. The characterisation of botnets is achieved using methods 
defined by (Raghava, Sahgal and Chandna, 2012) for identifying botnets in computer networks. This 
stage of the experiment assumes that the ability of theoretical model to identify the communications 
of botnets in a computer network and predict these activities. 
Additionally, with a combination of features from the three dimensions of cyberspace identified in 
this research, the researcher attempts to investigate co-integrating relationships between activities on 
these dimensions. Using features on the physical dimension to represent the activities of botnets in a 
victim’s network, the aim is to build a model that actively predicts this event with features from other 
dimensions of cyberspace. To do this, the researcher builds a predictive model to test for co-
integration between variables within and across these dimensions. The researcher attempts to test the 
predictive capacity of physical, social and economic activities on the physical dimension.  
4.7.5.7 Stage 7: Pre-empting Of Cyber-Attack on the network layer of cyberspace 
Stage 7 of the experiment assumes a cyber network attack on a target’s network. The researcher 
begins by characterising activities of a cyber-attack on the target’s network and assumes the ability of 
theoretical model to identify the activities of a cyber-attack in a computer network and predict these 
activities. Additionally, with a combination of features from the three dimensions of cyberspace 
identified in this research, the researcher attempts to investigate co-integrating relationships between 
activities on these dimensions. Using features on the physical dimension to represent the perpetration 
of a cyber-attack in the victim’s network, the aim is to build a model that actively predicts this event 
with features from other dimensions of cyberspace. To do this, the researcher builds a predictive 
model to test for co-integration between variables within and across these dimensions. The researcher 
attempts to test the predictive capacity of physical, social and economic activities on the physical 
dimension.  






This chapter discussed the methods for research and experimental design. This research aims to 
investigate techniques to detect early warning signs of a cyber-incident in cyberspace and thus pre-
empt cyber-attacks. The events at each stage of the experiment are considered ground truth. This aim 
stems from an ultimate contribution to increasing the state of cyber situational awareness. This study 
uses a positivist approaches together with some proven research design methods to access the proven 
advantages of such areas of research design and natural sciences. This chapter also provided a critical 
understanding of the experimental design and structure of analysis to be conducted at each phase of 
the experiment. The study is done in here phases. The first is the scenario development which creates 
the events around which study data is simulated. These scenarios are modelled to contain the 
behaviour of interest. The second stage uses proven statistical techniques and lab experiments to 
generate the data for this research. The third phase builds models to test the proposed theory using 
simulated data. Co-integration, Vector Auto-regressive and causal models were used to verify the 
hypothesised theoretical model and test relationships between variables of interest. The outcome is 
then used to develop a predictive model for active cyber defence. The next chapter provides a 
practical implementation of the developed theoretical framework using an experiment built around the 
scenario. 
  








This chapter presents the methods for data gathering, data preparation and data analysis in this 
research. The chapter presents the benchmark data used in validating the theoretical constructs 
presented in section Error! Reference source not found. of this research. Additionally, this phase of 
the research specifically highlights the analytical techniques applied to the benchmark data. The data 
preparation follows Hair et al. (2010)’s six-step structured approach to multivariate model 
construction. The process of building of the time-series prediction model at each stage of the 
experiment is also outlined, and the proposed analytical framework follows (Kuhn & Johnson Applied 
predictive modelling) step-by-step guide for building predictive models. Finally, this chapter tests the 
implementation of the structural analytical theory, vector autoregressive models, designed to test the 
suggested experimental hypothesis between the underlying constructs of the entangled cyberspace 
model.  
 
 DATA PREPARATION 5.2
This section explains how the data used in this research was acquired, formatted and transformed. 
Data acquisition, data formatting, data aggregation, data transformation and data validation was 
performed (Pyle, Editor and Cerra, 1999) in order to ensure data consistency, comprehensiveness and 
relevance to the problem statement. This study comprises of multiple sources of evidence which are 
assumed to represent theoretical concepts to be tested. Therefore, datasets were uniquely selected to 
represent activities on the physical, social and economic dimension respectively. In order to achieve a 
representative data model, the researcher creates a data space for each dimension of cyberspace 
represented in the literature review. In this regard, this study works with three data spaces, where each 
dataspace contains multiple sources of evidence. A 5-stage data preparation approach (Pyle, Editor 
and Cerra, 1999) was applied to each dataset on each dimension using a functional scripting 
language
1
. The data preparation strategy used on each data dimension is visualized in the figure 
below. 
                                                 
1
  All scripts and files used in producing the results seen in this section are available. see Appendix 1.1 





Figure 5-1: Data Preparation Framework 
5.2.1 Data Acquisition 
 
This section describes how the data used in this research was collected. It presents the sources of 
evidence that feeds model testing of the theoretical constructs. This research uses subsets of the 2011 
VAST IEEE visual analytics challenge datasets with a combination of real-world datasets simulated 
from the financial market prices. The IEEE Visual Analytics Benchmark Repository (Cook et al., 
2011) contains benchmark datasets and experiments for theoretical testing and development. The 
ground truth in benchmarks follows the events outlined in the scenario development, allowing for 
accuracy in metrics comparison and computation. Primarily, benchmark datasets are assumed to 
contain theoretical constructs under observation, and it is the researcher’s aim to use these datasets to 
test how well the research artefact picks up the nature of entanglements embedded in the datasets. The 
datasets used in this research are selected specifically to create a uniform representation of each 




5.2.1.1 Data Acquisition on The Physical Dimension 
 
Two categories of data are made available on the physical dimension; physical network data for a 
fictitious company and weather data readings for the metropolitan city in the scenario. These datasets 
represent the network layer and real-world layer of the physical dimension of cyberspace as discussed 
in the literature review. The datasets on the network layer are provided as evidence for improving the 
overall cyber situational awareness of the company (Cook et al., 2011). Four of the six datasets 
provided by the IEEE vast (Cook et al., 2011) are used in this research.  
                                                 
2
 All scripts and files used in producing the results seen in this section are available. see Appendix 1.2 




In this research, we aim to incorporate activities on the physical dimension of cyberspace in our 
theoretical model. The datasets provided on the physical dimension are as follows: 
 Network flow data from the network layer. 
 Intrusion Detection Logs from the network layer. 
 Firewall Logs from the network layer. 
 Weather data from the real-world layer. 
 
The scenario developed in this research incorporates log data from the network layer and weather data 
readings from the real-world layer of cyberspace. Three types of network log datasets were provided: 
network traffic logs, firewall logs and intrusion detection logs. 
Network flow data (PCAP Files) is provided for three days of network observations. The PCAP files 
are packet header data for all communications between source and destination IP addresses within the 






 of May. 
Communications are distinguished by the protocol-level information in the header, the source and 
destination port addresses, service levels and time.  
In addition to network flow capture data, network firewall logs are also provided. The firewall for the 
experiment in this research is a Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance 5510 (Cisco, 2017). There are one 
or more firewall log files for each of the three days under observation. Each file is a maximum of 512 
megabytes, containing both internal network events and external network events. All internal network 
events involving traffic between VLANs are logged, and all traffic relating to external networks is 
logged. This data is captured in a comma-separated values (.csv) file, with the most recent entry at the 
top.  
The intrusion detection system used in the experimental design is Snort (Dwivedi and Tripathi, 2015). 
Snort is a customizable intrusion detection system used to detect different types of network traffic 
based on a pre-defined set of rules.  
This dataset includes one IDS log for each day in text file (.txt) format that includes all intrusion 
detection events for the entire network for that day. Each log entry contains many detailed fields for 
each detected event. Each event relates to a entry in IDS logs collected by network SNORT. These 
fields are shown and explained in the table below:  
 
S/N CONTENT DESCRIPTION 
1 [**]  
[Snort Rule File]  
Text of specific rule violated  
[**] 
Text of specific rule violated 
2 [Classification: an optional generalized 
description of the alert]  
Classification (if present) 
 
3 [Priority of the alert] Priority 
4 Date/Time MM/DD-HH24:MI:SS.milliseconds Date/Time 
 
5 Source IP/Port Source IP/Port 
6 Destination IP/Port Destination IP/Port 
Remaining 
lines 
No content used in the challenge None 
Table 5-1: Intrusion Detection Fields 
In addition to the network layer, the real-world layer is also represented on the physical dimension.   




Weather data readings are provided for the metropolitan city in the scenario environment. The data 
was recorded at specific weather stations daily for a period of 20 days. The daily average wind speed, 
overall daily weather classification and wind direction are recorded in a .csv file 
A firewall is set up to monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic on a network and additionally filters 
specific types of connections from entering a network. In addition to IDS logs and network traffic 
logs, firewall logs are also provided from the experimental environment. The firewall logs record 
every connection made to the target network. Additionally, the firewall log records if each connection 
was rejected or accepted within the number of inbound connections and outbound connections on a 
network. 
 
SN FEATURE NAME FEATURE DESCRIPTION REFERENCE 
1 Date Time Date and Time when the activity was 
performed 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
2 Syslog Priority Priority of the log message (Fu et al., 2009) 
3 Operation Type of activity being performed (Fu et al., 2009) 
4 Message Code Message Code (Fu et al., 2009) 
5 Protocol Connection Protocol Type (Fu et al., 2009) 
6 Source IP Source IP associated with the activity (Fu et al., 2009) 
7 Destination IP Destination IP associated with the 
activity 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
8 Source Hostname Source Hostname associated with the 
source IP 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
9 Destination 
Hostname 
Destination Hostname associated with 
the destination IP 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
10 Destination Port Destination port associated with the 
destination IP 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
11 Source Port Source  port associated with the 
source IP 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
12 Destination 
Service 
Name of service associated with the 
destination port 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
13 Connections Built Number of connections built in this 
operation 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
14 Connections Torn Number of connections torn down in 
this operation 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
Table 5-2: Firewall Fields 
 
5.2.1.2 Data Acquisition on the Social Dimension 
 
Similarly, the researcher aims to incorporate data from the social dimension of cyberspace. Data on 
the social dimension of cyberspace are generated by cyber-personas, behind which exists real-world 
personas. The thoughts and social perception of these cyber-personas are captured as text data, more 
specifically social forum discussions. The social dimension of cyberspace characterizes activities 
from cyber personas and real-world personas. This dimension seeks to capture interactions, thoughts, 
perception and social interactions between personas in cyberspace. In order to incorporate the 
concepts of the persona and cyber persona in this research, social interactions from microblogging 




platforms are provided. This experiment represents these interactions with the text feeds provided by 
the IEEE vast data. Within the scenario, the microblogging messages were collected from various 
devices with GPS tracking capabilities. These devices include laptop computers, handheld computers, 
and cellular phones. The feeds are also tagged with unique identifiers for users posting these messages 
at any given time. The initial variables provided are outlined in the table below: 
 
SN VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
1 ID Personal Identifier of the individual posting the message. 
2 Created_at Date and Time the message was posted. 
3 Location Geographical coordinates of the device at the time of 
posting. 
4 Text The message that was posted. 
Table 5-3: Initial Features from Microblogging Feeds 
This data is the mini-challenge 1 data of the 2011 IEEE Vast visual analytics challenge available at 
(HCIL, 2013). 1,023,077 chat text was collected from 73,928 users in the chatroom over a 20-day 
time frame between the 30
th
 of April and the 20
th
 of May. 
5.2.1.3 Data Acquisition on the Economic Dimension 
 
The economic dimension contains evidence that supports the effects of economic, political and 
cultural events on cyber-events. Data collection on the economic layer used a real-world simulation of 
the desired effect. The scenario development in this research requires the representation of a 
company’s stock price crash. For this challenge, the researcher gathered data from the 2017 bitcoin 
price crash. The Bitcoin (BCH) price crash of 2017 took place from July 2017 after maintaining a 
steady increasing trend all year round. The per-minute figures for the opening, closing, market high, 
market low, market capitalization and price volume was collected for each day for the year 2017. The 
data was collected for a one-year window following the start of the increasing trend at the start of the 
year through the crash up until the end of the year. This duration was selected for two reasons. First, 
the experiment requires that a base of “normality” be established. Incorporating a time period where 
prices followed a “normal” trend helps the research artefact to identify sudden changes in this trend. 
Second, existing research indicates that long-term analysis of financial markets provides a more 
accurate overview of the long-term performance or sustainability of financial prices (Jin and An, 
2015). The table below shows the description of the variables used on this dimension. 
 
SN Variable Name Variable Description 
1 Open Per Minute Opening Prices for stock prices. 
2 Close Per Minute Closing Prices for stock prices. 
3 High Highest Stock Price recorded per minute. 
4 Low Lowest stock price recorded per minute. 
5 Volume_USD An average number of Company’s shares traded within a 
given time frame. 
6 Market Capitalization Average total recorded value of Company’s stocks within 
a given time frame. 
Table 5-4: Initial Features from Stock Data 
The rationale behind including this real-world data into the experimental design is to ensure that all 
dimensions are represented in the experiment. These prices are to reflect the effects of activities on the 




economic layer on events in other dimensions of the information space. The prices are included in the 
experiment to determine the possibilities of our proposed approach, picking up these evidences if they 
exist. Additionally, this research is concerned with proving that design artefacts are capable of picking 
up entanglements within various dimensions in cyberspace if they exist. It is geared toward 
establishing prove for an inter-dependent relationship between entities and elements in cyberspace.  
5.2.2 Data Transformation 
This section describes how the data collected in this research was transformed. Data transformation is 
necessary to extract useable features from data in a way that dynamics and relationships contained in 
the data are retained. Datasets provided on each dimension are transformed into suitable formats for 
predictive modelling and result analysis. Useful features are derived from existing data on each 
dimension using well-tested techniques that retain the dynamics of relationships between features in 
the datasets. Features are extracted to represent each event in the experimental design using 
transformation and quantification techniques. 
5.2.2.1 Data Transformation on Physical Dimension 
On the physical dimension, data transformation is performed on the three datasets provided, network 
traffic logs, intrusion detection logs and firewall logs.  
5.2.2.1.1 Network Traffic Fields 
Fields from the network traffic logs, in the pcap formats, are extracted using the tshark library on a 
Linux command line interface. The following fields were extracted from each packet in the pcap files. 
SN VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE DESCRIPTION REFERENCE 
1 Source IP Internet Protocol Address of the device 
sending the IP Packet. 
(Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
2 Destination IP Internet Protocol Address of the device 
receiving the IP Packet. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
3 Source Port Port number from which the data or 
request should be sent from the remote 
host. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
4 Destination Port Port number to which the data or request 
should be sent on the receiving host. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
5 Packet Arrival Time The timestamp when the packet was 
received. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
6 Epoch Time Also known as “UNIX” time is the 




Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
7 IP Protocol The protocol used for session 
communication. Can be 1 for UDP 
packets, 4 for IPV4 packets, 17 for UDP 
packets or 6 for TCP packets. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
8 Total Length The packet length in bytes Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
9 Time To Live The remaining lifetime of a packet when 
it is floating in a network. 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
10 IP Flags Flags field used to control how a 
specific IP packet is treated by a device 
Borja, 2013; Sanders, 
2017) 
11 Entropy of Source Ratio of packets with a given source IP (Shah and Tanvi, 2006) 




IP to ratio of all Source IPs within a given 
time frame. 
12 Entropy of 
Destination IP 
Ratio of packets with destination IP to 
ratio of all packets receiving IPs within a 
given time frame. 
(Shah and Tanvi, 2006) 
13 Entropy of Source 
Port 
Ratio of packets with a given source port 
to ratio of all Source ports within a 
given time frame. 
(Shah and Tanvi, 2006) 
14 Entropy of 
Destination Port 
Ratio of packets with a given destination 
port to ratio of all destination ports 
within a given time frame. 
(Shah and Tanvi, 2006) 
15 Packet Type Protocol used to transmit data over the 
network. 
(Shah and Tanvi, 2006) 
Table 5-5: Features Extracted from Network Traffic Logs 
The twenty-one extracted fields were converted into a CSV file where each record in the CSV file 
represents filed data for a single packet identified by the packet number. 
5.2.2.1.2 Intrusion Detection Log Fields 





May. Each text file contains log entries for event caught by snort. Each plain text file was transformed 
into a list of events where each item in the list is an event caught by snort recorded in the file. For 
each log entry, the researcher extracts all available variables such as the snort rule violated, alert 
classification, the priority of the alert, destination ports, source ports, destination IP, source IP, date 
and time of the alert. The table below outlines the features extracted from the Intrusion detection 
system logs. 
 
SN FEATURE NAME FEATURE DEASCRIPTION REFERENCE 
1 Date of Event Date of Alert (Fu et al., 2009) 
2 Time of Event Time of Alert (Fu et al., 2009) 
3 Alert 
Classification 
Description of Alert, e.g. portscan. 
Pingsweep, Attempted Denial Of 
Service 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
4 Priority of Alert Priority Level of alert (Fu et al., 2009) 
5 Destination IP Destination IP of alert (Fu et al., 2009) 
6 Destination Port Destination port associated with 
destination IP 
(Fu et al., 2009) 
7 Source IP Source IP of Alert (Fu et al., 2009) 
8 Source Port Source port associated with source IP (Fu et al., 2009) 
Table 5-6: Features Extracted from Intrusion Detection Logs 
5.2.2.1.3 Firewall Log Fields 
The firewall data was provided in a CSV format therefore little, or no data transformation was needed 
at this stage. However, selected features would be extracted from this dataset at a later stage of data 
preparation.  
 




5.2.2.2 Data Transformation on the Social Dimension 
In order to ensure a uniform data format for all datasets across three dimensions, the researcher 
applied data transformation techniques that quantify the given text data while retaining as much useful 
information as possible. The original data was aggregated on time to produce a per-minute summary 
of the original data. This first stage of data transformation produced a new dataset with four variables: 
the timestamp of the current minute, a combination of all messages posted within that minute, the 
total number of users posting within the minute and the total number of unique places recorded by the 
geographical location. 
The next phase of data transformation on the social dimension involves the quantification of the 
messages posted in the chat forum. This quantification phase follows a four-part approach: 
quantification based on opinions, quantification based on context-relatedness, quantification based on 
the uncertainty of information and quantification based on plutchnik’s wheel of emotions (Plutchik, 
1982).  
5.2.2.2.1 Quantification of Microblogging Feeds 
 
This subsection outlines the methods used in the quantification of microblogging feeds on the social 
dimension. The quantification techniques presented here are taken from an extensive review and 
evaluations of methods used in contemporary literature. The algorithms and techniques critically 
discussed in the literature review in (Plutchik, 1982; Nigam, Lafferty and Mccallum, 1999; Rose et 
al., 2010; Calefato, Lanubile and Novielli, 2017)are implemented in this section and applied to 
microblog data. The quantification of microblogging data is important to extract information from text 
data in a format that fits into predictive models. 
 
5.2.2.2.1.1 Word Count   
 
In modern English language, individual words are separated by an empty space. Therefore, given a 
text corpus C, the word count WC is defined as the number of individual words in C delimited by an 
empty space: 
 




Equation 5-1: Word Count In Text Data 
 
However, the relevance of the measure of “word count” is based on the pre-assumption of English 
language texts. In addition, the word count is also used as a normalizing feature for other frequency-
based quantification of text data. 
Each text in the microblogging feed is first split on a specific delimiter (in the English language, a 
space to indicate the separation of words) to create an array F of words. The word count is then given 
as the length of F. 
 
5.2.2.2.1.2 Opinion mining 
 
Given a text corpus C, we a five-item tuple “Opinion” is derived containing the positivity, negativity, 
neutrality, sentiment orientation, sentiment intensity of C.  




Opinion (C) = (PS, NG, NE, SO, SUB) 
Where; 
PS: The degree of positivity of C  
NG: The degree of negativity of C  
NE: The degree of neutrality of C 
SO: the Sentiment orientation or polarity of C 
SUB: The opinion subjectivity of C i.e. the measure of bias expressed in C. 
 
The general idea behind sentiment analysis as discussed in chapter 2, is to calculate an opinion score 
for a given text corpus. Here, the researcher represents sentiment as a tuple with three items, 
sentiment orientation (SO), sentiment ratings (SR) and sentiment intensity (SI):  
 
Sentiment = (SO, SR, SI) 
Calculating the sentiment orientation involves assigning a measure of positivity, negativity or 
neutrality to the sentiment score SS of a given text corpus. A threshold or boundary of neutrality is 
then required to classify text as positive, negative or neutral. The point of neutrality, usually the 
threshold, is the point at which it is assumed that no opinion is expressed in the given text. This point 
is usually 0. In its most standard form, the sentiment score of a given text corpus SS is given as:  






Equation 5-2: Sentiment Score of Text Data 
 
Where P is the number of positive words in the text corpus and N is the total number of negative 
words in the document. In this case, the threshold of neutrality is 0 which indicates the absence of 
sentiment in an opinion. If SS is less than 0, the text corpus is said to have an overall negative score. 
On the other hand, if the text corpus is greater than 0, the text corpus is said to have an overall 
positive score. In addition, this method uses opinion lexicon of positive and negative words designed 
by (Lui, 2015) to tag each word in a given text corpus as “positive” or “negative” after appropriate 
data cleaning techniques have been applied to the text corpus.  
Sentiment intensity refers to the strength of the opinion having been classified as positive, negative or 
neutral. An opinion can be weakly positive, weakly negative, strongly positive or strongly negative. 
 
5.2.2.2.1.3 Entropy  
Let us consider a binary variable X, which is associated with precisely a single word. X = 1 if the 
word exists in a given document and X = 0 otherwise. The entropy of the entropy of the word X is 
given as:  
 
𝐻(𝑋) =  −𝑃(𝑋 = 0)𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑃(𝑋 = 0) − 𝑃(𝑋 = 1)𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃(𝑋 = 1) 
Equation 5-3: Shannon's Entropy of Text Data 
 
The negative logarithm of each word in each text in the microblog feeds is summed up to produce a 
quantified measure of information uncertainty for each text. In information theory, the degree of 
randomness of a variable is directly correlated with the entropy and in contrast the greater the 
certainty or order of the variable, the smaller the entropy.  




The above definition of entropy indicates that the more randomness is associated with a specific 
variable of interest the bigger the uncertainty associated with it as well. Using entropy measurements 
for language texts involves estimating the measure of credibility of the information transmitted by a 
communication channel. When estimating the information entropy of a language text which consists 
of letters, words and sentences, each letter occurrence is treated as a sequential realization of a certain 
pattern. The amount of information contributed by the occurrence of each letter is therefore dependent 
on the intended sequence that forms the entire language text. Therefore, a probability distribution of 
all letters and all possible sequential combinations of letters are considered. Using this technique 
reveals the usefulness of each letter or word to the expression of the entire language text and also the 
level of complexity of the language text. For example, a long string of language text, containing a 
single letter, ‘aaaaaaaa’ would have an entropy of 0 indicating an absence of useful information in the 
text. This application does not account for covert channels of communication especially in areas of 
tracking cyber-related activities embedded in unstructured data [ref] the methods described in the 
methodology are limited to normal channels of communications as standard techniques in research 
would apply. Whilst it is possible to have these covert channels of communication, the approach 
works on picking up signatures within unstructured data as is, i.e it does not assume any prior 
structure to the data or signatures within the language used.  
5.2.2.2.1.4 Plunik’s Emotion Detection 
 
The system used for classification of text into the eight dimensions of Plutchnik’s emotions is based 
on gold standard datasets provided by (Norcross, Guadagnoli and Prochaska, 1984). Our approach 
trains a multi-class classification model using gold standard labelled dataset. Each text in the gold 
standard dataset is labelled as either one of Plutchnik’s eight dimensions of emotions. The application 
of trained recurrent neural network (RNN) models produces eight new probabilities for each text in 
microblog feeds: Anger, Anticipation, Sadness, Trust, Joy, Fear, Disgust and Surprise. 
5.2.2.2.1.5 Context Relatedness 
This section explains how the lexicon used for quantifying the various events of interest in the 
microblogging feeds was created. Given a set of text corpus C, that represents discussions on a 
particular topic of interest, the researcher seeks to create a wordlist of K terms that are seen to 
frequently occur across all corpus samples. Working under the assumption that these terms captures 
the event of interest, the researcher quantifies microblogging feeds combining the relative frequency 
of occurrence of these terms in each feed and pairwise mutual information of occurrence with other 
words in the feed. 
Problem Definition  
Given a corpus 𝐶 and a wordlist 𝐷, where 𝑑1 to 𝑑𝑛 represents a set of words that are frequently used 
during the occurrence of the event of interest, a rank 𝐾 is derived where 𝐾 is the number of matches 
of 𝑑𝑖 in 𝐶. Here we say the value 𝐾 represents the “context-relatedness” of the corpus 𝐶.  
 Creating the wordlists 
The experiment follows three different events on the social dimension: Discussions about a cyber-
attack, discussions about a fire incident and discussions about flu symptoms to signify the dispersion 
of a flu epidemic. Additionally, the researcher uses the cyber-attack discussions to characterize the 
weaponization phase of the kill chain in the experiment. In order to accomplish these tasks, the 
researcher creates a wordlist for each event listed above, a flu event, a cyber-incident, a fire incident 
and cyber weaponization.  




The ‘flu wordlist’ was created by targeting words that signified symptoms of a flu. These words were 
taken from flu descriptions from patients and medical experts on medical sites such as cdc.gov 
(cdc.gov, 2016), nhs.uk (Hern and Gibbs, 2017) and webmd.com. Similarly, the ‘fire wordlist’, is 
created by extracting discussions, complaints and alerts from incident response handles on twitter 
such as @UkFireServices, @ChicagoFireServices, @OttFire and @911FireUK. The researcher was 
careful to only collect tweets from other users mentioning these handles as opposed to collecting 
tweets posted by the handles themselves. 
In both scenarios, in order to create a wordlist of relative terms, the researcher applies keyword 
extraction technique based on terms that best describe the subject of each text provided. The keyword 
extraction technique is based on the rapid automatic keyword extraction described by (Rose et al., 
2010). The RAKE algorithm begins keyword extraction by creating a set of candidate keywords from 
the text corpus. To create a set of candidate keywords, the algorithm starts off by splitting the text into 
an array of words using specified delimiters. This array of words is then grouped into contiguous 
words using specific words and phrases as delimiters. Words occurring together within groups are 
considered to be candidate keywords.  Each identified word is then given a score based on the 
frequency of occurrence and degree of co-occurrence with other words. Finally, the top K scoring 
terms are selected as the extracted keywords from the corpus.  
To create the ‘cyber-incident’ wordlist, cyber discussions from known cyber-incident related twitter 
handles, discussions from specific subreddits and blog posts from cyber-attack reporting blogs such as 
cyberwarnews.info, hackreads.com and hackmaggedon.com were used. Similarly, in creating the 
‘weaponization’ wordlist, exploit and vulnerability descriptions from exploit database, google hacking 
database and common vulnerabilities database (CVE) was used. 
In the cases of the ‘cyber-incident’ and ‘weaponization’ wordlists, the RAKE keyword extraction 
algorithm was extended to include a pointwise mutual information score for each co-occurrence of 
words. The researcher creates a PMI matrix of candidate terms, and the top K terms were selected. 
Where 𝐾 =  
1
3
∗ 𝑁 and N is the total number of words in the text corpus.  
 
To calculate the degree of ‘relatedness’ of a document, we rely on a word frequency-based algorithm 
that is a function of the document’s words and our generic wordlists. For the purpose of this 
evaluation, our estimate of the ‘relatedness’ of a given text is a measure of the summed term scores of 
individuals words in the text matched to terms in our generic wordlist. The term scores in the wordlist 
are re-scaled on a scale of 0 through 100. The relatedness of a text is therefore estimated as the 
average of the term scores of all context-related terms in the given text. Given that all term scores 
were previously put on a scale of 0 through 100, the expected estimate for the relatedness of any given 
text should also be on a similar scale. Therefore, these estimates can be represented as a percentage. 
Note that each word in a text is scored regardless of its frequency of occurrence; therefore, a word W 
with a word frequency of 3 will add (𝑊𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑠) ∗ 3 to the total text score. 
 
1.1.1.1 Data Transformation on the Economic Dimension 
 
Data on the economic dimension consists of json files for every minute of every day for the time 
period December 31
st
 2016 to January 1
st
 2018. As earlier mentioned, the rationale behind including 
this data into the experimental environment is to simulate a stock market crash for the fictitious 
companies. Bitcoin prices were reported to have experienced a massive crash in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2017 (CoinMarketCap, 2018). This real-world simulation ensures that the data used 
captures the dynamics of analytical interest intended. Each json file was converted into csv 
representing the variables shown in Table 5-4 above. All resulting csv files were further 




chronologically merged into a single csv file. The raw data is available at (CoinMarketCap, 2018). 
Using the method stated, the researcher collected the raw data for everyday within the time frame in 
json format. This resulted in 396 json files. Each json file contained with each object representing a 
tuple of seven items (Opening Price, Closing Price, High, Low, Volume BTC, Volume USD, Market 
Capitalization). The resulting list of tuples contained 1440 tuples each represent a single minute of the 
given day. The json file for each day was converted into a .csv format using only unique records (all 
duplicate records were discarded). All 396 csv files were combined into a single file and sorted 
chronologically. All variables within the final csv file were converted into their appropriate format 
and the final data represents the (Date, Time, Opening Prices, Closing Prices, Highest observed price 
within the minute, Low observed price within the minute, Volume USD and Market Capitalization) 
for every minute of every day within the time frame. The table below shows a summary of the 
variables extracted on this dimension. 
5.2.3 Data Merging and Aggregation (Generating Time Series) 
 
This study uses simple aggregation analysis to generate time signals for predictive model 
development. At this stage of the data preparation, it was important to integrate all datasets on a 
similar cohesive timeline for analysis. On the physical dimension, individual fields in the packet data, 
IDS log data and firewall data are analysed to extract useful information for effective time series 
analysis. The table below outline the variables derived from a time-based aggregation analysis and 
combination of features from each data source on the network layer.  
 
 FEATURE NAME FEATURE DESCRIPTION DATA 
SORCE 
1 Total Number of Packets The total number of packets 
observed for a given time window 
T. 
Pcap Logs 
2 Total Number of Source 
IPs recorded 
The total number of unique 
source IPs observed for a given 
time window T. 
Pcap Logs 
3 Total Number of 
Destination IPs recorded 
The total number of unique 
destination IPs observed for a 
given time window T 
Pcap Logs 
4 Total Number of Source 
Ports recorded. 
The total number of unique 
source ports observed for a given 
time window T 
Pcap Logs 
5 Total Number of 
Destination Ports recorded. 
The total number of unique 
destination ports observed for a 
given time window T 
Pcap Logs 
6 Mean Epoch Time Mean of all epoch times within a 
given window T. 
Pcap Logs 
7 Mean Ip Length  Pcap Logs 
8 Mean Transmitted Bytes  Pcap Logs 
9 Flag The total number of flags raised 
within a given time window T. 
We expect an equal variance in 
the long term for normal traffic 
Pcap Logs 




taking the total number of 
connections into consideration. 
10 Mean Frame Length  Pcap Logs 
11 Mean TTL  Pcap Logs 
12 Network Average Hold 
Time 
  
13 Network Traffic The amount of data moving 
through the network for a given 
time window T. 
 
14 Network Congestion The amount of people 
communicating on a network 
within a given time window T. 
 
15 Number of total 
connections made 
The total number of inbound and 
outbound connections made 
within a given time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
16 Total number of packets 
sent 
The total number of outbound 
packets sent within a given time 
window T. 
Pcap Logs 
17 Total number of inbound 
connections 
The total number of inbound 
packets received within a given 
time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
18 Total number of outbound 
connections 
Total number of outbound 
connections made within a given 
time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
19 Total number of 
connections built  
The total number of inbound 
connections made within a given 
time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
20 Total number of 
connections torn down 
The total number of connections 
rejected by firewall within a given 
time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
21 Total Number of services Total Number of services running 
on destination ports within a 
given time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
22 Total Number of Operation Total Number of operations / 
activities performed within a 
given time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
23 Average Syslog Priority The average level of priority for 
alerts received within a given 
time window T. 
Firewall 
Logs 
24 Total number of IDS alerts The total number of alerts raised 
by the Intrusion detection system 
within a given time window T. 
IDS Logs 
25 Average level of intrusion 
priority 
The average level of Intrusion 
detection priority within a given 
time window T. 
IDS Logs 
26 DOS Alerts Total number of Attempted denial IDS Logs 




of service alerts raised within a 
given time window T. 
27 Port Scan Alerts Total number of port scan alerts 
raised within a given time 
window T. 
IDS Logs 
28 Ping sweep Alerts Total number of pingsweep alerts 
raised within a given time 
window T. 
IDS Logs 
29 Spp_frag3 Total number of spp_frag3 alerts 
raised within a given time 
window T. 
IDS Logs 
30 Total number of DNS 
requests 
The total number of DNS 
requests made on port 53 within a 
given time window T. 
Pcap Logs 
31 Total number of UDP 
Connections 
The total number of UDP Packets 
transmitted within a given time 
window T. 
Pcap Logs 
31 Total number of TCP 
Connections 
The total number of TCP Packets 
transmitted within a given time 
window T. 
Pcap Logs 
31 Total number of ICMP 
Connections 
The total number of ICMP 
Packets transmitted within a 
given time window T. 
Pcap Logs 
32 Total Number of HTTPS 
requests 
The total number of HTTPS 
requests made on port 443 within 
a given time window T. 
Pcap Logs 
33 Total Number of Email 
Requests 
The total number of EMAIL 
requests made on port 25 within a 
given time window T. 
Pcap Logs 
Table 5-7: Network Data Aggregated Features 
These features were generated from simple per-second aggregates of previous extracted features from 
the three datasets provided on this dimension. Similarly, on the social dimension, all probability 
features were merged with newly quantified text information to produce the features listed in the table 
below: 
SN Derived Variable Description Reference 
1 Word Count The number of unique words in 
a given text document. 
(Blumenstock, 2008) 
2 Opinion: Sentiment -
Positivity 
Degree of the positive 
emotional effect or positive 
polarity expressed in a given 
text document. 
(Pang and Lee, 2006; 
Cambria et al., 2013; Lui, 
2015) 
3 Opinion: Sentiment -
Negativity 
Degree of the negative 
emotional effect or negative 
polarity expressed in a given 
text document. 
(Pang and Lee, 2006; 
Cambria et al., 2013; Lui, 
2015) 
4 Opinion: Sentiment - Degree of unbias expressed in (Pang and Lee, 2006; 




Neutrality a given text document. Cambria et al., 2013; Lui, 
2015) 
5 Opinion: Sentiment -
Subjectivity 
The degree to which the 
emotions expressed in a given 
text document are based on or 
influenced by personal 
feelings, tastes, or opinions. 
 
(Pang and Lee, 2006; 
Cambria et al., 2013; Lui, 
2015) 
6 Opinion: Sentiment -
Polarity 
The overall orientation 
(Positive, Negative or Neutral) 
expressed in a given text 
document. 
(Pang and Lee, 2006; 
Cambria et al., 2013; Lui, 
2015) 
7 Relatedness: Cyber 
Relatedness 
The degree to which a given 
text is related to a cyber event. 
Author 
8 Relatedness: Flu 
Relatedness 
The degree to which a given 
text document is related to a 
flu event as expressed in the 
experimental scenario. 
Author 
9 Relatedness: Fire or 
Accident Relatedness 
The degree to which a given 
text document is related to a 
fire event as expressed in the 
experimental scenario. 
Author 
10 Entropy The average degree of 
uncertainty associated with a 
given text document. 
(C E Shannon, 1948; 
Bentz, 2016) 
 Channel Congestion The number of unique cyber 
personas engaged in a 
conversation within a given 
time window T. 
(Cleveland and Sun, 1995) 
 Channel Traffic The number of messages 
flowing through a channel 
within a given time window T. 
(Cleveland and Sun, 1995) 
 Emotion Detection The degree of emotions (one of 
Joy, Sadness, Anger, Disgust, 
Trust, Anticipation) expressed 
in a given text document 
(Norcross, Guadagnoli 
and Prochaska, 1984) 
Table 5-8: Features from the Social Dimension 
 
In conclusion, datasets were collected, transformed and aggregated to suit the demands of the 
experiment detailed in the scenario development. 
 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 5.3
 
This section explains how the data collected in this research is analysed. It outlines a procedural 
process for analysing the data at each stage of the experiment. Each dataset at each stage of the 
experiment is passed through a series of tests (Stationarity, Gaussian and Co-integration Tests). This 




section also goes further to explain the criteria for feature selection, vector autoregressive model order 
selection and the final model selection. Additionally, techniques for model validation, model 
prediction and error propagation to the next phase of the kill-chain are also critically discussed.  
Following the experimental design, the analysis is designed to address the hypothesis developed in the 
theory and experiment. The following steps outlined in this framework are undertaken for each phase 
of the experimental analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Experiment Analytical Framework 
The methods depicted in above analytical framework and how they are used in the experimental 
design is further discussed in section 5.3, sub-sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.11. 
5.3.1 Stationarity Test 
A stationarity test was carried out for each variable on each dataspace to ensure data did not violate 
pre-assumptions of stationarity within vector autoregressive models (Luetkepohl, 2011). Here, we test 
for trend stationarity and unit root processes to determine the proper transformation technique to be 
applied to each feature. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s (Cheung and La, 1995) test for unit root 
processes was conducted on each variable, and the results are documented in the experiment results. 
The Augmented Dickey fuller’s difference stationarity test conducted tests the null hypothesis for the 
presence of a unit root in each variable. Given a stochastic feature X, the augmented Dickey fuller 
tests provided a test hypothesis: 
𝐻0: X contains a unit root 
𝐻1: X does not contain a unit root 
Unit root processes are always non-stationary integrated order of D where D > 0, but may not always 
have a trend. The trend stationarity tests the null hypothesis that a process is a sum of a long-run 
linear trend and an invertible noise sequence (Hamilton, 1994). The researcher uses a difference 
transformation for unit root processes and logarithm transformation for trend stationarity data. 
On the network layer, all variables excluding the ‘The Number of Source Ips’, ‘The Number of 
Destination Ips’, ‘Mean time to live’, ‘Mean Captured Bytes’ and ‘The number of IDS Warning’ were 
stationary. All variables on the social dimension also return a significant p-value for null hypothesis 




stationarity. None of the features on the economic dimension were stationary. Consequently, data 
transformation was applied to detrend and normalize features that did not conform to pre-assumptions 
of stationarity and normality under necessary conditions in the experiment. 
 
5.3.2 Gaussian Test 
The Gaussian test is also known as a test for normality. Additionally, a Gaussian test was completed 
on each variable to ensure that pre-assumptions of normality are not violated. This research uses 
Jarque-Bera’s Skewness-Kurtosis test to ensure that all constructs were within the acceptable limit of 
skewness-kurtosis ranges. This test is chosen due to its robustness as compared to other generalist 
tests such as Anderson-Darling test and the Shapiro-Wilk test. The skewness-kurtosis test draws a 
contrast between the study data distributions and normal distributions (Hair, 2014).  Assuming a bell-
curve is plotted for the distribution of a random variable, skewness and kurtosis are known measures 
that go hand-in-hand. While skewness displays the direction to which the curve has shifted, kurtosis 
measures the robustness of the bell-curve. On one hand, measuring skewness delivers some insights 
into the asymmetry and balance of probability distribution of the data around its mean. For instance, a 
positively skewed distribution produces a bell-curve significantly shifted to the right. On the other 
hand, measuring the kurtosis delivers insights into the peakedness or flatness of the distribution. 
Therefore, positive kurtosis values suggest a peaked distribution while negative kurtosis values 
suggest a flatter distribution (Hair, 2014). Skewness-kurtosis critical values have been discussed and 
examined by many different academics (Massey, 1951; Cheung and La, 1995; Ghasemi and 
Zahediasl, 2012) and the general consensus for an acceptable range is between ±2.58 at a 0.01 
significance level.  
The researcher uses the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test to access both the levels of 
skewness and peakedness of each time vector in the model at each stage of the experiment. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test is a nonparametric test for the similarity of one-dimensional 
probability distributions.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test tests the null hypothesis that the 
cumulative distribution function of the sample is equal to the cumulative distribution function of an 
hypothesized ideal normal distribution. It quantifies the difference or distance between the 
observations of the observed sample and the observations of an ideal normal distribution. The test is 
conducted at a 95% confidence level with a two-tailed alpha level of 0.025. If the estimated p-value is 
less than the chosen alpha level, the null hypothesis that the sample is similar to a normal distribution 
is rejected. However, if the p-value is less than the chosen alpha level, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Therefore, significant p-values corresponds with non-normality of data.  
Logarithmic transformations are applied where necessary to meet assumptions of normality. Only 
2.4% of features on the network layer fell within the +2.58 and – 2.58 recommended range for both 
skewness and kurtosis tests. Most of the features on the social dimension fall within the acceptable 
range of skewness but are however seen to have a leptokurtic distribution. 83.3% of data on the 
economic dimension pass the tests for normality on both skewness and kurtosis.  
5.3.3 Outliers 
Outliers are described as being the most extreme points of data that have moderate to significant 
impact the effectiveness of model constructs and thus overall findings and conclusions. Outliers in 
time series data are often regarded as unexpected interventions or innovations from which various 




types of outlying observations can be produced. Identifying outliers in time series data is not 
straightforward as the presence of outliers may lead to multiple assumptions in the data. The easiest 
way to identify outliers is a simple line plot of the differences of data points against time. Outliers are 
seen as massive drifts from the mean and are usually interpreted as ‘anomalies’ in the data. While 
conventional methods of multivariate data analysis suggest the removal of outliers (Hair, 2014), the 
presence of outliers in time series explain the pattern of drifts from the series mean (Chen and Liu, 
1993). (Chen and Liu, 1993) develops a procedure for automatically detecting four types of outliers in 
time series data. 
 Additive outliers (AO) appear as a surprisingly large or small value occurring for a single 
observation in time. Subsequent observations remain unaffected by any drift of an additive 
outlier. 
 Similarly, to additive outliers, level shift (LS) outliers appear as surprisingly large or small 
values in the series however, all observations appearing immediately after the outlier move to 
a new level. This shift may affect subsequent observations and the effects may be permanent. 
 Innovational outliers (IO) are characterized by an initial impact at a single point in time but 
with effects that linger over subsequent observations of the series. The effects of this outlier 
may increase over time. 
 Temporal or Transient Change outliers (TO) are very similar to level shift outliers, however 
the effects of the outlier on the series diminishes exponentially over time with the series 
eventually returning to its normal levels. 
5.3.4 Missing Data 
Several approaches have been described by researchers for addressing the issue of missing data in 
time series data. Firstly, missing data in time series refer to points in time for which observations for 
the variable was not made or recorded. The primary approach for dealing with missing data is linked 
with understanding the pattern of missing data. This involves the researcher establishing the sources 
of the missing data in line with both random and non-random occurrences. Observation bias or 
intentional omission is said to be absent in the data if missing data is randomly distributed throughout 
time. The data used in this research can be analyzed for missing data on each dimension. On the 
physical dimension, merging the ids logs, network traffic logs and firewall logs led to sometime 
observations with missing data. Only time stamps with corresponding date time values across all logs 
were included in the final dataset. Similarly, on the economic dimension, days where stock prices 
were not observed were completely taken out of the data. 
Another commonly used approach for dealing with missing data especially in continuous datasets is 
the multiple imputation model (Acock, 2012). The idea behind the imputation model is to extract the 
dynamics of relevant information from the observed portions of the data, to impute multiple values for 
each missing data item. Most methods compute and construct multiple datasets depending on the 
estimated uncertainty in imputing each value. Multiple imputation has been proven to work properly 
for datasets with at most 30-40 features. 
5.3.5 Correlation Analysis 
To examine the linearity of relationships between observed features, this study uses the bivariate 
correlation matrix at a 0.01 significance level (2-tailed). As shown in the diagrams below, the is a 
53.4% significant correlation level (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is between +0.7 and -0.7) 




between features on the economic dimension. On the social dimension, only 10% significant 
correlation levels were observed while the physical dimension returned 13.4% significant correlation 
rates.  
5.3.5.1 Intra-Dimensional Correlation 
This inter-dimensional co-integration between features within each dimension may lead to multi-
collinearity in future analysis. However, this problem is addressed in the feature selection stage. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Inter-Dimensional Correlation on the Economic Dimension 
 
Of the 7 (M=7) features on the economic dimension, 3 (Open, Close and High) are seen to be highly 
positively correlated while ‘Volume’ is seen to have just enough significance to be positively 
correlated with the former 3 features.  
 





Figure 5-4: Inter-Dimensional Correlation on the Physical Dimension 
The physical dimension consists of 45 (M=45) features. As expected, variables like ‘The Number of 
TCP connections’, ‘The number of ICMP connections (‘ICMP’)’, ‘The number of UDP connections 
(‘UDP’)’ are seen to have significantly high positive correlation coefficients with ‘The total number 
of connections (‘totalCons’)’, ‘Number of Connection Built (‘conbuilt’) and torn down (‘corntorn’)’ 
and ‘The number of incoming (‘inbound’) and outgoing (‘outbound’) connections. Similarly, there is 
a significant linear relationship between the number of alerts from Intrusion Detection System and the 
number of applications running on the network.  





Figure 5-5: Inter-Dimensional Correlation on the Social Dimension 
Of the 22 features on the social dimension, 3 sets of 3 variables are seen to be highly correlated. The 
‘Entropy’, ‘Chat Traffic’ (‘Number _Of_Messages’) and ‘Cyber Relatedness’ (‘Cyber_Relate’) of 
variables are seen to all have significant correlation coefficients with each other. Similarly, the 
‘Chatroom Traffic’ (‘Number _Of_Messages’) and ‘Chatroom Congestion’ (‘Number _Of_Users’) 
are also seen to have significantly high correlation coefficients (Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient ≥ 
0.7) with each other. These correlations are expected given that the ‘quantification’ techniques of 
microblogging messages in section 5.2.2.2.1 are function variations of the number of words in each 
text. Interestingly, there is an observed negative correlation between the happiness of the population 
and their trust in context of the scenario events (Event 1-section 4.5.3.3). Subsequently, the researcher 
demonstrates intra-dimensional correlation between features on varios dimensions of the information 
space. 




5.3.6 Feature Selection 
A fundamental problem of predictive analytics is dimension reduction (Hall and Smith, 1998) which 
is aimed at reducing the number of features under consideration to obtain a subset of principal 
variables. Feature selection is done to simplify models by making interpretation easier, reducing 
training time and computational cost by reducing the hypothesis search space, avoiding the curse of 
dimensionality (Verleysen and François, 2005) and to avoid overfitting and enhance model 
generalization. There are three main strategies for feature selection: filter methods, wrapper methods 
and embedded methods.  
Wrapper methods build a predictive model for combination of feature subset. Wrapper methods 
include forward selection, backward selection and recursive selection. Additionally, wrapper methods 
are said to be very computationally intensive (a function of n X m) as they have to construct a model 
for every combination of subsets. Forward selection (Mehmood et al., 2012) is an iterative model 
which starts with an original model with m=0 features. On each iteration, each feature that is not 
already in the model is tested for plausible inclusion in the model. Only features that best improves 
the performance of the model in the midst of other features already in the model are added to the 
candidate model. Model performance is set based on a pre-set threshold for the p-value of each feature 
added to the model, usually 0.05 i.e. a 95% significance level.  One of the major drawbacks of 
forward selection is that significance of a variable is usually measured relative to other variables in 
the model. Therefore, each addition of a new variable, may render one or more variables already 
included in model as “non-significant”. As opposed to forward selection, backward selection (Hall 
and Smith, 1998) starts with all features initially in the model. On each iteration, the least significant 
features of all features at a chosen critical threshold is dropped. Each iteration successively refits 
reduced forms of the model by applying the same rule until only significant variables are left in the 
model. Recursive Feature Elimination or Stepwise selection on the other hand allows the selection 
algorithm to move in both ways backwards or forwards. The algorithm drops and adds features at 
each iteration by keeping the best and worst of every model constructed. The process alternates 
between choosing the least significant feature to drop and re-considering all dropped features for re-
introduction into the model. Therefore, this means that on each iteration, two separate hypotheses are 
tested, and two separate significance level are chosen for elimination and re-introduction. 
Filter methods are usually used as a pre-processing step with feature selection independent of any 
learning algorithm. Instead, features are scored based on their performance in various statistical tests 
with the outcome variable. Filter methods are often deemed to be computationally less-intensive while 
still capturing the relative usefulness of each feature in the model. A correlation-based feature 
selection procedure uses a search algorithm to evaluate the merit of each subset of features. The 
correlation-based feature selection procedure measures the goodness of feature subsets with the 
usefulness of each individual feature in predicting the outcome class and also the inter-correlation 
among features. It eliminates one or more of inter-correlated variables as they are seen to be 
redundant and add no more useful information (not already known) to the model. Therefore, the goal 
is to attain a feature subset where each feature is highly correlated with the outcome variable but non-
correlated with each other. (Hair, 2014) formalizes this measure of predictability VS redundancy as: 
𝐺𝑠 = 
𝑘𝑟𝑐𝑖
√𝑘 + 𝑘(𝑘 − 1)𝑟𝑖𝑖
 
Equation 5-4: Model Feature predictability VS redundancy 




Where 𝑘𝑟𝑐𝑖 is a measure of predictability or usefulness, √𝑘 + 𝑘(𝑘 − 1)𝑟𝑖𝑖 is a measure of 
redundancy,  𝑘 is the number of features in the chosen subset and 𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the average feature inter-
correlation and 𝑟𝑐𝑖 is the mean feature correlation of each feature with the outcome feature. Mutual 
information quantifies the amount of information gained about one feature upon the addition of 
another feature into the model. Therefore, it measures the amount of mutual dependence between two 
features. This method relies on the efficient estimation of the mutual dependence between a set of 
features and the outcome variable (Bonev, Escolano and Cazorla, 2008). Feature selection using 
mutual information is based on selecting only variables that share a mutual dependence with the 
outcome variables. This methodology measures the amount of information gained or lost by the 
addition or subtraction of each feature in the subset. Finally, a co-integration-based feature selection 
procedure also uses a search algorithm to evaluate the merit of each subset of features. The co-
integration-based feature selection procedure measures the goodness of feature subsets with the 
probability that a linear combination of each feature with the feature set produces a stationary 
residual. It selects only variables that are co-integrated and would therefore improve the overall 
prediction performance of the outcome variable. While correlation is not a pre-cursor for co-
integration, one drawback is that features may be correlated and co-integrated with the outcome 
variable leading to including redundant variables in the model. Finally, criterion-based procedures are 
also sometimes used as a feature selection technique. By selecting feature subset that maximizes any 
one of the information criteria outlined in the literature review, maximizes the adjusted R or 
minimizes the predicted sum of square errors. 
This study combines both filter and criterion-based methods at each stage of the experiment to 
determine optimal feature set for predicting the selected outcome feature. 
5.3.7 Model Order Selection 
After only significant features have been selected for our candidate model, the next step is 
determining the correct order or lag length of the VAR(p) model. Parametric approaches to time series 
analysis require the need to estimate a model order. Determining the model order is an important step 
in vector autoregressive modelling and involves selecting a suitable lag length that optimizes the 
performance of the model. Model order selection by using statistical order-selection criterion was first 
introduced by Akaike (Akaike, Clements and Hendry, 1969) in fitting autoregressive models for 
prediction. The importance of correct estimation of model order is demonstrated by  (Braun and 
Mittnik, 1993; Luetkepohl, 2011) who show that results of a VAR model whose model order differ 
from the true lag length are inconsistent. Various methods for appropriate model order estimation has 
been suggested over the years (Ventzislav and Lutz, 2005) resulting a number of lag order criteria 
selection methods: AIC, HQ, FPE, SC. (Ventzislav and Lutz, 2005) compare these various model 
order selection criteria commo0nly used in applied time series analysis and conclude that the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC) (Akaike, Clements and Hendry, 1969) produces the most accurate 
estimates for most VARs. However, the Hanan-Quinn criterion (HQC) (Hannan and Quinn, 2010) 
seems to be the most accurate for quarterly data and the Schwarz Information Criteria (Schwarz, 
1978) seems to be the most accurate for small datasets (N <= 120). This study estimates a VAR order 
by simple OLS per equation and selects model order that maximizes model performance based on 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
Most often in VAR lag length selection, symmetric lag lengths are used i.e the same lag length is used 
for every variable in the model. (Ozcicek and Douglas McMillin, 1999) suggested estimating VARs 
using asymmetric lags where the lag length of each variable may differ. The researcher also explores 
the possibility of asymmetric lag length selection.  





The auto correlation function measures the serial correlation of a time variable with itself at two 
different points in time. It is the estimated similarity between observations of a time series as a 
function of the time lag between them. Formally, the ACF is a function of the covariance and standard 
deviation between a time series and past values of itself. The ACF of a time series 𝑥𝑡 is given as: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−ℎ)
𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣 (𝑥𝑡)𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝐷𝑒𝑣(𝑥𝑡−ℎ)
=  
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−ℎ)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑥𝑡)
 
Equation 5-5: Auto-Correlation Function (II) 
 
5.3.7.2 PACF 
In general, the Partial auto correlation function (PACF) is a conditional correlation between two 
variables under the assumption that the values of some other feature in the feature set is taken into 
consideration as well. Formally, the Partial auto-correlation function is a function of the conditional 
covariance and variance between the variables of a regression model. It is given as: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑦, 𝑥3 | 𝑥1,𝑥2)
√𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑦 |𝑥1, 𝑥2) 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑥3 |𝑥1, 𝑥2)
 
Equation 5-6: Partial Auto-Correlation Function (II) 
 
The formula above represents the 1
st
 order partial auto correlation i.e. the conditional correlation 
between values of the series one time period apart conditional on the knowledge of the values in 
between. If the series is stationary, the variances √𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑦 |𝑥1, 𝑥2) and 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑥3 |𝑥1, 𝑥2) 
should equal each other. The partial auto correlation plot indicates the strength of the relationship 
between different lags of values of a time series. The partial auto correlation plot can also be used for 
visual inspection of appropriate model order as it shows points at which series are relevant in 
predicting its current values. 
Finally, the auto-correlation and Partial auto-correlation functions are useful in to determine the 
appropriate lag orders for time series models. Consequently, this addresses the ‘sensitivity to useful 
time frames’ limitation of the granger causality test. By using the appropriate lag order, the definite 
lags at which co-integration occurs between the two-time series identified. 
5.3.8 Co-integration Testing 
After appropriate features set has been duly selected, the reduced features set is tested for co-
integration. Given the features set Ω, the researcher estimates the co-integrating rank r of a 
multivariate time series data. At each stage of the experiment, the researcher constructs a co-
integration matrix of all selected features and derives the co-integrating rank r of the feature set. The 
co-integration procedure measures the goodness of each feature combination in the feature subsets 
with the probability that a linear combination of one or more features including the outcome feature 
produces a stationary residual. The co-integrating rank r is a measure of how many unique 
combinations of variables are co-integrated. 
In practice, there are two main approaches to co-integration testing the Engle and Granger approach 
(Engle et al., 2017) and the Johansen’s approach (Johansen, 2000) which correspond to bivariate and 
multivariate co-integration testing in time series analysis. The researcher follows the following steps 
to test for co-integration in the final feature set: 




 The researcher conducts an augmented dickey fuller test on each variable in the model with 
the following hypothesis: 
𝐻0: The process contains a unit root. 
𝐻1: The process contains no unit roots. 
The researcher eliminates variables where the null hypothesis is not rejected as co-integration 
implies a common stochastic trend between two variables. 
 The researcher performs a Johansen’s co-integration test on the selected feature set to 
determine the co-integrating rank r of the feature set. The Johansen’s test can be conducted 
either using the trace test or the eigen test. Both tests are similar, however differ in the 
specification of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis for the trace test is that the number of 
co-integrating vectors is less than the number of variables while the eigen tests the null 
hypothesis that the co-integrating rank is exactly equal to the number of variables. The test is 
conducted sequentially for r=1,2,3..N and the first non-rejection of the null hypothesis is 
taken and the co-integrating rank r. 
 
 To determine which variables are co-integrated, the researcher constructs a linear regression 
model for each combination of the untransformed features in the feature set using the Engle & 
Granger approach (Robert F. Engle and Kenneth F. Kroner, 1995). 
 The researcher conducts an augmented dickey fuller’s stationarity test on the residuals of the 
resulting OLS regression model with a null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis as stated 
above. 
 
5.3.9 Model Selection 
 
The Engle & Granger approach suggests a two-step approach to co-integration testing: testing for co-
integration and if variables are co-integrated, estimate the error correction model to investigate the 
long-run relationship. After a test for co-integration has been done the I(1) features in the selected 
feature set, a framework for estimating the model is selected. This selection is based on the results of 
the preceding co-integration test.  
The VAR model (2.9.6) is used when there is no co-integration between any combination of variables 
in the system i.e r=0. If all variables are stationary, the VAR is fitted in the levels to the series 
otherwise, the VAR is then estimated using the stationary transformed I(0) features. 
However, if the variables are I (1) and co-integrated (r > 0), then the system of equations is modified 
to allow for co-integrating relationships among the features. In traducing the co-integrating 
relationship leads to the estimation of a Vector Error Correction Model (Section 2.9.7). 
 
5.3.10 Residual Analysis 
 
Residual analysis provides a general approach to access the quality of models by checking if the 
model has achieved its goal of explaining as much variation in the dependent variable as possible. 
Additionally, in response to the limitations of the assumption of linearity of Granger Causility testing 
as outlined in section 4.4.1, testing the normality of residuals is a good way to ensure that the 
relationship between the time series under observations meet the assumption of linearity.  Residuals 
are left-overs of the model after the variation in dependent variable using the independent variable has 




been explained. Ideally, residuals should be stationary, unstructured and as close to zero as possible 
i.e residuals for each forecast must be as close to the actual value as possible. To this end, residuals 
are expected to be stationary with mean 0 and equal variance over time. To this effect, the researcher 
tests the residuals for each parameter of the model for stationarity, normality and serial auto-
correlation. The researcher employs two methods for residual analysis, visual methods and parametric 
testing methods. Visually, the researcher uses the Q-Q plot and the cumulative frequency plot to 
visualize the distribution of residuals. Additionally, the researcher uses auto-correlation and partial 
auto-correlation plots to test for serial auto-correlation in the residuals. Using the Shapiro-Wilk’s test, 
the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test and Durbin-Watson test, the researcher tests for normality of 
residuals, stationarity of residuals and serial auto-correlation of residuals.  
The Durbin-Watson test, otherwise known as the DW statistic is a test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals from a statistical model. However, the test can be extended to test for autocorrelation in the 
series itself. The DW test estimate usually falls between 0 and 4, 0 indicating a highly positive 
autocorrelation and 4 indicating a highly negative autocorrelation. A value of 2 is a point of neutrality 






Equation 5-7: Durbin Watson Test For Autocorrelation 
Where  
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑂𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑠 =  ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦 𝑖)
2𝑁
𝑖=1  and 
𝑆𝐷𝐸𝑆 = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 =   ∑ 𝛥𝑆𝑆𝐸2𝑁𝑖=1 . 
 
5.3.11 Model Validation 
In time series analysis, model validation substantiates that a computerized model within its domain of 
applicability possess a satisfactory range of consistency within the intended application of the model. 
Model validation involves testing the performance of a model across multiple samples of forecast 
values using new data. At each stage of the experiment, the researcher estimates a value for each of 
the following performance measurements: 
5.3.11.1 Goodness of Fit- 𝑹𝟐 and Adjusted 𝑹𝟐:  
Traditionally, the linear regression model calculates an equation that minimizes the distance between 
the equation line and all data points in the model. 𝑅2, also known as the co-efficient of determination, 
estimates the how close the data points are to the regression line. The 𝑅2, is simply interpreted as the 
percentage of the variation in the response variable explained by the model. The estimates for 𝑅2 
usually fall within the ranges of 0%, indicating that the model explains none of the variation in the 
response variable and 100%, indicating that the model explains all the variation in the response 
variable. Higher 𝑅2 corresponds to better fits. However, it is also important to check for spurious 
regressions in model by comparing 𝑅2 estimates to the Durbin-Watson statistic. Given that the Vector 
Autoregressive model is an OLS per equation model, the average 𝑅2 for the VAR(p) model construct 
at each stage is the average of the individual 𝑅2 for each parameter equation in the model. Unlike the 
𝑅2, the adjusted 𝑅2 is a modified version of the 𝑅2 that considers the number of explanatory variables 
in the model. The adjusted 𝑅2 only increases if a new explanatory variable added to the model 
improves the model more than would be expected by chance and decreases otherwise. One major 
disadvantage of measuring model performance using the 𝑅2 estimate is that it assumes that all 
explanatory variables explains some variation in the dependent variable. It therefore computes the 




percentage of explained variation like all independent variables actually affects the dependent 
variable. On the other hand, the adjusted 𝑅2 estimates the percentage of variation explained by only 
those independent variables that are actually relevant for predicting the dependent variable. 
5.3.11.2 Evaluating Forecast Accuracy  
 
Evaluating the accuracy of forecasts generated by a model is an important step in structural time 
series analysis. Forecasts are the models predicted values, and forecasts are evaluated by accessing 
how close to the actual observations they are. Evaluating forecasts accuracy is usually done in two 
steps: in sample forecasting and out of sample forecasting. In-sample performance evaluation is done 
by comparing the model’s forecast to the values of the actual data. Out of sample performance is 
conducted to evaluate the model’s performance on new data i.e data not used in model construction. 
At the start of any time series analysis, a number of n last observations is taken out of the time series 
and a prediction model is built with n-ahead forecasts. The n-ahead forecasts values are then 
compared to the reserved last n-observations to evaluate models out of sample performance. Rob 
Hyndman (Hyndman and Koehler, 2006) pushes this further by defining a procedure for cross-
validating time series based on a rolling forecast of every n-ahead model predictions. Each n-ahead 
data observation acts as a new test observation. The overall forecast accuracy is then estimated by 
computing the average over each n-ahead prediction. 
Measuring the accuracy models is typically done by measuring the size of the errors in the predictions 
generated by the model. Some model performance measurement techniques based on error analysis 
are given below. 
5.3.11.2.1 SSE (Sum Of Squared Errors) 
 
The sum of squared errors also known as the residual sum of squares or the sum of squared residuals 
is the total addition of the squares of errors (difference between the predicted value and the actual 
values). Theoretically, the sum of squared errors measures the discrepancy or similarity between the 
data and the estimated model values. Formally, the sum of squared errors is given by: 
 




Equation 5-8: Model Sum Of Squared Errors 
 
Where N is the number of observations, 𝑌𝑖 is the value of the ith data observation and 𝑌 is the value of 
the ith predicted value. In a Vector Autoregressive model, a simple OLS equation is built for each 
parameter in the model. This research estimates the SSE for each parameter in model and averages the 
SSE across all parameters to access the total SSE of the model. The total SSE is estimated and 
reported both in sample and out of sample. 
 
5.3.11.2.2 MAE (Mean Absolute Error) 
Since errors may be positive or negative, the mean absolute error is a measure of the size of errors 
irrespective of the direction of the errors. The mean absolute error is therefore the average of the 
absolute values of errors | 𝑖| = |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖| where 𝑦𝑖 are predicted values and 𝑥𝑖 are the actual values of 
the series. The MAE is a scale-dependent measure of accuracy (A function f(.) is scale-invariant if it 
yields the same result for argument x as it does for argument cx, where c is some positive constant). 




The MAE is a common measure of accuracy in time series analysis sometimes referred to as the 
‘Mean Absolute Deviation’. Formally, the Mean Absolute Error is given as: 
 
𝑀𝐴𝐸 = 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁(| 𝑖|) 
Equation 5-9: Model Mean Absolute Error 
Where 𝑖 is the error term associated with the ith prediction and the ith value of the series. This 
research estimates the MAE for each parameter in model and averages the SSE across all parameters 
to access the total MAE of the model. The total MAE is estimated and reported both in sample and 
out of sample. 
5.3.11.2.3 RMSE (Root Mean Squared Error) 
 
The root mean square error also sometimes called the root mean squared deviation measures the 
deviations of the predicted values format eh actual values. The value is estimated by finding the 
square root the mean of the squared error. The RMSE represents the standard deviation of the 
residuals or predicted errors for out-of-sample computations. The RMSE attempts to aggregate the 
size of prediction errors for each time observation into a single measure of predictive power. RMSE is 
scale-dependent (A function f(.) is scale-invariant if it yields the same result for argument x as it does 
for argument cx, where c is some positive constant) and is therefore used to compare errors of models 
on the same dataset. The TMSE is formally the square root of the average of the squared errors and 
will therefore always be a positive number. The effect of each error observation on the total RMSE is 
directly proportional to the size of the squared errors, consequently, RMSE measures are extremely 
sensitive to outliers. Formally, the RMSE is given as: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁( 𝑖
2) 
Equation 5-10: Model Root Mean Squared Error 
Where 𝑖
2 is the square of the ith error for all i-observations through N. This research estimates the 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 for each parameter in model and averages the 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 across all parameters to access the total 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 of the model. The total 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 is estimated and reported both in sample and out of sample. 
 
5.3.11.2.4 MAD (Mean Absolute Deviation) 
 
The Mean Absolute Deviation is a scale-dependent evaluation technique that measures the size of 
prediction and forecast errors in units. The MAD measurement estimates the average of the absolute 
values of the forecast errors over the observed time period. This method is independent of the 
direction of the errors and therefore avoids positive and negative errors cancelling out each other. The 









Equation 5-11: Model Mean Absolute Deviation 
 




Where N is the number of observations, 𝐴𝑡 are the actual values of the time series and 𝐹𝑡 are the 
forecast values generated by the model. This research estimates the 𝑀𝐴𝐷 for each parameter in model 
and averages the 𝑀𝐴𝐷 across all parameters to access the total 𝑀𝐴𝐷 of the model. The total 𝑀𝐴𝐷 is 
estimated and reported both in sample and out of sample. 
 
5.3.11.2.5 MAPE (Mean Absolute Percentage Error) 
 
The MAPE (Mean Absolute Percent Error) measures the size of the error in percentage terms. It is 
calculated as the average of the percentage of error terms for each ith associations with the predicted 
and actual values. The MAPE is often used in practice as it is intuitive to interpret in terms of relative 
errors. The MAPE is a percentage error and therefore has the advantage of being scale-dependent and 
insensitive to extreme values. Percentage errors however have the drawback of being infinite or 
undefined if the actual observations are zero for any time period of interest. Percentage errors are also 
criticized for having extreme values when the actual values are closer to zero (Hyndman and Koehler, 
2006). For real world applications, the MAPE is frequently used when the actual values of a series are 
way above zero. Formally, the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) is the mean of the absolute 











Equation 5-12: Model Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
 
Where N is the number of observations, 𝐴𝑡 are the actual values of the time series and 𝐹𝑡 are the 
forecast values generated by the model. This research estimates the 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 for each parameter in 
model and averages the 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 across all parameters to access the total 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 of the model. The total 
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸 is estimated and reported both in sample and out of sample. 
5.3.11.3 Co-integrating Ranks 
In addition to the measures of accuracy and performance outlined above, this research also estimates 
values for inter-dimensional co-integrating ranks and intra-dimensional co-integrating ranks. These 
rank values are used to assess the level of integral dependence between parameters of the model. The 
level of co-integration between variables of the model estimates the predictive power of the structural 
model for each parameter in the model. 
5.3.11.3.1 Intra-Dimensional Co-Integrating Rank 
Given a multi-dimensional dataspace Ω with time series vectors representative of incidents in 
cyberspace across various dimensions of cyber space 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕, if the co-integrating rank r for 
any pairs of variables across 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕  is greater than 1, we say these variables are intra-
dimensionally co-integrated. 𝒓Ω > 𝟎. 
5.3.11.3.2 Inter-Dimensional Co-integration 
Given a multi-dimensional dataspace Ω with time series vectors representative of incidents in 
cyberspace across various dimensions of cyber space 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒁𝒕, if the co-integrating rank r for 
any pairs of variables within 𝑿𝒕, 𝒀𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒁𝒕  is greater than 1, we say these variables are inter-
dimensionally co-integrated. 𝒓𝑿 > 𝟎 | 𝒓𝒀 > 𝟎 | 𝒓𝒛 > 𝟎. 




5.3.11.4 Percentage Parameter Prediction Performance 
Given that the VAR model is a set of structurally represented K OLS equations, where K = number of 
parameters in the model, each parameter is predicted per equation. This research measures the 
performance of the model for each parameter in the model.  
 
SN Analytical Step Justification 
1 Evidences from the social, physical and economic dimension Integrates data that represents activities on each 
of these dimensions 
2 Data preparation and Time-Based aggregation Cleans data and integrates on a similar timeline 
3 Normality Test Test Data meets the assumption of normality. If 
not, data is student normalized. 
4 Feature selection Features relevant to predicting the target variable 
are selected. 
5 Model Order Selection The correct lag of the model is selected using the 
ACF testing. 
6 Stationarity Test Test data meets stationarity assumption. If not, 
data is integrated once. 
7 Co-integration Testing (If Stationary) Test for co-integrating rank between time series 
data. 
8 Model Selection Select appropriate model 
9 Residual Analysis Analyses the size and distribution of error to test 
the goodness of the model. 
10 Model Validation Tests how well the model performs in identifying 
entangled relationships. 
Table 5-9: Summary of Analytical Framework 
 
 DATA ANALYSIS 5.4
5.4.1 Stage 1: The Antecedents Phase 
Stage 1 of the experiment integrates evidences from the social and economic dimension to spot 
antecedents to cyber-incidents. The rationale for conducting this stage of the experiment is to establish 
entanglements between events on the social dimension and economic dimension of cyberspace. The 
researcher uses series from the economic dimension and the social dimension in constructing a 
monitoring model. The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘Weighted Price Index’ of the 
company’s share prices. Both datasets were integrated on a similar timeline with the aim of predicting 
events of the last month on the economic dimension. The merging of both datasets produced a single 
dataset with 26 features and 30239 observations. Additionally, the data was split into two removing 
the last 120 observations (the last hour) from each feature in the dataset. The out of sample reliability 
of the constructed model will be tested on observations from the last hour using a N-ahead prediction 
strategy where N=120. This is done to ensure reliability of out of sample prediction performance 
testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 26 features on both dimensions as shown in the 
figure below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the 
average wind speed on the social dimension is seen to have a correlation coefficient with several 
features on the economic dimension. The black boxes in the figure below groups features into 
hierarchical clusters. The spread of the probability of a cyber-incident is seen to be clustered with the 
volume of share prices on the economic dimension. Figure 5-6 below shows the values for the intra-
dimensional correlation between features on the economic and social dimension. 
 





Figure 5-6: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Antecedents Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the economic and 
social dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment. The correlation coefficients 
are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by the color bar. Highly positively correlated pairs of variables 
tend towards +1 while highly negatively correlated pairs of variables tend towards -1. Multiple pairs 
of variables are seen to be highly positively or negatively correlated. For example, the group of 
features, Cyber relatedness (‘cyber_relate’), Entropy, chat room congestion (‘chat_congestion’) and 
chat room traffic (‘chat_traffic’) posted per minute are all seen to be highly positively correlated. 
Additionally, the group of features Weighted price (‘weighted_price’), Open prices (‘open’), closing 
prices (‘close’), High (‘high’) and Low (‘low’) prices are also seen to be highly correlated. 
Consequently, one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be highly correlated with each other 
(where Pearson’s correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are removed from the dataset. The 
correlation elimination process reduces the feature set by removing one or more of a set of highly 
correlated variables (Hall and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that information provided by highly 
correlated variables can be provided to the model by a single one of those variables therefore reducing 
redundancy to achieve a parsimonious model. The results of the filtered feature set after a correlation 
elimination produces a smaller feature set of 15 features as shown in the figure below, eliminating 11 
highly correlated features. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Correlation Co-efficient of Reduced Feature set (Antecedents Phase) 




The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the three 
dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment for the reduced feature set. There 
are some correlations identified between features across the economic and the social dimension. For 
example, the little identified correlation between the ‘wind_speed’ and the ‘weighted_price’ of Delish 
corporation and also the ‘wind_speed’ and company’s stock volume (‘volume_usd’) in dollar terms. 
Given the scenario-a epidemic possible spread by wind’, these correlations are expected given 
information from other variables such as emotions from the population regarding the company and its 
effects on company’s share prices’. This reduced set of 15 variables including the endogenous 
variable, ‘weighted_price’ are selected for further feature selection methods. To further reduce the 
number of features, the researcher applies a recursive features selection method to select only features 
that significantly reduce the error of prediction in the endogenous feature.  The recursive feature 
selection stage further reduces the uncorrelated feature set to only those variables that minimizes the 
prediction error for the chosen endogenous variable ‘weighted_price’. To begin the recursive feature 
selection from the uncorrelated feature set, the researcher starts by building an ordinary least squares 
regression linear model with the ‘weighted_price’ as the endogenous feature predicted by all other 
features in the reduced feature set above as shown in the figure above. The recursive feature selection 
searches for a model that optimizes the Akaike Information (AIC) and reduces errors. This step 
further reduces the number of features leaving 8 features. The resulting features are tabled below and 
used in further analysis. Lastly, the researcher creates generic methods for calculating the importance 
of each feature in predicting the outcome feature. This is used to examine the contribution of each 
feature in the dataset in predicting the outcome feature. This last step in the feature selection phase is 
elimination by variable importance (Gevrey, Dimopoulos and Lek, 2003). The absolute value of the t-
statistic for each feature is used to compute the unique contribution of each input-feature to the model 
and a cut off of 1 is chosen (Noppamas, Seree and Kidakan, 2014). From the figure below, it is 
observed that the most important features for predicting the weighted price index are the average wind 
speed, flu relatedness of microblog messages and the chatroom congestion.  





Figure 5-8: Variable Importance Of Features (Antecedents Phase) 
The last phase of the feature selection, depicted in figure 5-8 above, shows that the 7 homogenous 
features selected by the AIC are extremely useful for predicting the outcome feature. The flu 
relatedness of microblogging feed ‘flu_relate’ is seen to be the most important variable for monitoring 
the antecedent phase of the experiment within the context of the scenario. Event-based features such 
as flu-relatedness (‘fire_relate’) and fire_relatedness (‘fire_relate’) are important for identifying 
antecedents to the proliferation of kill-chains. 
The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework. 
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 
𝑁
2
, where N is 
the number of observations in the feature set. At each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each 
equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. Finally, the researcher selects 36 lags (half-hour) as this 
is the lag length with the optimal AIC. The partial auto correlation plots below show this to be valid 
for each feature selected.  





Figure 5-9: Partial Auto Correlation of Selected Features 
In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 
decomposition technique. As discussed in the literature review, time series decomposition works by 
splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the error 
terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive decomposition 
method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. After applying the 
Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, four features exhibited seasonal trend. Emotion 
probabilities such as ‘Fear’, ‘Trust’ and the chatroom congestion has a daily seasonality with a time 
period of 1446 minutes. Additionally, the cyber relatedness of texts in microblogging feeds are seen to 
have a 12-hour seasonal time period.  
A stationarity and normality test is conducted on the 9 features and results are tabled above. The 
results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for 7 of the 9 features. These selected features 
are seen to have a constant mean and variance over the selected period of time. However, two 
features, the weighted price and wind speed are seen to be non-stationary.  This feature is transformed 
by mean normalization as follows: 
𝑥 −  𝜇
√𝜎
 
Where 𝜇 is the feature is mean and 𝜎 is the feature variance. 
 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 
 P- 
Value 






Weighted Price 0.09 -3.20 False 0.07 -0.93 1.00 0.00 
Fire Relatedness 0.01 -17.34 True 2.05 7.86 0.50 0.00 
Fear 0.01 -14.84 True 1.14 3.75 0.50 0.00 




Trust 0.01 -17.93 True 0.63 1.59 0.50 0.00 
Volume 0.01 -15.60 True 0.97 0.51 1.00 0.00 
Chatroom 
Congestion 
0.01 -12.11 True 2.15 7.87 1.00 0.00 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -8.42 True 2.10 9.80 0.51 0.00 
Average Wind 
Speed 
0.50 -2.18 False 0.16 0.20 1.00 0.00 
Table 5-10: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results 
The Johansen’s co-integration test shows that there are 5 co-integrating relationships between features 
in the feature set. The Engle and Granger test for co-integration was used to determine co-integration 
between each pair of features in the feature set. To achieve this, the researcher constructs a linear 
regression model between each pair of features and conducts a stationarity test on the residuals of the 
resulting model. The Engle Granger test shows significant p-values for three features: the weighted 
price index, the chatroom congestion and the population fear derived from microblog feeds. The 
figure below shows a long-run equilibrium relationship between these three features with this 
relationship strongest towards the end of the period of observation. 
 
Figure 5-10: Co-Integrating Relationships Identified in the Antecedents Phase 
 
Given the presence of multiple co-integrating relationships and some non-stationary vectors, a VAR 
model that takes into consideration these relationships are used. A Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is fitted to the data in the levels. The VECM with order of 30 lags was estimated utilizing 
the OLS per equation in the model with 8 parameter OLS models where each feature is predicted by 
its on lags and lags of the other 7 features in the model. The density distribution plot below shows the 
residuals from the fitted VECM model. The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be 
independently distributed across each equation and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are 
experimental errors derived by finding the difference between the observed data points and the 
predicted data points. To ensure that these assumptions are met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of 
white noise residuals using a normality test on the residuals of the VECM model. The stationarity and 
normality test results for the residuals are shown below. 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 












0.01 -29.49 True -0.63 131.30 0.44 0.00 
Fire 
Relatedness 
0.01 -30.53 True 1.74 8.06 0.10 0.00 
Fear 0.01 -32.27 True 1.10 4.14 0.06 0.00 
Trust 0.01 -30.77 True 0.67 1.95 0.04 0.00 
Volume 0.01 -30.00 True 0.71 1.26 0.11 0.00 
Chatroom 
Congestion 
0.01 -31.38 True 0.54 4.66 0.15 0.00 
Flu 
Relatedness 
0.01 -34.40 True 0.31 2.57 0.08 0.00 
Average 
Wind Speed 
0.01 -29.56 True -15.98 3208.72 0.50 0.00 
Table 5-11: Residual Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Antecedents Phase) 
 
The distribution of the residuals for the weighted prices and average wind speed as shown in the 
figure below indicate a leptokurtic distribution with a strongly narrowly peaked curve. This indicates 
that the model is able to capture most of the trend in the endogenous variable. The model performs 
moderately in capturing the trends in the other features as the residuals are seen to be slightly skewed 
to the left.  
 
Figure 5-11: Density Distribution of Residuals (Antecedents Phase) 
 
Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  





Figure 5-12: Normality Probability Plot of Residuals (Antecedents Phase) 
 
The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 
distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 
points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few deviations from the ‘normality’ 
curve are observed in all 8 features. Given that the residuals were ‘normal enough’ with at least 98% 
of the data points falling within ±3 standard deviations of the mean, the effects of these outliers in the 
residuals were not significant. 
 
The performance of the VECM model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the literature review. The model is validation using both in sample 
and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the differences 
between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for the in-
sample model performance is shown in the table below. 
 
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
Weighted Price 0.03 0.08 -1.66 1.27 0.00 97.76 
Fire Relatedness 0.65 0.90 -114.63 12.74 0.00 69.06 
Fear 0.73 0.95 -4.34 334.60 0.00 66.46 
Trust 0.74 0.96 -172.39 188.90 0.00 65.99 
Volume 0.56 0.73 11.57 89.50 0.00 69.52 
Chatroom 
Congestion 
0.46 0.61 -975.04 221.84 0.00 78.71 
Flu Relatedness 0.59 0.78 -1802.55 546.85 0.00 72.51 
Average Wind Speed 0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.00 99.44 
AVERAGE TOTAL 0.47 0.63 -382.39 9.47 0.00  
 




Table 5-12: In Sample Model Performance Results (Antecedents Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model except the Chat Congestion and 
Volume features which records 22% and 3067% errors in total respectively. The model also 
performed accurately for features with smaller values of RMSPE, MAD and MSPE. These results 
show that the model works well with expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=60 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VECM model and the test data with 60 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  
 
       
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE ACCURACY 
Fire Relatedness 0.73 1.00 -73.25 26.92 0.00 65.39 
Fear 0.78 0.99 -96.74 6.39 0.00 64.48 
Trust 0.79 1.01 -108.36 19.67 0.00 64.04 
Volume 0.79 1.01 -97.29 6.62 0.00 63.91 
Chatroom 
Congestion 
0.68 1.03 -99.09 4.67 0.00 65.83 
Flu Relatedness 0.79 1.00 -93.06 3.80 0.00 64.10 
Average Wind Speed 1.04 1.05 -104.37 11.21 0.00 58.28 
AVERAGE TOTAL 0.84 1.06 -85.12 1.55 0.00 55.0 
 
Table 5-13: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Antecedents Phase) 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. The Chat Congestion and Volume features are still seen to be uncaptured by the 
model. Although these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome variable, 
the features included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging the 
performance measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records a 
total of 85% in sample accuracy and 70% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality tests each feature combination with the 
optimum lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to 
make inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of features in the 
feature set. The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the 
feature ‘x’ (on the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow).  
The table below shows only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
SN Causal Relation F-Statistic P-value 
1.  Fire Relatedness  --> Weighted Price 10.77 0.00 
2.  Fire Relatedness  --> Fear 35.89 0.00 
3.  Fire Relatedness  --> Trust 73.81 0.00 
4.  Fire Relatedness  --> Chatroom Congestion 10.80 0.00 
5.  Fire Relatedness  --> Flu Relatedness 79.63 0.00 
6.  Fire Relatedness  --> Average Wind Speed 15.10 0.00 
7.  Fear  --> Weighted Price 40.26 0.00 




8.  Fear  --> Fire Relatedness 23.46 0.00 
9.  Fear  --> Trust 16.39 0.00 
10.  Fear  --> Chatroom Congestion 63.69 0.00 
11.  Fear  --> Flu Relatedness 6.75 0.01 
12.  Trust  --> Weighted Price 7.93 0.00 
13.  Trust  --> Fire Relatedness 21.59 0.00 
14.  Trust  --> Fear 13.90 0.00 
15.  Trust  --> Flu Relatedness 196.12 0.00 
16.  Trust  --> Average Wind Speed 14.00 0.00 
17.  Volume --> Weighted Price 22.13 0.00 
18.  Volume  --> Flu Relatedness 10.91 0.00 
19.  Volume  --> Average Wind Speed 75.13 0.00 
20.  Chatroom Congestion  --> Weighted Price 7.80 0.01 
21.  Chatroom Congestion  --> Fear 20.56 0.00 
22.  Chatroom Congestion  --> Trust 5.90 0.02 
23.  Chatroom Congestion  --> Flu Relatedness 94.79 0.00 
24.  Flu Relatedness  --> Weighted Price 103.58 0.00 
25.  Flu Relatedness  --> Fire Relatedness 25.29 0.00 
26.  Flu Relatedness  --> Trust 105.28 0.00 
27.  Flu Relatedness --> Volume 12.26 0.00 
28.  Flu Relatedness  --> Chatroom Congestion 147.05 0.00 
29.  Flu Relatedness  --> Average Wind Speed 12.20 0.00 
30.  Average Wind Speed  --> Volume 9.94 0.00 
Table 5-14: F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Antecedents Phase) 
The table above shows pairs of significant causal relations. The granger analysis shows a total of 30 
causal relations of 56 possible relations between the 8 features in the feature set. Emotion features, 
fear and trust, from microblogging feeds are seen to likely have a causal relation with at least 4 
features in the feature set. There is an observed inter-dimensional casual relation between multiple 
sets of features on the social dimension as well as an intra-dimensional causal relation between 
features on the economic and social dimension. 
5.4.2 Stage 2: The Reconnaissance Phase 
 
Stage 2 of the experiment integrates evidences from the social and physical dimension to spot 
indicators of the first phase of the kill-chain: an active reconnaissance on a target network. The 
rationale for conducting this stage of the experiment is to establish entanglements between events on 
the social dimension and physical dimension of cyberspace by identifying early indicators of activities 
on the network layer using evidences from the social dimension. The researcher uses series from the 
network layer of the physical dimension and the social dimension in constructing a predictive model. 




Several endogenous variables are selected at this stage to characterize the occurrence of an active 
reconnaissance using a target’s network flow data. 
Three features are derived at this stage to indicate an active recon: Recon (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and 
Kalita, 2011), Scanner and the connection fail ratio (Nam and Kim, 2006). The feature ‘scanner’, 
which targets the same port on several hosts or several ports on a single host, is derived as a function 
of the number of distinct destinations Ip addresses and distinct destination ports communicating on a 
network within a given time window T.  
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
 
Equation 5-13: Estimating Network Scanners 
The numerator of this formula gives the number of unique hosts communicating with each node in a 
network at any given point in time. Scaling this value by the number of destination ports gives the 
number of unique services used by each incoming request to every node on a network. 
 
Figure 5-13: Network Scanners From Network Flow Data 
Similarly, a value for ‘Recon’ within any given time period T is derived as a function of distinct node 
communicating on a network and the total number of connections to distinct nodes on a network. This 
characterization follows methods developed by Bailey, Roedel and Silenok’s  (Bailey Lee, Roedel and 
Silenok, 2003) as discussed in the literature review. For a given time window T, the researcher 
estimates the value of ‘Recon’ as:  
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒
 
Equation 5-14: Estimating Network Reconnaissance 
 
The numerator of this formula gives the distinct nodes within a network communicating with each 
distinct destination ip addresses. The denominator gives the total number of   For normal traffic, for 
any given time frame, the value of this figure should be as close to the mean or 1 as possible. On the 
other hand, the researcher also estimates values for a ‘vertical scan’ within a given time window T. 





Figure 5-14: Active Reconnaissance from Network Flow Data 
 
Finally, (Kinable, 2008) presents a hypothesis that measures the connection fail ratio of a network at 
any given point in time as a function of the amount of inbound connections and outbound 
connections. The CFR of a network is given as: 
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 





Figure 5-15: Connection Fail Ratio 
 
The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘Recon’ which indicates the occurrence of an 
active reconnaissance on a target network. Datasets from both dimensions were integrated on a similar 
timeline with the aim of predicting events of the last hour on the physical dimension. The merging of 
both datasets produced a single dataset with 69 features and 2524 observations. Additionally, the data 
was split into two removing the last 60 observations (the last hour) from each feature in the dataset. 
The out of sample reliability of the constructed model will be tested on observations from the last 
hour using an N-ahead prediction strategy where N=60. This is done to ensure reliability of out of 
sample prediction performance testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 69 features on both dimensions as shown in the 
figure below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the 
average wind speed on the social dimension is seen to have a strongly positive correlation coefficient 
with several features on the physical dimension. The black boxes in the figure below groups features 
into hierarchical clusters. The recon, connection fail ratio and scanner features are seen to be highly 
correlated with other network layer features such as ip addresses, ports, number of connections denied 




by intrusion detection system and total alerts raised by intrusion detection system. Emotion and 
opinion features are also seen to be highly correlated with each other on the social dimension. 
 
Figure 5-16: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment. The correlation 
coefficients are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by the colour bar. Highly positively correlated pairs of 
variables tend towards +1 while highly negatively correlated pairs of variables tend towards -1. 
Multiple pairs of variables are seen to be highly positively or negatively correlated. For example, the 
group of features, Cyber relatedness (‘cyber_relate’), Entropy, chat room congestion 
(‘chat_congestion’) and chat room traffic (‘chat_traffic’) posted per minute are all seen to be highly 
positively correlated. Additionally, the group of features such as packet data features (totalBytes, 
total_packets, total_captured_bytes, incoming_http, outgoing_http) and intrusion detection features 
(total_ids_alerts, total_ids_prio_level, fragmentation) are also seen to be highly correlated. 
Consequently, one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be highly correlated with each other 
(where Pearson’s correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are removed from the dataset. The 
correlation elimination process reduces the feature set by removing one or more of a set of highly 
correlated variables (Hall and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that information provided by highly 
correlated variables can be provided to the model by a single one of those variables therefore reducing 
redundancy to achieve a parsimonious model. The results of the filtered feature set after a correlation 
elimination produces a smaller feature set of 30 features as shown in the figure below, eliminating 36 
highly correlated features. 
 





Figure 5-17: Correlation Co-efficient of Reduced Feature set (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment for the reduced feature 
set.  This reduced set of 30 variables including the endogenous variable, ‘recon’ is selected for further 
feature selection methods. To further reduce the number of features, the researcher applies a recursive 
features selection method to select only features that significantly reduce the error of prediction in the 
endogenous feature.  The recursive feature selection stage further reduces the uncorrelated feature set 
to only those variables that minimizes the prediction error for the chosen endogenous variable 
‘weighted_price’. To begin the recursive feature selection from the uncorrelated feature set, the 
researcher starts by building an ordinary least squares regression linear model with the ‘recon’ as the 
endogenous feature predicted by all other features in the reduced feature set above as shown in the 
figure above. The recursive feature selection searches for a model that optimizes the Akaike 
Information (AIC) and reduces errors. The recursive feature selection step further reduces the number 
of features leaving 10 features. The resulting features are tabled below and used in further analysis. 
Lastly, the researcher creates generic methods for calculating the importance of each feature in 
predicting the outcome feature. This is used to examine the contribution of each feature in the dataset 
in predicting the outcome feature ‘recon’. This last step in the feature selection phase is elimination by 
variable importance (Mehmood et al., 2012). The absolute value of the t-statistic for each feature is 
used to compute the unique contribution of each input-feature to the model and a cut off of 1 is chosen 
(Noppamas, Seree and Kidakan, 2014). From the figure below, it is observed that the most important 
features for predicting the outcome feature ‘recon’ are the connection fail ratio, cyber-relatedness 
(‘cyber_relate’) and flu-relatedness of microblogging feeds (‘flu_relate’), emotion features from 
microblogging feeds such as sadness and surprise, total number of alerts (‘total_ids_alerts’) raised by 
intrusion detection system, total number of UDP connections (‘UDP’) and total number of warning 
alerts (‘warning_alerts’) by intrusion detection system.  





Figure 5-18: Variable Importance Of Features (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The last phase of the feature selection left 11 homogenous features as extremely useful for predicting 
the outcome feature. The final features for the model are shown in table 5-14 below. Intrusion 
detection features such as the connection fail ratio (‘cfr’), number of fragmentation alerts 
(‘fragmentation’) and the number of warnings raised (‘warning’) are seen to be important during the 
reconnaissance phase of the kill-chain. These features are indicative of adversary presence in a 
target’s network. Additionally, on the social dimension, emotion-based features (fear, sadness and 
surprise) are also indicators to monitor at the reconnaissance phase.  
The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework.  
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 100 lags. At 
each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. 
Finally, the researcher selects 24 lags (approximately half-hour) as this is the lag length with the 
optimal AIC. The partial auto correlation plots below show the significant lags each of the ten features 
selected.  





Figure 5-19: Partial Auto Correlation of Selected Features (Reconnaissance Phase) 
 
In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 
decomposition technique. As discussed in the literature review, time series decomposition works by 
splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the error 
terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive decomposition 
method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. After applying the 
Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, seven of the ten features exhibited seasonal trend. 
Features on the network layer such as total number of IDS alerts, recon, and connection fail ratio and 
number of UDP connections were seen to have between 5- and 10-hours seasonal variations. Emotion 
probabilities such as ‘Sadness’ and ‘Surprise’ have a 12-hour seasonal variation. Additionally, the 
cyber relatedness and flu-relatedness of texts in microblogging feeds are seen to have a 12-hour 
seasonal time period.  
A stationarity and normality test are conducted on the 10 features and results are tabled below. The 
results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis of non-




stationarity in the augmented dickey fuller stationarity test. All selected features are seen to have a 
constant mean and variance over the selected period of time.  
 







Stationary Skewness Kurtosis 
Recon 0.01 -9.23408 True 16.0768 282.1766 
Fragmentation 0.01 -13.4934 True 35.4824 1257.001 
Total Ids Alerts 0.01 -5.60466 True 2.647027 12.87255 
Udp Connections 0.01 -6.30005 True 8.676738 131.6894 
Warning Alerts 0.01 -6.5179 True 7.673929 62.5321 
Connection Fail Ratio 0.01 -5.33053 True 13.7233 251.8265 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -13.1509 True 0.235649 1.225698 
Sadness 0.01 -10.9857 True 1.447701 8.616825 
Cyber Relatedness 0.01 -10.6626 True 0.683449 1.654992 
Surprise 0.01 -11.4438 True 1.286536 6.798069 
 
Table 5-15: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Reconnaissance Phase) 
Given that all features were stationary, the Johansen’s test for co-integration was not applicable at this 
stage of the experiment. However, for further investigation, the Engle and Granger test for co-
integration was used to determine co-integration between each pair of features in the feature set. To 
achieve this, the researcher constructs a linear regression model between each pair of features and 
conducts a stationarity test on the residuals of the resulting model. The Engle Granger test shows 
significant p-values for three features: the total number of IDS Alerts on the physical dimension, the 
level of population sadness and the level of cyber relatedness of microblogging feeds on the social 
dimension derived from microblog feeds. The figure below shows a long-run equilibrium relationship 









Figure 5-20: Co-Integrating Relationships Identified in the Reconnaissance Phase 
 
 The figure above visually represents the identified co-integrating relationships between the total 
number of IDS alerts, sadness as determined by emotion detectors and the cyber-relatedness of users’ 
micro-blogging texts. This identified link between the social and physical dimensions at the 
reconnaissance phase of the kill-chain. Although, these co-integrating relationships do not indicate a 
‘causal’ link at this point, the possibilities of this connections highlight the need to monitor these 
features at the reconnaissance phase.  The methods presented here aere able to pick up these 
entanglements between events on the social dimension that led to events on the physical dimension as 
designed in the scenario. 
Given that all features are observed to be stationary as seen in table 5-15 below, a VAR model was 
fitted to the levels. The VAR with order of 24 lags was estimated utilizing the OLS per equation in the 
model with 10 parameter OLS models where each feature is predicted by its on lags and lags of the 
other 9 features in the model. The density distribution plots below shows the residuals from the fitted 
VAR(24) model. The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be independently distributed across 
each equation and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are experimental errors derived by finding the 
difference between the observed data points and the predicted data points. To ensure that these 
assumptions are met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of white noise residuals using a normality test 
on the residuals of the VAR model. The stationarity and normality test results for the residuals are 
shown below. 
 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 







Recon 0.01 -12.10 True 8.17 248.24 
Fragmentation 0.01 -13.52 True 7.32 155.97 
Total Ids Alerts 0.01 -13.98 True 2.02 32.12 
Udp Connections 0.01 -15.22 True 0.22 1.19 




Warning Alerts 0.01 -14.34 True 2.59 38.56 
Connection Fail 
Ratio 
0.01 -13.66 True 5.88 140.65 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -14.68 True 0.52 1.05 
Sadness 0.01 -14.84 True 1.01 4.43 
Cyber 
Relatedness 
0.01 -12.10 True 8.17 248.24 
Surprise 0.01 -13.52 True 7.32 155.97 
Table 5-16: Residual Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Reconnaissance Phase) 
 
The distribution of the residuals for intrusion detection features are seen to be centered on zero with 
narrow peaked curves. The model performs moderately in capturing the trends in the other features as 
the residuals are seen to be slightly skewed to the left.  
 
Figure 5-21: Density Distribution of Residuals (Reconnaissance Phase) 
 
Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Equation 5-16: Residual Cumulative Probability 
Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  





Figure 5-22: Normality Probability Plot of Residuals (Reconnaissance Phase) 
 
The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 
distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 
points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few outliers are observed in all 10 
features. 
The performance of the VAR model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the analytical framework. The model is validation using both in 
sample and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the 
differences between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for 
the in-sample model performance is shown in the table below. 
 
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
Recon 0.26 0.57 -86.20 86.20 0.00 79.35% 
Fragmentation 0.13 0.26 -5.05 5.05 0.00 90.28% 
Total Ids Alerts 0.35 0.56 -17.31 17.31 0.00 77.29% 
Udp Connections 0.35 0.59 -71.62 71.62 0.00 76.44% 
Warning Alerts 0.17 0.39 53.13 53.13 0.00 59.57% 
Connection Fail 0.31 0.52 81.34 81.34 0.00 38.54% 





Flu Relatedness 0.73 0.94 840.32 840.32 0.00 -362.00% 
Sadness 0.71 0.93 5069.51 5069.51 0.00 -2475.63% 
Cyber Relatedness 0.71 0.92 123.91 123.91 0.00 -2.82% 
Surprise 0.71 0.94 -3022.03 3022.03 0.00 58.71% 
Average Model 
Error 
0.44 0.66 296.60 937.04 0.00  
Table 5-17: In Sample Model Performance Results (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model except the UDP connections 
feature which records a 637% average error. The model also performed accurately for features with 
smaller values of RMSPE, MAD and MSPE. These results show that the model works well with 
expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=60 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VAR model and the test data with 60 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
Recon 0.21 0.45 -281.27 281.27 0.01 62.14 
Fragmentation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Ids Alerts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Udp Connections 0.20 0.11 -217.71 217.71 0.01 65.71 
Warning Alerts 0.33 0.45 -109.40 109.40 0.01 77.79 
Connection Fail 
Ratio 
0.24 0.33 -197.82 197.82 0.01 78.80 
Flu Relatedness 0.55 1.54 -75.23 75.23 0.01 53.17 
Sadness 0.22 1.47 -193.78 193.78 0.01 52.45 
Cyber Relatedness 0.32 0.32 -110.55 110.55 0.01 55.35 
Surprise 0.44 0.11 -74.10 74.10 0.01 53.54 
Average Model 
Error 
0.25 0.48 296.60 937.04 0.00  
Table 5-18: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. However, some features such as predictions for the UDP connections and the 
level of cyber relatedness of microblogging feeds are seen to exhibit a higher level of out of sample 
percentage error. Although these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome 
variable, the features included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging 
the performance measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records 
a total of 85% in sample accuracy and 67% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality tests each feature combination with the 
optimum lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to 
make inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of feature in the 




feature set. The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the 
feature ‘x’ (on the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow).  
The table below shows only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
SN Causal Relationship F Statistic P-value 
1.  Reconnaissance  --> Ids Alerts 18.54 0.00 
2.  Reconnaissance  --> Warning Alerts 233.30 0.00 
3.  Fragmentation  --> Warning Alerts 23.37 0.00 
4.  Ids Alerts  --> Reconnaissance 7.61 0.01 
5.  IDS Alerts  --> Fragmentation 32.03 0.00 
6.  Ids Alerts  --> Warning Alerts 5.47 0.02 
7.  Udp Connections  --> Ids Alerts 6.95 0.01 
8.  Udp Connections  --> Warning Alerts 25.97 0.00 
9.  Udp Connections  --> Connection Fail Ratio 688.54 0.00 
10.  Warning Alerts  --> Reconnaissance 121.54 0.00 
11.  Warning Alerts  --> Ids Alerts 10.79 0.00 
12.  Warning Alerts  --> Udp Connections 5.96 0.01 
13.  Warning Alerts  --> Connection Fail Ratio 36.85 0.00 
14.  Connection Fail Ratio  --> Udp Connections 1033.82 0.00 
15.  Connection Fail Ratio  --> Warning Alerts 67.41 0.00 
16.  Sadness  --> Cyber Relatedness 5.33 0.02 
17.  Sadness  --> Surprise 14.87 0.00 
18.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Udp Connections 5.81 0.02 
19.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Warning Alerts 12.02 0.00 
20.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Sadness 7.45 0.01 
Table 5-19: F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Reconnaissance Phase) 
The granger analysis shows a total of 20 likely causal relations of 100 possible relations between the 
10 features in the feature set. The recon feature is seen to have plausible causal relations with 2 
intrusion detection features. There is also an observed bi-causal relation or feedback loop between the 
recon feature and these two features. Similarly, the connection fail ratio and the number of UDP 
connections are also seen to have a bi-directional causal relationship. Inter-dimensionally, there exist 
causal relationships between features on the physical dimension as well as causal relations between 
features across the social and physical dimension, intra-dimensionally. 




5.4.3 Stage 3: The Weaponization Phase 
Stage 3 of the experiment integrates evidences leading from the physical dimension and evidences on 
the social dimension to spot indicators of a plausible ongoing weaponization on the social dimension 
of cyberspace. The rationale for conducting this stage of the experiment is to establish entanglements 
between events on the physical and social dimension of cyberspace using co-integral links between 
them. The researcher uses series from the network layer of the physical dimension taking into account 
prior stages of the kill-chain and the social dimension in constructing a predictive model.  
The endogenous variable selected for this phase characterizes the spread of discussions related to 
cyber weapons and vulnerabilities in microblogging feeds. The ‘weaponizaton’ variable is derived by 
quantifying each feed in microblogging feeds to an external weaponization ‘Lexicon’ or wordlist. The 




Figure 5-23: Characterizing the Weaponization Phase 
 
The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘weaponization’ which indicates discussion about 
cyber weapons, exploits and vulnerabilities on social platforms. Datasets from both dimensions were 
integrated on a similar timeline with the aim of predicting events of the last hour on the physical 
dimension. The merging of both datasets produced a single dataset with 71 features and 2404 
observations. Additionally, the data was split into two removing the last 60 observations (the last 
hour) from each feature in the dataset. The out of sample reliability of the constructed model will be 
tested on observations from the last hour using an N-ahead prediction strategy where N=60. This is 
done to ensure reliability of out of sample prediction performance testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 71 features on both dimensions as shown in the 
figure below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the level 
of chat congestion and chatroom traffic is seen to have a slight correlation with the number of distinct 
connections to the network. Additionally, on the social dimension, emotion and opinion features are 
observed to be highly correlated with each other. The black boxes in the figure below groups features 
into hierarchical clusters. The recon, connection fail ratio and scanner features are seen to be highly 




correlated with other network layer features such as ip addresses, ports, number of connections denied 
by intrusion detection system and total alerts raised by intrusion detection system. This correlation 
was also observed in the previous stage of the experiment.  
 
Figure 5-24: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Weaponization Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment. The correlation 
coefficients are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by the color bar. Highly positively correlated pairs of 
variables tend towards +1 while highly negatively correlated pairs of variables tend towards -1. 
Multiple pairs of variables are seen to be highly positively or negatively correlated. For example, the 
group of features, Cyber relatedness (‘cyber_relate’), Entropy, chat room congestion 
(‘chat_congestion’) and chat room traffic (‘chat_traffic’) posted per minute are all seen to be highly 
positively correlated. Additionally, the group of features such as packet data features (totalBytes, 
total_packets, total_captured_bytes, incoming_http, outgoing_http), reconnaissance features (‘cfr’, 
‘recon’, ‘portscan’,’pingsweep’) and intrusion detection features (total_ids_alerts, 
total_ids_prio_level, fragmentation) are also seen to be highly correlated with each other. There is 
also an observed subtle correlation between the ‘weaponization’ and event-based cyber-relatedness of 
user discussions ‘cyber_relate’. Consequently, one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be 
highly correlated with each other (where Pearson’s correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are 
removed from the dataset. The correlation elimination process reduces the feature set by removing 
one or more of a set of highly correlated variables (Hall and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that 
information provided by highly correlated variables can be provided to the model by a single one of 
those variables therefore reducing redundancy to achieve a parsimonious model. The results of the 




filtered feature set after a correlation elimination produces a smaller feature set of 25 features as 
shown in the figure below, eliminating 46 highly correlated features. 
 
 
Figure 5-25: Correlation Co-efficient of Reduced Feature set (Weaponization Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment for the reduced feature 
set. This reduced set of 25 features including the endogenous variable, ‘weaponization’ are selected 
for further feature selection methods. To further reduce the number of features, the researcher applies 
a recursive features selection method to select only features that significantly reduce the error of 
prediction in the endogenous feature.  The recursive feature selection stage further reduces the 
uncorrelated feature set to only those variables that minimizes the prediction error for the chosen 
endogenous variable ‘weaponization’. To begin the recursive feature selection from the uncorrelated 
feature set, the researcher starts by building an ordinary least squares regression linear model with the 
‘recon’ as the endogenous feature predicted by all other features in the reduced feature set above as 
shown in the figure above. The recursive feature selection searches for a model that optimizes the 
Akaike Information (AIC) and reduces errors. The recursive feature selection step further reduces the 
number of features leaving 15 features. The resulting features are shown in the table below and used 
in further analysis. Lastly, the researcher creates generic methods for calculating the importance of 




each feature in predicting the outcome feature. This is used to examine the contribution of each 
feature in the dataset in predicting the outcome feature ‘recon’. This last step in the feature selection 
phase is elimination by variable importance (Mehmood et al., 2012). The absolute value of the t-
statistic for each feature is used to compute the unique contribution of each input-feature to the model 
and a cut off of 1 is chosen (Noppamas, Seree and Kidakan, 2014). From the figure below, it is 
observed that the most important features for predicting the outcome feature ‘Weaponization’ are the 
flu relatedness, fire relatedness and cyber relatedness of microblogging feeds, emotion features from 
microblogging feeds such as population joy, fear, trust, total number of packet bytes transmitted. 
 
Figure 5-26: Variable Importance Of Features (Weaponization Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the important indicators of the ‘weaponization’ phase of the kill-chain. 
Emotion-based features such as anticipation, disgust, sadness and trust are seen to be important 
indicators at this phase. Additionally, event-based features such as cyber, flu and fire relatedness (in 
the context of the scenario) are important indicators at this phase as well. The last phase of the feature 
selection left the same 15 homogenous features as extremely useful for predicting the outcome 
feature. The final features for the model are shown in the table 5-19 below. 
The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework.  
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 100 lags. At 
each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. 
Finally, the researcher selects 5 lags (approximately 5 mins) as this is the lag length with the optimal 
AIC.  
In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 




decomposition technique. As discussed in the literature review, time series decomposition works by 
splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the error 
terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive decomposition 
method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. After applying the 
Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, none of the fifteen features exhibited seasonal trend at the 
selected time interval. 
A stationarity and normality test is conducted on the 15 features and results are tabled below. The 
results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity in the augmented dickey fuller stationarity test. All selected features are seen to have a 
constant mean and variance over the selected period of time.  
 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 
 P-value Test Statistic Stationary Skewness Kurtosis 
Weaponization 0.01 -7.68 True 0.40 0.96 
Joy 0.01 -10.04 True 0.25 0.33 
Mean Bytes 0.01 -7.29 True 1.92 8.49 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -7.07 True 0.47 0.61 
Sadness 0.01 -8.89 True 0.49 0.50 
Fire Relatedness 0.01 -7.05 True 1.85 6.73 
Entropy 0.01 -6.75 True 1.14 3.46 
Cyber 
Relatedness 
0.01 -8.07 True 0.77 1.62 
Sentiment 0.01 -9.27 True 0.55 -1.06 
Trust 0.01 -8.60 True 0.43 1.14 
Disgust 0.01 -12.27 True 1.72 5.05 
Fear 0.01 -8.59 True 0.50 0.31 
Anticipation 0.01 -10.00 True 0.65 0.57 
Surprise 0.01 -9.02 True 0.55 1.60 
Decoy 0.01 -8.54 True 15.41 235.40 
Table 5-20: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Weaponization Phase) 
Additionally, the skewness tests show that all features are at least fairly normal with varying 
peakedness shown by the kurtosis test. Given that all features were stationary, the Johansen’s test for 
co-integration was not applicable at this stage of the experiment. However, for further investigation, 
the Engle and Granger test for co-integration was used to determine co-integration between each pair 
of feature in the feature set. To achieve this, the researcher constructs a linear regression model 
between each pair of feature and conducts a stationarity test on the residuals of the resulting model. 
The Engle Granger test shows no significant p-values for features in the system at the selected time 
period. 
Given that all features are observed to be stationary and the absence of any co-integrating 
relationships at this stage of the experiment, a VAR model was fitted to the levels. The VAR with 
order of 5 lags was estimated utilizing the OLS per equation in the model with 15 parameter OLS 
models where each feature is predicted by its on lags and lags of the other 14 features in the model. 
The density distribution plots below shows the residuals from the fitted VAR(5) model.  
The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be independently distributed across each equation 
and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are experimental errors derived by finding the difference 




between the observed data points and the predicted data points. To ensure that these assumptions are 
met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of white noise residuals using a normality test on the residuals 
of the VAR model. The stationarity and normality test results for the residuals are shown below. 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 
 P-value Test Statistic Stationary Skewness Kurtosis 
Weaponization 0.01 -10.58 True 0.38 0.78 
Joy 0.01 -11.35 True 0.18 0.23 
Mean Bytes 0.01 -13.66 True 3.06 42.69 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -12.95 True 0.28 0.54 
Sadness 0.01 -12.52 True 0.51 0.69 
Fire Relatedness 0.01 -10.58 True 1.47 5.97 
Entropy 0.01 -13.56 True 1.06 3.95 
Cyber 
Relatedness 
0.01 -11.33 True 0.56 1.12 
Sentiment 0.01 -11.70 True 0.53 -0.88 
Trust 0.01 -11.81 True 0.44 1.13 
Disgust 0.01 -13.11 True 1.61 4.44 
Fear 0.01 -10.59 True 0.55 0.50 
Anticipation 0.01 -11.55 True 0.64 0.59 
Surprise 0.01 -11.46 True 0.61 1.57 
Decoy 0.01 -11.11 True 9.66 244.30 
 
Table 5-21: Residual Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Weaponization Phase) 
 
The distribution of the residuals for intrusion detection features are seen to be centered on zero with 
narrow peaked curves. The model performs moderately in capturing the trends in the other features as 
the residuals are seen to be slightly skewed to the left.  






Figure 5-27: Density Distribution of Residuals (Weaponization Phase) 
 




Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  






Figure 5-28: Normality Probability Plot of Residuals (Weaponization Phase) 
 
The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 




distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 
points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few outliers are observed in all 15 
features. 
The performance of the VAR model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the literature review. The model is validation using both in sample 
and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the differences 
between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for the in-
sample model performance is shown in the table below. 
 





0.74 0.94 -891.59 891.59 0.00 66.53 
JOY 0.76 0.95 117.34 117.34 0.00 18.85 
MEANBYTES 0.21 0.39 18.75 18.75 0.00 80.48 
FLU_RELATE 0.66 0.85 -336.31 336.31 0.00 69.83 
SADNESS 0.73 0.93 13.60 13.60 0.00 61.51 
FIRE_RELATE 0.68 0.92 -107.02 107.02 0.00 68.01 
ENTROPY 0.59 0.80 1775.52 1775.52 0.00 -638.10 
CYBER_RELATE 0.72 0.93 -42.59 42.59 0.00 67.01 
SENTIMENT 0.83 0.96 -1457.74 1457.74 0.00 64.17 
TRUST 0.75 0.95 -373.60 373.60 0.00 66.04 
DISGUST 0.72 0.98 -419.57 419.57 0.00 66.01 
FEAR 0.74 0.93 -61.37 61.37 0.00 66.76 
ANTICIPATION 0.76 0.97 754.14 754.14 0.00 -236.35 
SURPRISE 0.75 0.96 -219.11 219.11 0.00 65.92 
DECOY 0.16 0.77 -384.32 384.32 0.00 81.37 
AVEARGE 
TOTAL ERROR 
0.65 0.88 -107.59 464.84 0.00  
Table 5-22: In Sample Model Performance Results (Weaponization Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model except the UDP connections 
feature which records a 637% average error. The model also performed accurately for features with 
smaller values of RMSPE, MAD and MSPE. These results show that the model works well with 
expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=60 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VAR model and the test data with 60 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  
 
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
WEAPONIZATION 0.74 0.94 -891.59 891.59 0.00 64.4147375 
JOY 0.76 0.95 117.34 117.34 0.00 -165.25613 




MEANBYTES 0.21 0.39 18.75 18.75 0.00 62.5591361 
FLU_RELATE 0.66 0.85 -336.31 336.31 0.00 57.4980546 
SADNESS 0.73 0.93 13.60 13.60 0.00 49.9239341 
FIRE_RELATE 0.68 0.92 -107.02 107.02 0.00 58.3512524 
ENTROPY 0.59 0.80 1775.52 1775.52 0.00 57.7179547 
CYBER_RELATE 0.72 0.93 -42.59 42.59 0.00 57.5131851 
SENTIMENT 0.83 0.96 -1457.74 1457.74 0.00 58.8138437 
TRUST 0.75 0.95 -373.60 373.60 0.00 -24.772427 
DISGUST 0.72 0.98 -419.57 419.57 0.00 58.7325357 
FEAR 0.74 0.93 -61.37 61.37 0.00 5.64543808 
ANTICIPATION 0.76 0.97 754.14 754.14 0.00 56.6288404 
SURPRISE 0.75 0.96 -219.11 219.11 0.00 57.1853207 
DECOY 0.16 0.77 -384.32 384.32 0.00 -309.58694 
AVEARGE TOTAL 
ERROR 
0.65 0.88 -107.59 464.84 0.00  
Table 5-23: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Weaponization Phase) 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. However, some features such as predictions for the mean packet bytes and the 
level of cyber relatedness of microblogging feeds are seen to exhibit a higher level of out of sample 
percentage error. Although these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome 
variable, the features included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging 
the performance measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records 
a total of 85% in sample accuracy and 67% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality tests each feature combination with the 
optimum lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to 
make inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of features in the 
feature set. The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the 
feature ‘x’ (on the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow). The 
table below shows only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 Causal Relations F Statistic P-value 
1.  Weaponization  --> Joy 7.05 0.01 
2.  Weaponization  --> Flu Relatedness 26.11 0.00 
3.  Weaponization  --> Sadness 6.58 0.01 
4.  Weaponization  --> Fire Relatedness 8.33 0.00 
5.  Weaponization  --> Entropy 30.53 0.00 
6.  Joy  --> Mean transmitted bytes 31.33 0.00 
7.  Joy  --> Cyber Relatedness 12.18 0.00 
8.  Joy  --> Fear 10.74 0.00 




9.  Joy  --> Anticipation 5.37 0.02 
10.  Joy  --> Decoy 8.90 0.00 
11.  Mean transmitted bytes  --> Joy 6.14 0.01 
12.  Flu Relatedness  --> Weaponization 10.92 0.00 
13.  Flu Relatedness  --> Joy 8.02 0.00 
14.  Flu Relatedness  --> Mean 
transmitted bytes 
12.75 0.00 
15.  Flu Relatedness  --> Entropy 13.32 0.00 
16.  Flu Relatedness  --> Cyber 
Relatedness 
5.74 0.02 
17.  Flu Relatedness  --> Fear 10.15 0.00 
18.  Flu Relatedness  --> Anticipation 6.15 0.01 
19.  Sadness  --> Weaponization 13.38 0.00 
20.  Sadness  --> Joy 5.25 0.02 
21.  Sadness  --> Flu Relatedness 89.77 0.00 
22.  Sadness  --> Entropy 6.87 0.01 
23.  Sadness  --> Cyber Relatedness 21.74 0.00 
24.  Fire Relatedness  --> Flu Relatedness 7.42 0.01 
25.  Fire Relatedness  --> Entropy 20.91 0.00 
26.  Fire Relatedness  --> Trust 8.34 0.00 
27.  Fire Relatedness  --> Surprise 5.17 0.02 
28.  Entropy  --> Weaponization 12.71 0.00 
29.  Entropy  --> Flu Relatedness 7.95 0.00 
30.  Entropy  --> Sadness 20.05 0.00 
31.  Entropy  --> Sentiment 8.60 0.00 
32.  Entropy  --> Trust 28.58 0.00 
33.  Entropy  --> Fear 34.26 0.00 
34.  Entropy  --> Surprise 22.35 0.00 
35.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Flu 
Relatedness 
22.38 0.00 




36.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Sadness 11.15 0.00 
37.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Sentiment 6.96 0.01 
38.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Trust 10.97 0.00 
39.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Fear 16.51 0.00 
40.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Anticipation 9.24 0.00 
41.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Surprise 9.25 0.00 
42.  Sentiment  --> Weaponization 5.96 0.01 
43.  Sentiment  --> Flu Relatedness 10.81 0.00 
44.  Sentiment  --> Cyber Relatedness 8.37 0.00 
45.  Trust  --> Mean transmitted bytes 5.83 0.02 
46.  Trust  --> Entropy 19.65 0.00 
47.  Trust  --> Cyber Relatedness 11.96 0.00 
48.  Disgust  --> Cyber Relatedness 6.78 0.01 
49.  Fear  --> Joy 10.25 0.00 
50.  Fear  --> Mean transmitted bytes 30.72 0.00 
51.  Fear  --> Sadness 9.36 0.00 
52.  Fear  --> Entropy 23.32 0.00 
53.  Fear  --> Cyber Relatedness 22.60 0.00 
54.  Fear  --> Anticipation 9.47 0.00 
55.  Anticipation  --> Mean transmitted 
bytes 
7.41 0.01 
56.  Surprise  --> Flu Relatedness 6.47 0.01 
57.  Surprise  --> Fire Relatedness 11.59 0.00 
58.  Surprise  --> Entropy 25.75 0.00 
59.  Surprise  --> Cyber Relatedness 7.72 0.01 
Table 5-24: F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Weaponization Phase) 
The granger analysis shows a total of 59 likely causal relations of 225 possible relations between the 
15 features in the feature set. The weaponization feature is seen to have plausible causal relations with 
4 emotion features on the social dimension. There is also an observed bi-causal relation or feedback 
loop between the weaponization feature and these 4 features. Inter-dimensionally, there exists only 
relations between features on the social dimension. Intra-dimensionally, the number of transmitted 




bytes feature from on the network layer is seen to be linked with emotion features on the social 
dimension such as fear, trust and anticipation. 
 
5.4.4 Stage 4: The Delivery Stage 
 
Stage 4 of the experiment integrates evidences leading from the physical dimension and evidences on 
the social dimension on a pre-defined time scale to spot indicators of a plausible injection in victims’ 
network on the physical dimension of cyberspace. The rationale for conducting this stage of the 
experiment is to establish entanglements between events on the physical and social dimension of 
cyberspace using co-integral links between them at the 3
rd
 stage of the traditional kill chain model. 
The researcher uses series from the network layer of the physical dimension considering prior stages 
of the kill-chain already identified in previous stages and the social dimension in constructing a 
predictive model.  
The endogenous variable selected for this phase characterizes an injection using database and http 
connections to the target network. The ‘injection’ variable is derived as a function of identified 
malicious HTTP connections and Database connections to target network (Roy, Singh and Sairam, 
2011; Issues, 2012; Raghava, Sahgal and Chandna, 2012). It is estimated by scaling the number of 
database connections by the number of malicious HTTP connections, all scaled by the total number of 
connections made and packets sent over the network.  
 
1









Figure 5-29: Database Injection 
The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘injection’ which indicates an attempt at a 
database injection on target network, is arbitrary to represent the delivery, exploitation and installation 
stages of the traditional kill-chain. 
Datasets from both dimensions were integrated on a similar timeline with the aim of predicting events 
of the last hour on the physical dimension. The merging of both datasets produced a single dataset 




with 72 features and 2524 observations. For testing and evaluation of developed model, the data was 
split into two removing the last 120 observations (the two hours) from each feature in the dataset. The 
out of sample reliability of the constructed model will be tested on observations from the last hour 
using an N-ahead prediction strategy where N=120. This is done to ensure reliability of out of sample 
prediction performance testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 72 features on both dimensions as shown in the 
figure below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the level 
of chat congestion and chatroom traffic is seen to have a slight correlation with the number of distinct 
connections to the network. Additionally, on the social dimension, emotion and opinion features are 
observed to be highly correlated with each other. The black boxes in the figure below groups features 
into hierarchical clusters. The recon, connection fail ratio, scanner and weaponization features are 
propagated from the reconnaissance and weaponization phases of the kill-chain. Sets of network and 
social features are observed to be highly correlated with each other such as ip addresses, ports, 
number of connections denied by intrusion detection system, total alerts raised by intrusion detection 
system, entropy, weaponization, chat room congestion. These correlation relationships were also 
observed in the previous stages of the experiment.  
 





Figure 5-30: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Delivery Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment. The correlation 
coefficients are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by the color bar. Highly positively correlated pairs of 
variables tend towards +1 while highly negatively correlated pairs of variables tend towards -1. 
Multiple pairs of variables are seen to be highly positively or negatively correlated. For example, the 
group of features, Cyber relatedness (‘cyber_relate’), Entropy, chat size (‘chat_size’), chat room 
congestion (‘chat_congestion’) and chat room traffic (‘chat_traffic’) posted per minute are all seen to 
be highly positively correlated. Additionally, the group of features such as packet data features, 
reconnaissance features and intrusion detection features are also seen to be highly correlated with 
each other. Consequently, one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be highly correlated with 
each other (where Pearson’s correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are removed from the dataset. 
The correlation elimination process reduces the feature set by removing one or more of a set of highly 
correlated variables (Hall and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that information provided by highly 
correlated variables can be provided to the model by a single one of those variables therefore reducing 
redundancy to achieve a parsimonious model. The results of the filtered feature set after a correlation 




elimination produces a smaller feature set of 24 features as shown in the figure below, eliminating 48 
highly correlated features. 
 
Figure 5-31: Correlation Co-efficient of Reduced Feature set (Delivery Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment for the reduced feature 
set relevant to the delivery stage of the kill-chain. This reduced set of 24 features including the 
endogenous variable, ‘injection’ is selected for further feature selection methods. To further reduce 
the number of features, the researcher applies a recursive features selection method to select only 
features that significantly reduce the error of prediction in the endogenous feature.  The recursive 
feature selection stage further reduces the uncorrelated feature set to only those variables that 
minimizes the prediction error for the chosen endogenous variable ‘Injection’. To begin the recursive 
feature selection from the uncorrelated feature set, the researcher starts by building an ordinary least 
squares regression linear model with the ‘injection’ as the endogenous feature predicted by all other 
features in the reduced feature set above as shown in the figure above. The recursive feature selection 
searches for a model that optimizes the Akaike Information (AIC) and reduces errors. The recursive 
feature selection step further reduces the number of features leaving 16 features. The resulting 
features are shown in the table below and used in further analysis. Lastly, the researcher creates 
generic methods for calculating the importance of each feature in predicting the outcome feature. This 
is used to examine the contribution of each feature in the dataset in predicting the outcome feature 
‘injection’. This last step in the feature selection phase is elimination by variable importance 
(Mehmood et al., 2012). The absolute value of the t-statistic for each feature is used to compute the 




unique contribution of each input-feature to the model and a cut off of 1 is chosen (Noppamas, Seree 
and Kidakan, 2014). From the figure below, it is observed that the most important features for 
predicting the outcome feature ‘injection’ are the total number of database connections, 
entropy/chatroom congestion and population fear and trust derived from microblogging feeds. 
 
 
Figure 5-32: Variable Importance Of Features (Delivery Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the relative variable importance for each feature in the final feature set. The 
last phase of the feature selection left the same homogenous features as extremely useful for 
predicting the outcome feature. The final features for the model are shown in table 5-24 below. 
The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework.  
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 100 lags. At 
each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. 
Finally, the researcher selects 15 lags (approximately 15 minutes) as this is the lag length with the 
optimal AIC.  
In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 
decomposition technique. As discussed in the literature review, time series decomposition works by 
splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the error 
terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive decomposition 
method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. After applying the 
Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, the injection feature shows an approximately 2-hour 
seasonal variation while the database connections show an approximately 2.5 hour seasonal variation. 
A stationarity and normality test are therefore conducted on the 4 features and results are tabled 
below. The results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis 




of non-stationarity in the augmented dickey fuller stationarity test. All selected features are seen to 
have a constant mean and variance over the selected period of time. 
 
 Stationarity Test Normality Test 

















Injection 0.01 -12.57 True 36.13 1483.21 0.50 0.00 
Chat 
Congestion 
0.01 -5.42 True 1.97 6.92 1.00 0.00 




0.01 -11.60 True 24.92 644.54 0.50 0.00 
Table 5-25: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Delivery Phase) 
Additionally, the skewness and K-S tests show that the Chat Congestion and population fear features 
are fairly normal. However, the Injection and database connections are observed to be slightly right 
skewed all features exhibiting varying peakedness shown by the kurtosis test. Given that all features 
were stationary, the Johansen’s test for co-integration was not applicable at this stage of the 
experiment. However, for further investigation, the Engle and Granger test for co-integration was 
used to determine co-integration between each pair of feature in the feature set. To achieve this, the 
researcher constructs a linear regression model between each pair of features and conducts a 
stationarity test on the residuals of the resulting model. The Engle Granger test shows no significant 
p-values for features in the system at the selected time period. 
Given that all features are observed to be stationary and the absence of any co-integrating 
relationships at this stage of the experiment, a VAR model was fitted to the levels. The VAR with 
order of 15 lags was estimated utilizing the OLS per equation in the model with 4 parameter OLS 
models where each feature is predicted by its on lags and lags of the other 3 features in the model. The 
density distribution plots below shows the residuals from the fitted VAR(15) model.  
The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be independently distributed across each equation 
and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are experimental errors derived by finding the difference 
between the observed data points and the predicted data points. To ensure that these assumptions are 
met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of white noise residuals using a normality test on the residuals 
of the VAR model. The stationarity and normality test results for the residuals are shown below. 



















Injection 0.01 -13.06 1.00 35.42 1493.90 0.38 0.00 
Chat 
Congestion 
0.01 -12.99 1.00 0.74 4.47 0.12 0.00 
Fear 0.01 -13.55 1.00 0.55 0.58 0.04 0.00 
Database 
Connection
0.01 -13.06 1.00 8.69 438.52 0.44 0.00 





Table 5-26: Residuals' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Delivery Phase) 
The distribution of the residuals for the outcome feature injection is seen to be centered at zero with 
narrow peaked curves and slightly skewed to the right. The distribution curve shows that the model 
performs well in predicting the database connections and the chat congestion features. The model 
performs moderately in capturing the trends in the other features as the residuals are seen to be 
slightly skewed to the right.  
 
 
Figure 5-33: Density Distribution of Residuals (Delivery Phase) 
 
Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  





Figure 5-34: Normality Probability Plot of Residuals (Delivery Phase) 
 
The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 
distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 
points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few outliers are observed in all 4 
features. 
The performance of the VAR model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the analytical framework. The model is validation using both in 
sample and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the 
differences between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for 
the in-sample model performance is shown in the table below. 
 
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
INJECTION 0.17 0.97 -45.66 45.66 0.00 77.37 
CHAT_CONGESTI
ON 
0.49 0.65 -33.82 33.82 0.00 77.13 
FEAR 0.74 0.93 -813.07 813.07 0.00 66.59 
DBCONS 0.07 0.46 -81.65 81.65 0.00 89.37 




TOTAL AVERAGE 0.37 0.75 -243.55 243.55 0.00 77.61 
Table 5-27: In Sample Model Performance Results (Delivery Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model except the population fear 
feature which records a 197% average error. The model also performed accurately for features with 
smaller values of RMSE, MAD and MAPE. These results show that the model works well with 
expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=120 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VAR model and the test data with 120 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
INJECTION 0.17 0.97 -45.66 45.66 0.00 96.12 
CHAT_CONGESTI
ON 
0.49 0.65 -33.82 33.82 0.00 80.04 
FEAR 0.74 0.93 -813.07 813.07 0.00 21.89 
DBCONS 0.07 0.46 -81.65 81.65 0.00 73.65 
TOTAL AVERAGE 0.37 0.75 -243.55 243.55 0.00 77.61 
Table 5-28: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Delivery Phase) 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. However, some features such as predictions for database connections per minute 
and population fear of microblogging feeds are seen to exhibit a higher level of out of sample 
percentage error. Although these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome 
variable, the features included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging 
the performance measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records 
a total of 85% in sample accuracy and 67% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality tests each feature combination with the 
optimum lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to 
make inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of feature in the 
feature set. The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the 
feature ‘x’ (on the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow). The 
table below shows only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
 Causal F-statistics P-value 
1 Injection  --> Chat Congestion 31.7184 1.99E-08 
2 Chat Congestion  --> Fear 6.783119 0.009259 
Table 5-29:  F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Delivery Phase) 
The granger analysis shows a total of 2 likely causal relations of 16 possible relations between the 4 
features in the feature set. The outcome feature ‘injection’ is seen to have plausible causal relations 
with 1 feature on the social dimension. There are no observed bi-causal relation or feedback loop 
between features at this stage of the experiment. Inter-dimensionally, there exists only relations 
between features on the social dimension such as the population fear and chat congestion. Intra-
dimensionally, the injection feature from on the network layer is seen to be linked with the chat 
congestion on the social dimension. 









5.4.5 Stage 5: The Exploitation Phase 
 
Stage 5 of the experiment integrates evidences leading from the physical dimension and evidences on 
the social dimension on a pre-defined time scale to spot indicators of a plausible detection of botnets 
in victim’s network on the physical dimension of cyberspace. According to (Sans Institute, 2012), the 
identification of botnets on a victim’s network is also a strong indicator of phases 3, 4 and 5 of the 
traditional cyber-attack kill-chain (i.e exploitation, installation and C&C). The rationale for 
conducting this stage of the experiment is to establish entanglements between events on the physical 
and social dimension of cyberspace using co-integral links between them at the 4
th
 stage of the 
traditional kill chain model. The researcher uses series from the network layer of the physical 
dimension while propagating prior stages of the kill-chain already identified in previous stages and 
the social dimension in constructing a predictive model.  
The endogenous variable selected for this phase characterizes the presence of a botnet on victim’s 
network as a ratio of the number of DNS requests on port 53 to the number of UDP packets sent on 
the victims’ network (Sans Institute, 2012). The ‘botnets’ variable is therefore derived as a function of 
the total number of incoming and outgoing DNS requests and the total amount of UDP packets sent 
within selected time intervals on the victim’s network. It is estimated by scaling the total number of 
DNS requests by the number of UDP connections, all scaled by the total number of connections made 
and packets sent over the network.  
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Figure 5-35: Actions of Botnets on the Physical Dimension 
 
The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘botnets’ which indicates nodes on victim’s 
network are controlled by external adversaries. As with the previous stage of the experiment, this 
feature is also arbitrary to represent multiple stages of the traditional kill-chain. Datasets from both 
dimensions were integrated on a similar timeline with the aim of predicting events of the last hour on 
the physical dimension. The merging of both datasets produced a single dataset with 73 features and 
2524 observations. For testing and evaluation of developed model, the data was split into two 
removing the last 120 observations (the two hours) from each feature in the dataset. The out of sample 
reliability of the constructed model will be tested on observations from the last hour using an N-ahead 
prediction strategy where N=120. This is done to ensure reliability of out of sample prediction 
performance testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 73 features on both dimensions as shown in the 
figure below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the level 
of chat congestion and chatroom traffic is seen to have a slight correlation with the number of distinct 
connections to the network. Additionally, on the social dimension, emotion and opinion features are 
observed to be highly correlated with each other. The black boxes in the figure below groups features 
into hierarchical clusters. The recon, connection fail ratio, scanner, weaponization and injection 
features are propagated from the reconnaissance, weaponization and delivery phases of the kill-chain. 
Sets of network and social features are observed to be highly correlated with each other such as ip 
addresses, ports, number of connections denied by intrusion detection system, total alerts raised by 
intrusion detection system, entropy, weaponization, chat room congestion. These correlation 
relationships were also observed in the previous stages of the experiment.  






Figure 5-36: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Exploitation Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment relevant to the 
exploitation phase of the kill-chain. The correlation coefficients are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by 
the color bar. Highly positively correlated pairs of variables tend towards +1 while highly negatively 
correlated pairs of variables tend towards -1. Multiple pairs of variables are seen to be highly 
positively or negatively correlated. For example, the group of features, Cyber relatedness 
(‘cyber_relate’), Entropy, chat size (‘chat_size’), chat room congestion (‘chat_congestion’) and chat 
room traffic (‘chat_traffic’) posted per minute are all seen to be highly positively correlated. 
Additionally, the group of features such as packet data features (totalPackets, totalBytes, 
mean_ip_len, meanttl, undstports, meansrcports), reconnaissance features (portscan, pingsweep, 
recon, scanner) and intrusion detection features (tot_alerts, warning, decoy) are also seen to be highly 
correlated with each other. Consequently, one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be highly 
correlated with each other (where Pearson’s correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are removed 
from the dataset. The correlation elimination process reduces the feature set by removing one or more 
of a set of highly correlated variables (Hall and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that information 




provided by highly correlated variables can be provided to the model by a single one of those 
variables therefore reducing redundancy to achieve a parsimonious model. The results of the filtered 
feature set after a correlation elimination produces a smaller feature set of 27 features as shown in the 
figure below, eliminating 46 highly correlated features. 
 
Figure 5-37: Correlation Coefficients Reduced Feature Set (Exploitation Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment relevant to the 
exploitation phase of the kill-chain for the reduced feature set. This reduced set of 27 features 
including the endogenous variable, ‘botnets’ are selected for further feature selection methods. To 
further reduce the number of features, the researcher applies a recursive features selection method to 
select only features that significantly reduce the error of prediction in the endogenous feature.  The 
recursive feature selection stage further reduces the uncorrelated feature set to only those variables 
that minimizes the prediction error for the chosen endogenous variable ‘botnets’. To begin the 
recursive feature selection from the uncorrelated feature set, the researcher starts by building an 
ordinary least squares regression linear model with the ‘botnets’ as the endogenous feature predicted 
by all other features in the reduced feature set above as shown in the figure above. The recursive 
feature selection searches for a model that optimizes the Akaike Information (AIC) and reduces 
errors. The recursive feature selection step further reduces the number of features leaving 16 features. 




The resulting features are shown in the table below and used in further analysis. Lastly, the researcher 
creates generic methods for calculating the importance of each feature in predicting the outcome 
feature. This is used to examine the contribution of each feature in the dataset in predicting the 
outcome feature ‘botnets’. This last step in the feature selection phase is elimination by variable 
importance (Mehmood et al., 2012). The absolute value of the t-statistic for each feature is used to 
compute the unique contribution of each input-feature to the model and a cut off of 1 is chosen 
(Noppamas, Seree and Kidakan, 2014). From the figure below, it is observed that there are 8 
important features for predicting the activities of botnets on victim’s network. These features include 
are the total number of database connections, flu-relatedness of micro-blogging feeds, the mean 
transmitted packet bytes, the total number of packets transmitted on the network and the population 
fear and trust derived from microblogging feeds. 
 
Figure 5-38: Variable Importance of Features (Exploitation Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the relative variable importance for each feature in the final feature set. The 
last phase of the feature selection left the same 8 homogenous features as extremely useful for 
predicting the outcome feature. The final features for the model are shown in the table 5-29 below. 
Features like the average_wind_speed, flu relatedness of microblog feed (‘flu_relate’) and fear are 
seen to be important indicators for the exploitation phase. In the context of the scenario, these results 
reflect the link between the effects of Delish corporation’s activities and the population’s response to 
these activities. These ‘event-based’ features such as tracking the flu relatedness of user discussions 
(‘flu_relate’), given the events in the scenario, are inferred to be useful for pin-pointing adversary 
activities within the target network. 




The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework.  
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 300 lags. At 
each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. 
Finally, the researcher selects 240 lags (approximately 4 hours) as this is the lag length with the 
optimal AIC.  
In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 
decomposition technique. As discussed in section literature review, time series decomposition works 
by splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the 
error terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive 
decomposition method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. 
After applying the Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, the botnets and database connections 
features shows an approximately 2.5 hours seasonal variation. 
A stationarity and normality test is therefore conducted on the 9 features and results are tabled below. 
The results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity in the augmented dickey fuller stationarity test. All selected features are seen to have a 
constant mean and variance over the selected period of time. 
 












Botnets 0.01 -11.60 True 18.35 382.97 0.50 0.00 
Flu Relatedness 0.01 -8.26 True 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.00 
Total Number Of 
Transmitted 
Packets 
0.01 -12.02 True 18.24 361.81 1.00 0.00 
Database 
Connections 
0.01 -11.60 True 24.92 644.54 0.50 0.00 
Mean 
Transmitted Bytes 
0.01 -7.29 True 1.92 8.49 1.00 0.00 
Mean Ip Length 0.01 -7.25 True 1.82 7.64 1.00 0.00 
Average Wind 
Speed 
0.63 -1.88 True 0.20 -1.96 1.00 0.00 
Fear 0.01 -10.27 True 0.62 0.77 0.50 0.00 
Mean Epoch 0.01 -16.43 True -16.84 323.15 1.00 0.00 
Table 5-30: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Exploitation Phase) 
 
Additionally, the skewness and K-S tests show that the botnets, total number of transmitted packets, 
database connections and mean epoch are slightly skewed and exhibiting varying peakedness. 
However, the kurtosis tests for the flu relatedness, average wind speed and fear are seen to be fairly 




normal. Given that all features were stationary, the Johansen’s test for co-integration was not 
applicable at this stage of the experiment. However, for further investigation, the Engle and Granger 
test for co-integration was used to determine co-integration between each pair of features in the 
feature set. To achieve this, the researcher constructs a linear regression model between each pair of 
features and conducts a stationarity test on the residuals of the resulting model. The Engle Granger 
test shows no significant p-values for features in the system at the selected time period. 
Given that all features are observed to be stationary and the absence of any co-integrating 
relationships at this stage of the experiment, a VAR model was fitted to the levels. The VAR with 
order of 240 lags was estimated utilizing the OLS per equation in the model with 9 parameter OLS 
models where each feature is predicted by its on lags and lags of the other 8 features in the model. The 
density distribution plots below shows the residuals from the fitted VAR(240) model.  
The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be independently distributed across each equation 
and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are experimental errors derived by finding the difference 
between the observed data points and the predicted data points. To ensure that these assumptions are 
met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of white noise residuals using a normality test on the residuals 
of the VAR model. The stationarity and normality test results for the residuals are shown below. 
 



















Botnets 0.01 -21.93 1.00 0.12 3.70 0.50 0.00 
Flu 
Relatedness 





0.01 -18.98 1.00 0.08 4.57 0.50 0.00 
Database 
Connections 




0.01 -20.29 1.00 -0.11 3.93 0.49 0.00 
Mean Ip 
Length 
0.01 -20.22 1.00 -0.12 3.92 0.49 0.00 
Average 
Wind Speed 
0.01 -18.87 1.00 -0.09 4.54 0.50 0.00 
Fear 0.01 -20.17 1.00 0.01 4.01 0.46 0.00 
Mean 
Epoch 
0.01 -21.28 1.00 -0.04 4.05 0.49 0.00 
Table 5-31: Residuals' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Exploitation Phase) 
The distribution of the residuals for the outcome feature botnets is seen to be centered at zero with 
narrow peaked curves and slightly skewed to the right. The distribution curve shows that the model 
performs well in predicting the database connections and the chat congestion features. The model 




performs moderately in capturing the trends in the other features as the residuals are seen to be 
slightly skewed to the right.  
 
Figure 5-39: Density Distribution Of Residuals (Exploitation Phase) 
Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  





Figure 5-40: Normality Probability Plot of Residuals (Exploitation Phase) 
 
The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 
distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 
points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few outliers are observed in all 9 
features. 
The performance of the VAR model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the analytical frameowk. The model is validation using both in 
sample and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the 
differences between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for 
the in-sample model performance is shown in the table below. 









Botnets 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 99.96 




0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 99.92 
Database 
Connections 




0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 99.87 
Mean Ip Length 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 99.86 
Average Wind 
Speed 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.97 
Fear 0.02 0.03 -18.11 18.11 0.00 99.17 




0.00 0.01 -1.78 1.66 0.00  
Table 5-32: In Sample Model Performance Results (Exploitation Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model. The model also performed 
accurately for features with smaller values of RMSE, MAD and MAPE. These results show that the 
model works well with expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=120 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VAR model and the test data with 120 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  





Botnets 0.50 0.00 0.02 1.78 0.06 88.44 




0.03 0.00 0.14 -0.78 0.04 83.328 
Database 
Connections 




0.06 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.11 96.156 
Mean Ip Length 0.04 0.01 1.01 0.13 0.03 83.772 
Average Wind 
Speed 
0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.02 73.606 
Fear 0.02 0.03 12.11 13.98 0.07 72.982 
Mean Epoch 0.19 0.30 0.06 1.14 0.02 89.56 







0.10 0.05 1.82 1.73 0.10  
Table 5-33: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Exploitation Phase) 
 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. However, some features such as out of sample predictions for population fear of 
microblogging feeds are seen to exhibit a higher level of out of sample percentage error. Although 
these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome variable, the features 
included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging the performance 
measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records a total of 95% in 
sample accuracy and 90% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality tests each feature combination with the 
optimum lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to 
make inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of feature in the 
feature set. The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the 
feature ‘x’ (on the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow). The 
table below shows only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 Causal Relation F-Statistic P-Value 
1.  Botnets  --> Total Number Of Transmitted Packets 98.09035 1.08E-22 
2.  Botnets  --> Database Connections 50.94001 1.26E-12 
3.  Botnets  --> Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes 8.631804 0.003335 
4.  Botnets  --> Mean IP Length 9.264652 0.002362 
5.  Flu Relatedness  --> Database Connections 5.510133 0.018987 
6.  Flu Relatedness  --> Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes 60.27341 1.21E-14 
7.  Flu Relatedness  --> Mean IP Length 69.14968 1.51E-16 
8.  Flu Relatedness  --> Average Wind Speed 164.6685 1.66E-36 
9.  Flu Relatedness  --> Fear 32.46769 1.36E-08 
10.  Flu Relatedness  --> Mean Epoch Time 5.401285 0.020205 
11.  Total Number Of Transmitted Packets  --> Botnets 28.96232 8.10E-08 
12.  Total Number Of Transmitted Packets  --> Mean 
Epoch Time 
5.631192 0.017722 
13.  Database Connections  --> Botnets 25.68134 4.33E-07 
14.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Botnets 16.26122 5.69E-05 
15.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Database 
Connections 
7.856095 0.005106 




16.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Mean IP Length 16.39418 5.31E-05 
17.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Average Wind 
Speed 
56.6992 7.14E-14 
18.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Fear 10.77685 0.001043 
19.  Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes  --> Mean Epoch 
Time 
194.8797 1.22E-42 
20.  Mean IP Length  --> Botnets 14.09603 0.000178 
21.  Mean IP Length  --> Database Connections 7.847556 0.00513 
22.  Mean IP Length  --> Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes 15.0411 0.000108 
23.  Mean IP Length  --> Average Wind Speed 58.50122 2.92E-14 
24.  Mean IP Length  --> Fear 10.84633 0.001004 
25.  Mean IP Length  --> Mean Epoch Time 186.4537 6.14E-41 
26.  Fear  --> Mean Transmitted Packet Bytes 116.1097 1.79E-26 
27.  Fear  --> Mean IP Length 123.9961 4.07E-28 
28.  Fear  --> Average Wind Speed 144.5079 2.29E-32 
29.  Fear  --> Mean Epoch Time 12.00307 0.00054 
30.  Mean Epoch Time  --> Average Wind Speed 7.742741 0.005435 
Table 5-34: F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Exploitation Phase) 
The granger analysis shows a total of 30 likely causal relations of 81 possible relations between the 9 
features in the feature set. The outcome feature ‘botnet’ is seen to have plausible causal relations with 
5 features on the physical dimension. A bi-directional causal relationship is also observed between 
botnet activities and mean frame length of transmitted bytes. Intra-dimensionally, there exists 
relations between features on the social dimension such as the population fear and the mean bytes 
transmitted on victim’s network. Inter-dimensionally, there are observed causal relations between 
features within the physical dimension. 
 
5.4.6 Stage 6: The Attack Phase 
 
Stage 6 of the experiment integrates evidences leading from the physical dimension with evidences on 
the same dimension on a pre-defined time scale to spot indicators of a plausible detection of denial of 
service attempts on victim’s network on the physical dimension of cyberspace. The rationale for 
conducting this stage of the experiment is to establish entanglements between events on the 
dimensions of cyberspace studied in this thesis using co-integral links between them at the 6
th
 stage of 
the traditional kill chain model. The researcher uses series from the network layer of the physical 
dimension while propagating prior stages of the kill-chain already identified in previous stages and 
the social dimension in constructing a predictive model.  




The endogenous variable selected for this phase characterizes a denial of service attack on victim’s 
network as a ratio of the number of DNS requests on port 53 to the number of UDP packets sent and 
the total number of incoming connections on the victims network (Sans Institute, 2012). The ‘dos’ 
variable is therefore derived as a function of the total number of requests, the total amount of TCP 
packets and total number of SYN flags raised sent within selected time intervals on the victim’s 
network (Sans Institute, 2012). It is estimated by scaling the total number of TCP Packets and the total 
number of SYN flags by the number of connections made and packets sent over the network.  
 
 (
𝑇𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑆𝑌𝑁 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
) 




Figure 5-41: Denial Of Service on The Physical Dimension 
 
The endogenous variable selected at this stage is the ‘dos’ which a denial of service attempt by 
external adversaries. As with the previous stage of the experiment, this feature is also arbitrary to 
represent multiple stages of the traditional kill-chain. Datasets from both dimensions were integrated 
on a similar timeline with the aim of predicting events of the last hour on the physical dimension. The 
merging of both datasets produced a single dataset with 74 features and 2524 observations. For testing 
and evaluation of developed model, the data was chronologically split into two, removing the last 120 
observations (the two hours) from each feature in the dataset, as a separate test dataset. The out of 
sample reliability of the constructed model will be tested on observations from the last hour using an 
N-ahead prediction strategy where N=120. This is done to ensure reliability of out of sample 
prediction performance testing. 
A simple intra-dimensional correlation analysis of the 74 features on both dimensions as shown in  
figure 5-4 below, reveals a slight correlation between features on both dimensions. For example, the 




level of chat congestion and chatroom traffic is seen to have a slight correlation with the number of 
distinct connections to the network. Additionally, on the social dimension, emotion and opinion 
features are observed to be highly correlated with each other. The black boxes in the figure below 
groups features into hierarchical clusters. The recon, connection fail ratio, scanner, weaponization and 
injection features are propagated from the reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery and the C&C 
phases of the kill-chain. Sets of network and social features are observed to be highly correlated with 
each other such as ip addresses, ports, number of connections denied by intrusion detection system, 
total alerts raised by intrusion detection system, weaponization, chat room congestion. These 
correlation relationships were also observed in the previous stages of the experiment.  
 
 
Figure 5-42: Intra-Dimensional Correlation Coefficients (Attack Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment relevant to the 6th phase 
of the experiment. The correlation coefficients are on a scale of +1 to -1 as shown by the color bar. 
Highly positively correlated pairs of variables tend towards +1 while highly negatively correlated 
pairs of variables tend towards -1. Multiple pairs of variables are seen to be highly positively or 
negatively correlated. For example, the group of features, Cyber relatedness, Entropy, chat size, chat 
room congestion and chat room traffic posted per minute are all seen to be highly positively 
correlated. Additionally, the group of features such as packet data features, reconnaissance features 
and intrusion detection features are also seen to be highly correlated with each other. Consequently, 




one or more of pairs of features that are seen to be highly correlated with each other (where Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient ≥ +0.65 or ≤ -0.65) are removed from the dataset. The correlation elimination 
process reduces the feature set by removing one or more of a set of highly correlated variables (Hall 
and Smith, 1998). The assumption is that information provided by highly correlated variables can be 
provided to the model by a single one of those variables therefore reducing redundancy to achieve a 
parsimonious model. The results of the filtered feature set after a correlation elimination produces a 
smaller feature set of 26 features as shown in the figure below, eliminating 48 highly correlated 
features. 
 
Figure 5-43: Correlation Coefficients Reduced Feature Set (Attack Phase) 
The figure above shows the intra-dimensional correlation between features across the social and 
physical dimensions of the information space represented in this experiment relevant to the 6th phase 
of the experiment for the reduced feature set. This reduced set of 26 features including the 
endogenous variable, ‘dos’ are selected for further feature selection methods. To further reduce the 
number of features, the researcher applies a recursive features selection method to select only features 
that significantly reduce the error of prediction in the endogenous feature.  The recursive feature 
selection stage further reduces the uncorrelated feature set to only those variables that minimizes the 
prediction error for the chosen endogenous variable ‘dos’. To begin the recursive feature selection 
from the uncorrelated feature set, the researcher starts by building an ordinary least squares regression 
linear model with the ‘dos’ as the endogenous feature predicted by all other features in the reduced 
feature set above as shown in the figure above. The recursive feature selection searches for a model 
that optimizes the Akaike Information (AIC) and reduces errors. The recursive feature selection step 
further reduces the number of features leaving 10 features. The resulting features are shown in the 
table below and used in further analysis. Lastly, the researcher creates generic methods for calculating 




the importance of each feature in predicting the outcome feature. This is used to examine the 
contribution of each feature in the dataset in predicting the outcome feature ‘dos’. This last step in the 
feature selection phase is elimination by variable importance (Mehmood et al., 2012). The absolute 
value of the t-statistic for each feature is used to compute the unique contribution of each input-
feature to the model and a cut off of 1 is chosen (Noppamas, Seree and Kidakan, 2014). From the 
figure below, it is observed that there are 9 important features for predicting an attempted denial of 
service attack on victim’s network. These features include botnet activities, chat traffic, 
reconnaissance, number of destination IP addresses active within a given time frame, the population 
fear, joy, flu relatedness, fire relatedness and cyber relatedness derived from microblogging feeds. 
 
 
Figure 5-44: Variable Importance of Features (Attack Phase) 
 
The figure above shows the relative variable importance for each feature in the final feature set. The 
last phase of the feature selection left the same 9 homogenous features as extremely useful for 
predicting the outcome feature. The recon variable is seen as the most useful feature for predicting the 
attack phase of the kill-chain (in a Denial of Service attack). Interestingly, event-related features from 
the social dimension such as the cyber-related of text discussions (‘cyber_rel’), discussions about the 
fire event and flu spread (‘fire_rel’, and ‘flu_rel’) are also seen as significant indicators of this phase. 
The final features for the model are shown in the table 5-34 below. 
The next phase of the analytical framework involves selecting appropriate orders for the intended 
model. This involves selecting an autoregressive order, testing for seasonality in each feature and 
selecting a moving average as discussed in the analytical framework.  
The VAR model order selection phase seeks to select the appropriate significant lag at which features 
are serially correlated. The researcher uses an iterative solution with the maximum of 300 lags. At 
each iteration, the researcher builds a model for each equation in the VAR and measures the AIC. 
Finally, the researcher selects 216 lags (approximately 2 hours) as this is the lag length with the 
optimal AIC.  




In addition to selecting appropriate VAR lag order, the researcher also tests each time series in the 
feature set for seasonality. In order to achieve this, the researcher employs a time series 
decomposition technique. As discussed in section literature review, time series decomposition works 
by splitting a time series into its three main components: the trend, the seasonal movement and the 
error terms. Seasonal patterns are expected to repeat with a fixed period of time. An additive 
decomposition method was chosen as the magnitude of the series does not increase with the series. 
After applying the Fourier transform for detecting seasonality, the botnets and database connections 
features shows an approximately 2 hours seasonal variation. 
A stationarity and normality test are therefore conducted on the 10 features and results are tabled 
below. The results of the stationarity test show a significant p-value for rejecting the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity in the augmented dickey fuller stationarity test. All selected features are seen to 
have a constant mean and variance over the selected period of time. 












Dos 0.01 -11.56 True -11.89 160.09 0.99 0.00 
Recon 0.01 -9.03 True 15.75 269.98 0.52 0.00 
Chatroom 
Traffic 
0.01 -5.54 True 1.42 5.05 1.00 0.00 
Botnets 0.01 -11.60 True 18.35 382.97 0.50 0.00 
Cyber 
Relatedness 
0.01 -8.98 True 0.58 1.05 0.50 0.00 
Fire 
Relatedness 
0.01 -7.23 True 1.81 5.63 0.50 0.00 
Icmp Packets 0.01 -18.34 True 0.064 0.08 1.00 0.00 
Flu 
Relatedness 
0.01 -8.26 True 0.40 0.48 0.53 0.00 




0.14 -3.03 False 0.64 -0.30 1.00 0.00 
Table 5-35: Features' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Attack Phase) 
Additionally, the skewness and K-S tests show that the botnets, recon and dos features are slightly 
skewed and exhibiting varying peakedness. However, the kurtosis tests for the flu relatedness, cyber 
relatedness, fire relatedness, number of destinations ips and the chatroom traffic are seen to be fairly 
normal. Given that all features except the number of destination IPs were stationary, the Johansen’s 
test for co-integration was not applicable at this stage of the experiment. However, for further 
investigation, the Engle and Granger test for co-integration was used to determine co-integration 
between each pair of features in the feature set. To achieve this, the researcher constructs a linear 
regression model between each pair of features and conducts a stationarity test on the residuals of the 
resulting model. The Engle Granger test shows no significant p-values for features in the system at the 
selected time period. 
Given that all features are observed to be stationary and the absence of any co-integrating 
relationships at this stage of the experiment, a VAR model was fitted to the levels. The VAR with 




order of 216 lags was estimated utilizing the OLS per equation in the model with 10 parameter OLS 
models where each feature is predicted by its on lags and lags of the other 9 features in the model. The 
density distribution plots below show the residuals from the fitted VAR(216) model.  
The error terms i.e. the residuals are expected to be independently distributed across each equation 
and serially uncorrelated. The residuals are experimental errors derived by finding the difference 
between the observed data points and the predicted data points. To ensure that these assumptions are 
met, the researcher tests the hypothesis of white noise residuals using a normality test on the residuals 
of the VAR model. The stationarity and normality test results for the residuals are shown below. 
 












Dos 0.01 -10.71 1.00 0.26 1.39 0.45 0.00 
Recon 0.01 -15.47 1.00 -0.06 1.28 0.46 0.00 
Chatroom 
Traffic 
0.01 -16.37 1.00 0.03 1.29 0.41 0.00 
Botnets 0.01 -17.87 1.00 -0.22 1.72 0.44 0.00 
Cyber 
Relatedness 
0.01 -13.99 1.00 0.11 1.67 0.41 0.00 
Fire 
Relatedness 
0.01 -18.35 1.00 0.10 1.75 0.42 0.00 
Icmp Packets 0.01 -18.26 1.00 -0.02 1.31 0.43 0.00 
Flu 
Relatedness 
0.01 -13.08 1.00 -0.09 1.33 0.43 0.00 




0.01 -13.77 1.00 -0.08 1.35 0.48 0.00 
Table 5-36: Residuals' Stationarity and Normality Test Results (Attack Phase) 
The distribution of the residuals for the outcome feature dos is seen to be centered at zero with narrow 
peaked curves and slightly skewed to the right. The distribution curve shows that the model performs 
well in predicting and in capturing the trends in most features as the residuals are seen to be slightly 
fairly normal and stationary.  





Figure 5-45: Density Distribution Of Residuals (Attack pHASE) 
 
Lastly, after observing the density distribution of the residuals, the researcher derives a normal 
probability plot for each residual from the structural model. To achieve this, the researcher calculates 
the cumulative probability of each residual using the formula: 




Where P is the cumulative probability of an observed residual, I is residual observation and N is the 
number of observations made within the given time period.  










The normal probability plot identifies departures from normality, non-linearity and outliers in a given 
distribution. Deviations from the straight line indicate a deviation from normality. A homoscedastic 
distribution is observed across all plots with reducing errors around zero. The S-Shape formed by data 




points in the plots indicate a shift towards normality. However, a few outliers are observed in all 10 
features. 
The performance of the VAR model is measured using structural multivariate time series model 
validation techniques outlined in the analytical framework. The model is validation using both in 
sample and out of sample prediction values. The in-sample residuals are derived by obtaining the 
differences between the actual observations and the predictions returned by the model. The results for 
the in-sample model performance is shown in the table below. 
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
Dos 0.03 0.04 1.14 1.14 0.00 98.11 
Recon 0.02 0.03 -25.07 25.07 0.00 98.88 
Chatroom Traffic 0.06 0.08 91.26 91.26 0.00 60.58 
Botnets 0.03 0.05 40.95 40.95 0.00 82.03 
Cyber Relatedness 0.06 0.08 -5.72 5.72 0.00 97.25 
Fire Relatedness 0.05 0.07 78.18 78.18 0.00 66.36 
Icmp Packets 0.05 0.06 -17.90 17.90 0.00 97.84 
Flu Relatedness 0.05 0.06 -6.93 6.93 0.00 97.78 
Joy 0.07 0.10 9.33 9.33 0.00 92.78 
Number Of 
Destination Ips 
0.01 0.01 0.49 0.49 0.00 99.32 
Total Average 
Error 
0.04 0.06 16.57 27.70 0.00  
Table 5-37: In Sample Model Performance Results (Attack Phase) 
The model works well in predicting most of the features in the model. The model also performed 
accurately for features with smaller values of RMSE, MAD and MAPE. These results show that the 
model works well with expected data and fits the observations of interest. 
Additionally, out of sample validations are also done for each feature Out of sample forecasts are 
obtained by forecasting the N-ahead data values where N=120 minutes i.e the last hour initially 
subtracted from the original dataset. The out of sample residuals are then derived by obtaining the 
differences between forecasts on the test datasets using the VAR model and the test data with 120 
observations. The measures of out of sample performance values are presented in the table below.  
 MAE RMSE MPE MAPE MAD FEATURE 
ACCURACY 
Dos 10.68 13.59 -93.88 93.88 0.09 51.29 
Recon 1.96 2.50 2130.88 2130.88 0.02 5.83 
Chatroom Traffic 2.24 2.90 102.48 102.48 0.02 75.58 
Botnets 2.27 2.98 -83.88 24.74 0.02 70.65 
Cyber Relatedness 2.27 3.04 566.58 566.58 0.02 66.68 
Fire Relatedness 2.29 2.98 -22641.30 22641.30 0.02 55.41 
Icmp Packets 2.25 2.95 -726.61 726.61 0.02 69.58 
Flu Relatedness 2.42 3.21 -226.18 226.18 0.02 68.69 
Joy 2.27 3.08 201.74 201.74 0.02 71.20 
Number Of 
Destination Ips 
2.15 2.92 -171.61 171.61 0.02 89.83 






3.08 4.01 -2094.18 2688.60 0.03  
Table 5-38: Out of Sample Model Performance Results (Attack Phase) 
The out of sample performance shows that the model works well in predicting new values of the 
endogenous feature. However, some features such as out of sample predictions for population fear of 
microblogging feeds are seen to exhibit a higher level of out of sample percentage error. Although 
these features are selected as being important for predicting the outcome variable, the features 
included in the model are not entirely efficient in predicting them. By averaging the performance 
measure across the various performance measurement techniques, the model records a total of 95% in 
sample accuracy and 90% out of sample accuracy for the outcome feature. 
Following the performance test, the granger causality test each feature combination with the optimum 
lag selected in the model order selection stage. The structural model can also be used to make 
inference about the direction or directions of causality between every pair of feature in the feature set. 
The granger causality test is set up with the null hypothesis of no causality between the feature ‘x’ (on 
the left-hand of the arrow) and the feature ‘y’ (on the right-hand of the arrow). The table below shows 
only causal links with significant P-values to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 Causal Relationship F Statistic P-Value 
1.  Denial Of Service Attempt  --> Recon 93.56279 9.76E-22 
2.  Denial Of Service Attempt  --> Cyber Relatedness 6.425258 0.011314 
3.  Recon  --> Cyber Relatedness 9.147256 0.002517 
4.  Recon  --> Flu Relatedness 5.330605 0.021039 
5.  Chatroom Traffic  --> Joy 5.057547 0.024609 
6.  Botnets  --> Number Of Destination Ips 7.495017 0.006233 
7.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Denial Of Service Attempt 17.69884 2.68E-05 
8.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Recon 17.27046 3.36E-05 
9.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Flu Relatedness 15.77563 7.34E-05 
10.  Cyber Relatedness  --> Number Of Destination Ips 8.737648 0.003147 
11.  Fire Relatedness  --> Chatroom Traffic 33.67483 7.37E-09 
12.  Fire Relatedness  --> Flu Relatedness 28.6925 9.29E-08 
13.  Fire Relatedness  --> Joy 13.69332 0.00022 
14.  Flu Relatedness  --> Denial Of Service Attempt 13.5687 0.000235 
15.  Flu Relatedness  --> Recon 6.928613 0.008537 
16.  Flu Relatedness  --> Fire Relatedness 6.064838 0.01386 
17.  Flu Relatedness  --> Joy 15.85585 7.04E-05 




18.  Flu Relatedness  --> Number Of Destination Ips 14.64731 0.000133 
19.  Joy  --> Cyber Relatedness 8.683932 0.003241 
20.  Joy  --> Flu Relatedness 6.379723 0.011607 
21.  Joy  --> Number Of Destination Ips 27.164 2.03E-07 
22.  Number Of Destination Ips  --> Botnets 63.50503 2.45E-15 
Table 5-39: F-Test Results for Granger Analysis (Attack Phase) 
The granger analysis shows a total of 22 likely causal relations of 90 possible relations between the 10 
features in the feature set. The outcome feature ‘dos’ is seen to have plausible causal relations with 3 
features, 1 on the physical dimension and 2 on the social dimension. A bi-directional causal 
relationship is also observed between denial of service attempts and the spread of epidemic flu in the 
population. Additionally, the 3 major events of the scenario design are observed to intra-
dimensionally linked to the denial of service attempts on the network layer. Intra-dimensionally, there 
exists relations between features on the social dimension such as the population joy and the number of 
destination IPs communicating on victim’s network. Inter-dimensionally, there are observed causal 
relations between features within the physical dimension such as the number of destinations ips 
communicating on victim’s network and botnet activities. There is also a bi-directional relationship 




This chapter has presented the practical implementation of the entangled cyberspace framework with 
an alignment to the theory developed in chapter 2 of this report. It presents the experimental test 
environment as well as the proposed analytical and implementation strategy for the framework. It 
showed how data used in evaluating the theoretical framework was acquired, transformed and 
analysed to yield supporting results. The accuracy and errors for each model developed at each phase 
of the experiment was also measured and reported and their impact in the usefulness of the 
framework. The next chapter discusses the results of the analysis and therefore the findings of this 
research. 





Figure 5-47: Summary Of Experiments 
The figure above depicts the summary of experiments for each stage of the kill-chain. The approach 
presented in this research are experimentally tested in pre-empting each stage of the kill-chain. We 
performed an in sample and out-sample testing of how well the approach is able to pre-empt the next 
phase of the kill-chain using features identified across various dimensions of the information space. 
The ability of our approach to pre-empt the next phase of the kill-chain is documented as the 
difference of our predicted values from our actual values. We estimate the error recorded at each 
phase using metrics discussed in section 5.3.11.2.  
The ability of the approach to record a reduction in the propagated error across the phases 
demonstrates that the approach is able to detect features that are useful for characterizing various 
phases of the kill-chain. However, the error recorded at the ‘weaponization’ phase is seen to have 
increased approximately 7% from the last phase. These may be due to the fact that the approach has 
limited access to representative data at this phase.  
Furthermore, the determination of the level of ‘acceptable error’ is strictly determined by the domain 
of analysis and an acceptable threshold set by some criteria determined by the cyber analyst.  




6 CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 INTRODUCTION 6.1
This empirical results and analysis chapter discusses critically, the results from the experimental 
design and testing of the Entangled Cyberspace Theory using the scenario events. The experiment was 
conducted in six stages representing the phases of the generic cyber-attack kill-chain presented by 
Lockheed Martin (Hutchins, 2011). This chapter is organised as follows:  
 The events within the scenario are described in the next section. 
 Results of event analysis from each evidence source included in the scenario are discussed in 
sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. 
 Results of the intra-dimensional co-integration analysis across the three dimensions 
represented are presented in section 5.6. 
 The physical-social-economic kill chain is presented in section 5.7. 
  Results of the intra-dimensional causal analysis are presented in section 5.8. 
 Finally, the evaluation of the hypothesised theoretical framework is presented in section 5.9. 
This chapter aims at addressing the alignment of the research experiment and results with the research 
aims and objectives outlined in Chapter 1 of this report. This section also validates the experimental 
design as sufficient for proving the hypothesised theory and answering the research questions of 
entanglements between dimensions of cyberspace. The results of the analysis are explored and 
reported systematically following the research design and approach discussed in Chapter 3 of this 
report. To achieve these stages of intra-dimensional analysis in cyberspace, the researcher 
independently analyses results from the cyber-attack kill-chain phases as they are perpetrated across 
the various dimensions of cyberspace. 
 THE SCENARIOS IN CONTEXT 6.2
The scenarios used in this research are a combination of events based on the IEEE VAST 2011 visual 
analytics challenge (Cook et al., 2011) and real-world events in the financial sector. The individual 
events were designed to simulate a flu epidemic spread, a fire accident in the population of a fictitious 
metropolitan city, a denial of service attack on a fictitious company and a stock market crash in the 
share prices of the company. Each event included in the scenario is designed to characterise activities 
on a single dimension of cyberspace. The events in the microblogging feed, the cyber-attack and the 
stock market crash are designed to characterise activities on the social, physical and economic 
dimension respectively. 
6.2.1 Activities on the Social Dimension 
Health professionals have noticed a drastic increase in the number of flu-related illnesses. Observed 
symptoms are reported to include fever, chills, sweats, swollen lymph nodes, fatigue, aches, pains 
coughing, breathing difficulty, nausea and vomiting. Microblog feeds collected from various devices 
owned by the population within the metropolitan area of interest are used to characterise various 
events occurring in the population. A deep analysis of the microblogging feeds identifies three main 
events: an Epidemic Spread, a Truck Accident characterized by reports of a fire and discussions 
related to a cyber-event.   
 
 





Figure 6-1: Scenario Event - Fire Accident on the 17th of May 
 
The results of applying a fire-related lexicon to the microblogging feed provide a detailed 
quantification of feeds based on the truck accident event. On the 17
th
 of May, there are reports of a 
truck accident within the microblogging feeds. The truck accident is reported in 500 microblog feeds 
on the 17
th
 of May within the observed period. The incidents as depicted by the figure above shows 
major discussions at around 2 am, 8 am and 9 pm during the day. 
Additionally, between 8 am on the 17
th
 of May, and 8 am on the 20
th
 of May increased reports of flu-
related symptoms are observed within the microblog feeds. Similarly, the results of applying the flu-
related wordlist to the microblogging feeds provide a detailed quantification of feeds based on the flu 
epidemic event.  Infected individuals are seen to be randomly across the population area. From the 
figure below, the spike in reports on flu-related symptoms is observed by the drastic increase in flu 
relatedness of microblogging feeds beginning on the 17
th
 of May up until about the 20
th
 of May. 





Figure 6-2: Scenario Event - Flu Spread Within Population 
Furthermore, the spread of this epidemic or flu in the population is also seen to be related to the 
average wind speed of the area from where the feed was collected. The figure below shows data 




 of May. The average wind speed for these three days was 
either 5, 8 or 9. It is observed that on days with higher records of wind speed there is a higher drift in 
the observed levelled of flu relatedness in the microblogging feeds. 
 
Figure 6-3: Scenario Event - Flu Spread VS Wind Speed Over Time 
 
6.2.2 Activities on the Physical Dimension 
The company in the scenario is a fictitious company based in the U.S. The company operates a 
corporate network with a cyber-team responsible for managing all aspects of the corporate network. 
The company is recently concerned with the level of cyber situational awareness of its employees and 
is dedicated to developing this capacity. To achieve this, the company analyses log files including 




intrusion detection logs, firewall logs and network traffic logs to identify events of concern and 
develop a holistic cyber situational awareness strategy. The network architecture of the company’s 
network is provided in chapter 4 of this report. The critical assets identified in the network are high 
priority nodes essential to the business processes of the company. A thorough analysis of the timeline 
of events on the physical dimension shows a streak of cyber incidents of interest beginning on the 11
th
 
of April 2011 and ends on the 15
th
 of April 2011. The dates and times for the earliest detection of 
activities on each day is shown in the table below. 
SN Event Description Day Evidence 
Source 
1 Nessus Scan  The scan shows that the remote 
host runs a version of Windows 
known to be affected by 
multiple buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities when viewing 
WMF files. This may allow 
adversaries to execute arbitrary 











External systems are attempting 
to disrupt communications with 
the web server. This is an attack 
on the corporate web server to 







3 Port Scan All Freight computers begin port 
scanning other systems on their 
subnet (which is why this is not 
detected in the Firewall logs). 
This suggests a problem within 








4 Port Scan All Freight computers continue 
port scanning other systems on 
their subnet (which is why this 








5 Port Scan This port scan attack is from the 
unpatched workstations which 
are port scanning internal 







6 SMTP Email  An email exchange between two 
AFC employees. Represents the 
initiation of a socially 
engineered attack. Additional 
information about the activity 
can be found in the PCAP file 













Remote Desktop Connection set 
to alert by emergency if detected 
from the outside.  Remote 
Desktop connections from 
outside the network are 
prohibited by policy, but the 
network administrator has not 
blocked the connections on the 









This is an authentication log for 
event ID 4634 to the web server 
corresponding to the  unblocked 
external login 
01:31 pm 14th May 
2011 
Security Logs 
9 New Computer 
Powered on 








Table 6-1: Timeline of Events on the Physical Dimension 
For this analysis, the activities shown in the table above are summarized as three main cyber-incidents 
on the victim’s network: a) Denial of service attacks, b) Port Scan attacks and c) Social Engineering 
attack. Port scans are seen to happen from within the network which may suggest infected machines 
scanning for other hosts on the network to spread infection. Denial of service attacks are seen to be 
from external systems attempting to take down the company’s corporate web server running on the 
host machine (see network architecture section). Finally, the SMTP, remote desktop control and 
authentication attacks sum up to a strategic social engineering attack designed to infiltrate the victim’s 
network. The adversary uses this attack to disguise an externally controlled computer as a legitimate 
node on a victim’s network. 
6.2.3 Activities on the Economic Dimension 
Events on the economic dimension lead up to a stock market crash in the stock prices of Delish 
Corporation. The timeline of share price fluctuations on the economic dimension takes place 
throughout one year. Significant price increases and price drops are observed at equal time interval 
deviating from the series equilibrium. The stock price crash happens before the activities on the 
physical and social dimensions and acts as antecedents to the events on these dimensions. The 
experiments show that the timeline of events on the economic dimension can be directly linked to 
events on the physical dimension, specifically on the network dimension at the first stage of the 
traditional kill-chain model. The predictive accuracy of Network scan and reconnaissance features on 
the network layer of the physical dimension using the weighted prices from the economic dimension 
is seen to be highly significant.  
OBJECTIVE 1: To characterize cyberspace as a collection of multiple dimensions that are part of a 
whole 
 PHASED ANALYSIS 6.3
This section discusses the causal relationships observed between features across the various 
dimensions of cyberspace. Each stage of the experiment conducts a simple causal analysis with 
features across various dimensions. Although not all features with significant causal relationships 
were significant in predicting the outcome feature at that stage, the observed features with significant 
causal relationships represent an inter-connection of events at that stage of the kill chain. The 




subsequent sub-sections discuss the results of these analysis at each stage of the kill-chain 
experimentation. 
Stage one, the antecedent phase highlights causal relationships between user emotion features, event 
features (such as the epidemic spread within the population) and financial features (such as the 
weighted price index of company prices). Additionally, these features are also seen to exhibit a 
feedback system where user emotion features and event features are simultaneously predictive of each 
other. This phenomenon speaks to the interdependence of this human emotion on real-world events as 
identified in the experiment. 
Stage two of the experiment analyses events on the network layer of the physical dimension to pre-
empt an active reconnaissance. Vulnerability detection and intrusion detection features ae not only 
seen to be co-integrated but also causally linked within the given timeframe. Vulnerability detection 
features such as port scans and ping sweeps lead up to the detection of intrusions such as the 
attempted denial of service attack at 11.39am on the 13
th
 of May. Additionally, the causal feedback 
loop between these features indicates a cyclic pattern between adversaries searching for exploitable 
vulnerabilities on victim’s network and attempted attacks on the network such as the DOS and the 
outright infiltration of victim’s network. Furthermore, there is also a minimal causal relation identified 
between the population’s sadness and cyber-related gists on the social dimension. These features are 
seen to affect the population’s perspective towards events occurring in the experiment.  
Stage three of the experiment tracks the weaponisation phase of the Physical-Social-Economic kill-
chain on the social dimension of cyberspace. This event is measured by lexical analysis of user texts 
based on a cyber weaponization wordlist. Consequently, we observe causal relationships between this 
feature and other features on the social dimension. For example, the emotion features and user opinion 
features such as polarity of user gists, are seen to be causal with each other. More importantly, the 
amount of information flowing through and from victim’s network (as measured in the number of data 
packets through the network) is also seen to be linked to event features (Epidemic Flu Spread) and 
user emotion features (Anticipation, trust and fear).  
Stage four of the experiment integrates evidence from the physical and social dimension to spot 
indicators of a cyber-weapon injection into the victim’s network. This event is characterized as a 
function of the total number of packets sent over the network, the total number of incoming and 
outgoing database connections on the network and the total number of identified malicious HTTP 
requests. This stage of the experiment identifies only two significant causal relationships: 
Causal relationships are observed between the social and physical dimensions and within the social 
dimension at the injection phase. The derived injection feature is seen to highly co-integrated and 
causal of the chatroom congestion on the social dimension. Inter-dimensionally, there is one observed 
significant causal relationship between the chatroom traffic and the population fear.   
Stage five of the experiments tracks botnets in the operating network using evidence from the social 
and physical dimensions. The network layer characterizes this event as a function of time aggregated 
DNS requests and UDP connections in the operating network. Here, the research identifies 
approximately 30 significant causal relations between features on the physical and social dimensions 
with a 60% bi-directional causation. As expected, there are observed circular causal relationships 
between the derived botnet features and other features on the network layer like the total number of 
transmitted packets, the mean number of bytes transmitted within a given time frame and the total 
number of database connections on the network. Additionally, there are significant causal relations 
between features on the physical and social dimensions such as the epidemic spread and population 
fear as indicated on the social dimension and the number of database connections and the mean 
number of data bytes transmitted over the network within a given time frame. 




 PREDICTIVE FEATURES WITHIN DIMENSIONS 6.4
The causal analysis leads to the identification of useful predictive features on each dimension at each 
phase of the proposed kill-chain. These are features identified by this research as early indicators of 
kill-chain phases. The identification of these features across the dimensions solidifies the research 
theory of entanglements between dimensions of cyberspace, put in the context of a traditional kill-
chain.  
6.4.1 Predictive Features on the Social Dimension 
Through the course of the experiment, several features from the social dimension have been observed 
to be significantly important to the entangled cyberspace eco-system. The scenario and experimental 
design use three sets of features to characterize events on the social dimension: Emotion-based 
features, Opinion–based features and Event-based features. This research uses a bag-of-words 
approach with various context wordlists to characterize various events from microblogging 
discussions. These characterizations track discussions on certain events such as the epidemic flu 
spread, a perceived creation of a cyber-weapon and a truck accident on the social dimension. These 
features are referred to in this research as ‘event-based’ features. Similarly, the emotions features 
include joy, fear, anticipation, surprise, sadness, trust while the emotion-based characterise the 
sentiments of discussions.  
SN Feature Stage1 Stage2  Stage3 Stage4 Stage5 Stage6  
 EVENT-BASED FEATURES  
1 Flu-
Relatedness 
✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ 83% 
2 Fire-
Relatedness 
X X ✓ X X ✓ 33% 
3 Cyber-
Relatedness 
X ✓ ✓ X X ✓ 50% 
4 Weaponization X X ✓ X X X 17% 
6 OPINION-BASED FEATURES  
7 Positivity X X X X X X 0% 
8 Negativity X X X X X X 0% 
9 Neutrality X X X X X X 0% 
10 Entropy X X ✓ X X X 17% 
11 Sentiment X X ✓ X X X 17% 
 EMOTION-BASED FEATURES  
12 Anticipation X X ✓ X X X 17% 
13 Surprise X ✓ ✓ X X X 33% 
14 Joy X X ✓ X X ✓ 33% 
15 Trust ✓ X ✓ X X X 33% 
16 Fear ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ X 67% 
17 Sadness X ✓ X X X X 17% 
18 Disgust X X ✓ X X X 17% 
 OTHER  
19 Chatroom 
Congestion 
✓ X X X X ✓ 33% 
 TOTAL 25% 25% 93% 6% 12% 31% TOTAL 




Table 6-2: Predictive Features on the Social Dimension 
The table above shows the predictive importance of each feature on the social dimension at each stage 
of the kill-chain. As stage 3 of the kill chain is seen by most cyber analysts as the network blind-spot, 
it is first observed that the social dimension is significantly important in predicting stage phase three 
of the kill-chain; the weaponization phase.  
Furthermore, event-based features and emotion-based features are seen to be significant predictive 
indicators across all stages of the kill-chain. Significant events of importance within the time frame 
under observation such as the epidemic flu-spread and truck accident (from the scenario design), are 
directly linked to the propagation of events across the kill-chain. Event-based features are also seen to 
be not significantly predictive of events at the delivery stage of kill-chain (Stage 4 of the experiment). 
In general, features on the social dimension are observed to be not significantly important for 
predicting events at the delivery, exploitation and installation phase of the kill-chain. These results 
support two important notions; i) the structure of the kill-chain and ii) the manner of execution of each 
event in the kill-chain.  
6.4.2 Predictive Features on the Physical Dimension 
The physical dimension in the experimental design comprises of features on the real-world layer and 
the network layer. Several features from these layers were observed to be significantly important in 
the entangled cyberspace framework. The scenario and experimental design use network layer 
features from 3 sources (Packet flow log files, Intrusion detection log files and firewall log files). 
These feature sources record the flow of information in and out of the network, the intrusions 
attempted on the operating network and the type of connections made to the network. On the real-
world layer, the average wind speed provides weather data observations for the metropolitan city in 
the scenario design. This weather data is integrated with microblogging feeds from the same 
population on the social dimension. This research aggregates network data measurements at equally 
time-spaced intervals to create aggregated time signals that characterise the operating network 
activities. 
SN FEATURE STAGE1 STAGE2 STAGE3 STAGE4 STAGE5 STAGE6  




X X X X ✓ X 16.7% 
2 Mean 
Epoch Time 
X X X X ✓ X 16.7% 
3 Mean Ip 
Length 













X X X ✓ ✓ X 33.3% 










X X X X X ✓ 16.7% 

































X X X X X X 0% 













X X X X X X 0% 
18 DOS Alerts X X X X X X 0% 
19 Port Scan X X X X X X 0% 





20 Ping sweep 
Alerts 
X X X X X X 0% 
21 Spp_frag3 X ✓ X X X X 16.7% 
 DERIVED FEATURES 
22 Recon X X X X X ✓ 16.7% 
23 Connection 
Fail Ratio 
X ✓ X X X X 16.7% 
24 Injection X X X ✓ X X 16.7% 
25 Botnets X X X X ✓ ✓ 33.3% 
26 DOS      ✓ 16.7% 
 TOTAL 0% 19% 4% 23% 39% 23%  
Table 6-3: Predictive Features on The Physical Dimension 
The table above shows the predictive importance of each feature on the physical dimension at each 
stage of the kill-chain. The predictive importance of features on the physical dimension are observed 
to be sparsely spread across the phases of the kill-chain. The features are also observed to be more 
useful in predicting events at stages 5 & 6 (C&C and Attack) of the kill-chain. At this stage of the kill-
chain, it is assumed that the adversary has certain control over the victim’s network. 
In general, the physical dimension, therefore, presents 4 major categories of features that are shown to 
be important in predicting events on the cyber-attack kill chain. These features include packet flow 
data, intrusion detection log data, derived features on the network layer and real-world observations 
particular to certain events of interest. 
6.4.3 Predictive Features on the Economic Dimension 
The features on the economic dimension as used in this research pertain to establishing the base for 
antecedents to cyber-attacks. The economic dimension, as it applies to this research, is theorized to 
contain features from political, cultural and financial real-world events. The scenario development 
incorporated features from digital financial markets as a representation of the economic dimension. 
The specific features used in the experimental design includes the average volume of the company’s 
shares of a period of time, the weighted price index, the opening, closing, high and low prices of the 
shares of a period of time. The weighted price index is used as an endogenous variable in phase 1 of 
the experiment. The results from phase one of the experiments show a certain level of co-integration 
between activities on the economic dimension and activities on the social dimension. The average 
wind speed from the physical dimension was also seen to be a useful exogenous feature in predicting 
the weighted prices of the company’s shares.  
One further discussed limitations of this research is the restriction of the representation of the 
‘economic’ layer to financial data. As earlier stated in the literature review, data on this dimension 
cover a range of SPEC factors that should ideally be grouped and tested. The addition of this layer 
serves as a proof of concept. 
 THE ENTANGLED CYBERSPACE FRAMEWORK 6.5
 The proposed framework in chapter 2 of this report suggests an integration of two existing theories: 
the multi-dimensional cyberspace (Barnett, 2014) and the traditional kill-chain model (Hutchins, 
2011). In addition to the traditional kill-chain model, this research incorporates the claims of social, 
political and economic effects on cyber-incidents by introducing a pre-stage to the traditional kill-




chain model; the antecedent phase. The results of the experiment show an interdependent relationship 
between events that characterize this phase and events from other stages of the kill-chain. 
Furthermore, the economic dimension is also incorporated into the entangled cyberspace framework 
to characterize the antecedent phase of the kill-chain. 
Therefore, each phase of the kill-chain corresponds to a single dimension of cyberspace based on time 
observations of events. Events are therefore represented as time signals, where each phase can be 
characterized by multiple time signals representing multiple events on that phase. Multiple time 
signals are analysed using structural models for multiple time series analysis (Vector Auto-regressive 
models) as discussed in the literature review. The prediction accuracy and error measured at each 
stage of the experiment represents the usefulness of selected events in characterizing the defined stage 
of the kill-chain on the intended dimension. This experiment is carried out across the 5 phases of the 
denial of service kill-chain (Konikoff, Harris and Petersen, 2013) and predictive features are identified 
to characterize corresponding stages of the kill-chain. 
The experiment testing the scenario was done in 6 stages which examines the events at the 6 stages of 
the attack scenario (including the antecedent stage) in this study. The research aims to provide 
empirical evidence for the existence of the entangled cyberspace using an integrated framework that 
detects early warning signs of cyber-incidents using a collection of webbed data. The theoretical 
framework of the entangled cyberspace is therefore practically implemented with the research 
approach. The research approach used identifies and integrates multiple sources of the evidence in the 
form of time signals, from various dimensions of cyberspace and analyses them using a multi-
dimensional phased approach. The phases of the framework are assumed to be equivalent to the 
phases of the attack kill-chain under consideration (in this experiment, a denial of service attack). This 
research, therefore, provides empirical evidence for the proposed framework put forward in chapter 2 
of this report. The proposed framework is an integration of the multi-dimensional cyberspace 
(Barnett, 2014), the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain (Hutchins, 2011) and Vector autoregressive 
models (Sims, 1980). 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Scenario-Based Entangled Cyberspace Framework 
The diagram above depicts a representation of the entangled cyberspace framework as applied to a 
hypothetical scenario. Each circle represents a phase in the cyber-attack kill-chain while the 
directionality of the arrows depicts the phased movements of events, vertically across the information 
space and horizontally across the kill-chain. The analytical framework as depicted in figure 5-2 is 
applied at each phase of the kill-chain on the corresponding dimension of representative evidence 
source. The entangled cyberspace, in theory, is the fusion of three conceptual foundations: a) A multi-
dimensional characterization of cyberspace, b) A sequential phased model for perpetrating cyber-




attacks and c) A structural model for integrating and simultaneously analysing multiple sources of 
evidence. The entangled cyberspace is established in this research as a seamless integration of 
evidence sources useful for a certain domain of analysis. The domain of analysis under consideration 
in this research is the cyber domain, and the experiment is developed in the context of certain cyber-
attack on a target network. The theoretical development for the research proposed framework is also 
developed in the context of a cyber-attack being perpetrated in cyberspace. 
The entangled cyberspace starts with the characterization of cyberspace into different dimensions of 
interest. Various researchers as identified in the literature review have provided a wide range of 
cyberspace characterizations. After a suitable characterization of cyberspace has been identified, the 
framework identifies evidence sources across these characterized dimensions and integrates them in 
the context of an identified analytical domain. It assumes that all entities relevant to analytical tasks 
exist on some identified dimension of cyberspace. 
These identified events are also characteristic of the stages of the traditional kill-chain model and used 
as the basis for developing the theoretical framework for pre-empting cyber-attacks. Given the 
domain of analysis (a cyber-attack), this research expands the idea of a seamless integration of 
evidence source across multiple dimensions of cyberspace by incorporating the steps involved in the 
traditional method for carrying out cyber-attacks. The stages of the traditional kill-chain model are 
split across the identified dimensions of cyberspace to create a multi-dimensional entanglement of 
events, characteristic of the kill-chain. 
In the hypothesized scenario of this research, the task is predicting a cyber-attack which is represented 
as the last stage of the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain. The framework in this research tests the 
usefulness of prior events on each dimension of cyberspace in predicting successive stages of the kill-
chain. Each prior stage is assumed to have happened before the start of the next stage of the kill-chain. 
The structural model propagates errors across the stages of the kill-chain, and only features that 
actively reduce prediction errors or increase prediction accuracy are used in predicting successive 
stages of the kill-chain. The structural model used is the vector autoregressive model due to its ability 
to extract relationships from multiple time series regression analysis simultaneously. The prediction 
accuracy and error measurements indicate the ability of events at one stage of the kill chain to pre-
empt the events at the next phase kill-chain.  
 
 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 6.6
 
The experiment testing the scenario in this research was conducted in 6 stages which examines the 
events at the 6 stages of the attack scenario in this study. The research aim is to provide an integrated 
framework that identifies early warning signs of cyber-incidents given a collection of webbed data. 
The research approach used identifies and integrates multiple sources of evidence from various 
dimensions of cyberspace and analyses them using a multi-dimensional phased approach. The 
framework can be interpreted as consisting of M phases and N dimensions where the phases 
correspond to the stages of the observed attack kill-chain while the dimensions correspond to the 
number of identified data sources (i.e. data dimensions) in cyberspace. This research, therefore, puts 
forward a framework that is an integration of evidence-based scenarios from a multi-dimensional 
cyberspace and a traditional cyber-attack kill-chain model. A benchmarked scenario was used to test 
the implementation of the theoretical framework, and the results of the multi-dimensional phased 
experiment are documented in chapter 4 of this report. This chapter discusses the findings from the 
experiment as they meet the specified research objectives. The findings from each stage of the 
experiment are detailed below, and the interpretation of the meaning is also provided. 




The first stage of the analysis presents a contextual timeline for events in the scenario design. This 
timeline provides a time spectrum on which the hypothesized link between events across the three 
dimensions is tested. This stage of analysis justifies the use of identified sources of evidence in 
representing events in cyberspace. The second stage of analysis in this chapter discusses the results of 
inter-dimensional and intra-dimensional correlation, co-integration and causation. These stages of the 
analysis establish the links between events on the various dimensions of cyberspace. The third stage 
of this chapter analysis identifies the features relevant for predicting the perpetration of a cyber-attack 
across the various dimensions of cyberspace. Lastly, the final stage of analysis in this chapter 
establishes the Entangled Cyberspace as a seamless integration of inter-connected events across the 
various dimensions of cyberspace. This concept of inter-dependence of events in cyberspace has been 
tested and proven in this research using traditional cyber-attack monitoring frameworks and models of 
characterizations in cyberspace.  
This method of analysis follows a strategy to fully justify the existence of the entangled cyberspace by 
individually meeting the requirements for each research objective stated. The analysis in this chapter 
was conducted in such a way that the contributions of the two frameworks used in developing the 
research artefacts are critically analysed. Firstly, the research justifies the sources of evidence as 
suggested by Alex Barnett, Clark and Klimburg in the Multi-Dimensional Cyberspace. Secondly, the 
sources of evidence that represent the various stages of Lockheed Martin’s cyber-attack kill-chain are 
also evaluated and justified. This integrated analysis helps to justify the entanglements of events in 
cyberspace thoroughly. 
 CONCLUSION 6.7
This chapter has discussed various issues based on the research finding from the experiment and the 
existing literature on the implementation of analytical strategies to cyber defence. The discussions 
presented are based on thorough analysis of the benchmark data provided and extraction of hidden 
entanglements using the proposed framework. The research findings indicate that entanglements of 
events in cyberspace can be analysed using structural models for simultaneous analysis of multiple 
events. More so, the research findings also highlight specific predictive features of cyber incidents 
within each identified dimension of cyberspace. Each feature is evaluated based on its usefulness in 
predicting events at certain stages of the kill-chain.  
The analysis of the experiment shows significant inter-dimensional relationships between feature 
types at various stages of the kill-chain. The antecedent phase is assumed to occur before the start of 
the kill-chain and assumingly kick starts the events of the kill-chain. The experimental timeline of 
events in phase one shows a chronological sequence of events. The chronological arrangement of 
events in the experimental design justifies a phased approach to analysing the causal effects of events 
between phases and across the dimensions of cyberspace. The phases of the experiment identify co-
integrating events that are assumed to occur on each dimension with links to other dimensions of 
cyberspace. The results at the phased experimentation show that there are inter-dimensional and intra-
dimensional correlative and co-integrating relationships.  
The social dimension stands out with the most useful predictive features for events on other 
dimensions of cyberspace. The social dimension provides measures for the level of emotions shown 
by users towards specific events happening on the economic dimension. Events on the social 
dimension, across various phases of the experiment, are also proven to be predictive of events on 
another dimension.  
Additionally, the economic dimension is proven to be useful in identifying the offset a kill-chain 
based on political, cultural and economic events. It is important to note that the economic dimension 
here represents political and economic factors that are assumed to influence the propagation of cyber-




attacks in cyberspace. The evidence identified on the economic dimension of cyberspace was shown 
to characterize the first phase of the modified cyber-attack kill-chain, the antecedent phase. This 
phase, therefore, characterizes events that trigger the start of a cyber-attack and the evidence to this 
fact is the predictive usefulness of these indicators as measured in phase one of the experiment. 
The discussions at each phase of the experiments lead up to establishing the basis for the use of the 
entangled cyberspace theory in predicting cyber incidents. The analysis at each phase of the 
experiment presents the process and features to consider while including evidence sources in the 
framework. Additionally, co-integrating relationships were tested at each phase of the experiments to 
determine the extent to which features on at each phase of the kill-chain are inter-dependent. 
Practically, the entangled cyberspace approach will contribute to an integrated implementation of 
proactive cyber defence techniques that can keep defenders one step ahead of their adversaries. The 
entangled cyberspace framework is based on a time-space categorization of events that are assumed to 
characterize stages of the traditional kill-chain which leads up to a cyber-attack. The next chapter 








7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 INTRODUCTION 7.1
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of from the research findings for the entire study that was 
carried out to achieve the research aims and objectives. This research provides an understanding of 
the usefulness of certain entanglements of events in cyberspace on the propagation of cyber incidents. 
The researcher attempts to develop a theoretical framework to holistically incorporate entanglements 
of webbed data across the various dimensions of cyberspace in pre-empting cyber-attacks. Prediction 
of cyber-attacks is done with a structural phased approach, where phases correspond to the stages of 
the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain. This chapter summarizes the structure the structure and conduct 
of this study by reviewing the outcomes of deliverables of the thesis and then analysing the findings. 
Finally, this chapter presents the research contributions; contributions to theory and contributions to 
practice. The research limitations are considered and discusses suggestions for future research.  
 RESEARCH SUMMARY 7.2
 
Chapter one introduced the research agenda and highlighted the research motivation, research aims, 
research objectives, research strategy and intended contributions to theory and practice. Chapter 1 
emphasizes the importance of implementing proactive cyber defence strategies in modern 
organization infrastructure to curb the growing sophistication of cyber-attack methods used by 
adversaries. The increased global use of inter-connected devices and the increase in openness to 
information has created a sophisticated problem of the ‘defence-attack’ loop. Organizations would 
benefit from implementing proactive defence strategies that keep them ahead of the adversaries. 
Although organization are adopting are adopting a certain level of proactive cyber defence that 
includes monitoring, detection and mitigation techniques, a strategy that involves identifying early 
warning signs of cyber incidents an therefore pre-empting them, to achieve a superior level of cyber 
awareness over the adversary. 
Chapter 2 expatiates on the theoretical rationale for the thesis by introducing and reviewing existing 
frameworks, techniques and methods for implementing proactive cyber situational awareness in 
organisations. The literature on the practical implementation of methods incorporated into the 
theoretical framework proposed in this research is also reviewed. The literature covered, different 
aspects of the entangled cyberspace theory including characterisation of cyberspace, evidence 
validation, data fusion, multivariate structural time series analysis and the cyber-attack kill-chain. The 
gaps in the literature were also identified, therefore highlighting the novelty of this study. The 
literature review highlighted a lack of existing frameworks to integrate multiple sources of evidence 
and methods for simultaneously analysing multiple entangled signals from events in cyberspace. 
Finally, the conceptual foundations for the theoretical framework were introduced in chapter 2, and 
the research hypotheses were also formulated. The conceptual foundation proposed incorporated three 
main individual concepts: 
a) A multi-dimensional characterisation of cyberspace 
b) A sequential phased model, the cyber-attack kill-chain, for perpetrating cyber-attacks 
c) A structural model, Vector Autoregressive Models for integrating and simultaneously 
analysing multiple sources of evidence. 
Chapter 3 presented the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this research. It critically discussed 
how the entangled cyberspace framework is developed using a combination of existing theories 




discussed in the literature. Thus, addressing how the existing theories/models are used to ground the 
entangled cyberspace framework 
Chapter 4 highlights the analysis of the research methodology used in this study to examine the 
implementation of the entangled framework in pre-empting cyber-attacks. This chapter discusses in 
detail the research approach briefly highlighted in chapter 1. 
Additionally, the research assumptions were clearly stated and the effects that they may have on the 
results of the experiment. For example, the theoretical framework assumes all events in cyberspace 
occur on a pre-identified dimension of cyberspace and can be measured on a time-space continuum. 
Additionally, the framework assumes all events are represented as time signals. Therefore, multiple 
sources must be measured on near similar timelines to fit into the multivariate model. Lastly, the 
multi-variate structural VAR assumes the same lag order for all time signals in the model. The 
limitations of a static lag-length selection were also discussed in the literature. 
Chapter 4 also develops an acting scenario for testing the theoretical framework. This scenario testing 
is done using an experimental design which outlines how the experiment was designed around the 
scenario to test the validity of the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2. The multi-
dimensional model used was introduced and vector autoregressive models with co-integrating time 
signals for events at each stage of the kill-chain was developed. Here, the researcher develops the 
experimental hypothesis to meet the set research objectives in chapter 1. The research hypothesis were 
set up to: 
i) Identify the features that predict the occurrence of a cyber-attack on the network layer across 
the entangled information space. 
ii) Test for correlation and co-integration of events between and within the identified 
dimensions of the entangled information space. 
iii) Establish a predictive link between these activities between and within the identified 
dimensions of the entangled information space. 
iv) Explain the nature of entanglements between these identified events and usefulness in 
pre-empting cyber-attacks. 
Chapter 5 presents a practical implementation of the experiment based on events in the developed 
scenario. Time signals at each stage of the kill-chain, on their corresponding dimensions were 
analysed and the accuracy of models were evaluated by calculating the prediction errors at each stage. 
Each stage of the experiments represents events at each stage of the kill-chain, and it is assumed that 
these events occur in a multi-dimensional space of both kill-chain events and cyberspace dimensions 
respectively. In this chapter, the objectives of the research were met as follows: 
i. Algorithms in cyber situational awareness, time series analysis, natural language processing 
and model evaluations are identified as useful methods and tools to be implemented in the 
integrated approach for pre-empting cyber-attacks. These methods are seen to capture the 
nature of entanglements between activities in the entangled information space. 
ii. The dimensions of the entangled information space were proven as the economic dimension 
which consists of the market and media layers, the physical dimension which consists of the 
network and real-world layers and the social dimension which consists of the persona and 
cyber persona. The entanglements of events on the economic dimension and results from 
phase 1 of the experiment supports previous research by (Gandhi et al., 2011b) in proving the 
effects  of social, cultural, political and economic events on the proliferation of cyber-attacks. 
iii. Features such as network packet flow features, text emotion, text sentiments and economic 
and financial indicators such as share prices are seen to be useful in developing models that 
predict the occurrence of cyber-attack on the network layer. An integration of these features 




are also seen to explain the nature of entanglements between events across the dimensions of 
cyberspace. 
Chapter 6 gives detailed discussions of the results from each stage of the experiment. Additionally, 
this chapter aligns the experiment results with the research aims and objectives by answering the 
research questions put forward in chapter 1. Chapter 5 also presents analytical discussions of the 
results from data analysis in view of the research literature. Chapter 5 extracts the classes of features 
indicative of cyber-incidents from an analytical perspective and identifies inter-dependencies between 
events across the various dimensions of cyberspace used in this research. 
Chapter 7 presents an overview of previous chapters as well as the research contributions to theory, 
methodology and practice. This chapter also summarises the findings of the research and outlines the 
research limitations. Finally, suggestions for future research and research continuation are put ford 
with the domain of analysis. 
In summary, this thesis presents an integrated approach for identifying entanglements of events in the 
various information layers of cyberspace. This thesis identified the physical and social dimension as 
used by previous authors in the literature and implemented the economic dimension as suggested by 
(Gandhi et al., 2011a). The thesis put forward an approach that integrates methods of data fusion, data 
processing and analysis to untangle the complex dynamics of events in cyberspace across the 
information layers. After implementing the integrated approach to a set of representative entangled 
datasets, the findings of the thesis clearly show the possibilities of successfully pre-empting cyber-
attacks by implementing the set of approaches suggested. The findings of this research also show the 
activities of the cyber-attack kill-chain hopping across dimensions these activities of the can be 
identified through intra-dimensional analysis. This confirmed integrated approach is presented in the 
figure 7.1 below. The figure depicts an integrated approach for identifying evidence sources to test for 
entanglements in across the information space. It is also a contextual summary of the experimental 
approach confirmed by the researcher for pin-pointing entanglements in the information space. 





Figure 7-1: Integrated Approach for Untangling events in cyberspace 




 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 7.3
 
This section discusses the contributions of this research to the body of knowledge in the area of cyber 
defence. The study offers contributions in two categories: a) contributions to theory and b) 
contributions to practice. These contributions are further discussed in the following subsections. 
7.3.1 Contributions to Theory 
In chapter 2 of this study, the research identified the limited existence of a proactive cyber defence 
strategy capable of analysing the entanglements of events that affect cyber incidents. It was 
recognized that a multi-dimensional analytical model that incorporates multiple sources of evidence 
from various sources to simultaneously pre-empt cyber-attacks had not been considered in previous 
studies. Additionally, it was also identified that previous studies had limited analysis to a single 
dimension of cyberspace usually the physical dimension or the social dimension. Moreover, an 
analytical understanding of the antecedents to cyber-incidents had not been thoroughly visited in 
literature. The theoretical contributions of this research are therefore listed below: 
a) Enhancing the existing cyber defence strategies, by providing a framework for identifying 
sources of evidence that are useful to pre-empting cyber incidents (Section 3.2). 
b) An approach for identifying features that are characteristic of various events across the 
various dimensions of the information space. 
c) A conceptual understanding of the features that are relevant for predicting cyber-incidents 
on identified dimensions of cyberspace (Section 6.5). 
d) A structural approach for co-integration and causal testing of events across cyberspace. 
e) A conceptual addition of the effects of Social-Political-Economic and Cultural (SPEC) on 
the proliferation of cyber-incidents. 
f) An introduction of a Social-Political-Economic and Cultural  (SPEC) kill-chain for 
modelling the effects of SPEC factors on the proliferation of a cyber-attack (Section 6.6). 
This study contributes to IS literature as it introduces a multi-dimensional analytical approach to other 
major parts of IS research in cyber defence. Significant studies in cyber defence analysis revolved 
around a single linear analysis of data from single sources of evidence. These studies were limited in 
their ability to understand the dynamics of webbed data related to cyber-incidents. Additionally, only 
few studies (Hahn et al., 2015) have provided a phased analysis of the traditional kill-chain. For 
example, (Hahn et al., 2015) provides a phased analysis of the kill-chain although this analysis is 
limited to include only evidences from the network layer. Additionally, (Ning et al., 2016) provides 
the theoretical background for the implementation of a cyber-physical-social-hyper thinking space 
that incorporates elements from the  social, physical and information dimensions of cyberspace. They 
laid the foundation for the development of proactive cyber defence models by identifying elements 
that influence cyber events beyond the network layer.  The entangled cyberspace framework put 
forward in this research is a multi-dimensional phased model that fills these inherent gaps in 
literature. The framework addresses the limited evidence base in the work of (Hahn et al., 2015) and 
provides an empirical justification of certain parts of (Ning et al., 2015) by incorporating structural 
models of analysis for multiple sources of evidence. These models are capable of simultaneously 
analysing multiple events and identifying hidden interconnections between events. 
In addition to filling the analytical gaps of previous cyber defence models, this study contributes to IS 
literature on the information security management model (TM Forum, 2011) specifically, the 
monitoring, analysis and detection phases. The literature identifies gaps in current cyber defence 
analytical models about the sources of evidence that feed these models.  Most of these evidence 
sources are mostly from a single dimension of cyberspace; the physical dimension specifically the 




network layer or the social dimension. Moreover, on the social dimension, most cyber analytical 
techniques have been based solely on data from microblogging platforms such as Twitter. In addition 
to the works of (Hahn et al., 2015; Hernández et al., 2016),this research provides insights on 
identifying useful sources of evidence in cyberspace. As earlier stated, this research takes a multi-
dimensional perspective by extending the scope of the evidence base for cyber analytics beyond the 
physical dimension; most especially the network layer. 
Furthermore, this study builds on the works of (Klimburg and Mirtl, 2012; Barnett, 2014) by 
providing three similar characterisations of cyberspace based on certain functionalities of cyberspace 
in modern existence. These characterizations, in turn, serve as a potential evidence base for cyber 
defence predictive models. Therefore, the characterisation of cyberspace provided in this study serves 
to address the modern challenges of cyber defence in relation to the inter-relationships between 
cultural, political and economic dynamics in the real-world and the propagation of cyber-incidents in 
cyberspace. Additionally, this study shows that the use of a multi-dimensional evidence base 
integrated framework improves the quality of predictive models in cyber defence. 
This study also largely contributes to cyber defence research in areas that seek to identify early 
warning indicators of cyber incidents. Although studies by (Kruegel et al., 2003; Hernández et al., 
2016) provide useful models for feature identification for cyber threats, these features are usually 
mono-dimensional. The conceptual understanding of feature identification and extraction presented in 
this research harnesses features from multiple evidence-based using a phased approach. To this effect, 
this research offers a phased feature extraction conceptual model based on the phases of the traditional 
kill-chain. This research provides feature-based classifications for events at each phase of the kill-
chain as they occur across the identified dimensions of cyberspace. 
Furthermore, this research provides an overview of the predictive capacity of each dimension of 
cyberspace in predicting cyber incidents. Quantifiable measurements for user emotions and user 
sentiments are proven to significantly improve the quality of cyber predictive models on the social 
dimension. 
Similarly, on the physical dimension, measurements for network alerts, network traffic and packet 
flow are identified as useful predictors of cyber-attacks. This corresponds with previous studies in 
cyber defence analytics such as (Kim, Paek and Oh, 2008; Konikoff, Harris and Petersen, 2013; 
Edkrantz, 2015; Stanfield and Stanfield, 2016). Lastly, the economic dimension as implemented in 
this research practically proves claims by (Gandhi et al., 2011a) of an economic, cultural and political 
dimension to cyber incidents. 
Finally, this study presents a new cyber-attack kill-chain perspective by the analysis of the traditional 
cyber-attack kill-chain to include social, political, economic and cultural factors presented in the 
literature review. This was achieved by providing a conceptual understanding of the antecedents of 
cyber-incidents and how they fit into the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain. The ‘antecedents’ in this 
research serves as a conceptual representation of SPEC factors and their effect on the propagation of 
cyber-incidents. Therefore, this research provides the first step for further incorporation of SPEC 
factors into the traditional cyber-attack kill-chain. 
 
7.3.2 Contributions to Practice 
 
The empirical findings from this study are also very useful to information security professionals such 
as security engineers, communications and network specialists, cyber risk analyst, cyber defence 
analysts, cyber data scientists etc. This study has practical influence for the implementation of the two 
major conceptual frameworks presented-(a) The entangled cyberspace and (b) The multi-level Kill 
Chain-with the ability to significantly improve the application of cyber defence strategies in 




organisations. Thereby, enhancing the organisation’s overall cyber situational awareness and improve 
the level of security by being ahead of the adversary. By implementing the phased framework 
provided in this research, cyber defenders can closely follow the propagation of each phase of the kill-
chain and implement proper mitigation strategies to counteract adversaries’ efforts. 
Additionally, this study builds on and improves the information security management model by (TM 
Forum, 2011) as discussed in chapter 2 of this report. The monitoring, analysis and detection phases 
of the information security management model are critical to a successful proactive cyber defence 
strategy. This research, therefore, contributes to improving techniques and methods applied at these 
stages by providing certain insights to early warning indicators of cyber-indents beyond the physical 
dimension. 
The results from the analysis in combination with gaps identified in the literature also show that 
organisations will benefit from building the capacity to handle a large analysis of structured and 
unstructured data from multiple data sources. This involves a large number of computational 
resources allocated to data identification, data extraction, data cleaning, data formatting, data fusion 
and data analysis. In addition to pre-defined data sources identified in the experimental design, this 
study provides a conceptual understanding of cyberspace characterisation which will help 
cybersecurity analyst determine what features are useful for prediction in certain cyber-attack 
scenarios. 
Lastly, information security analysts can implement the frameworks put forward in this research to 
actively pre-empt the actions of adversaries in certain attack scenarios. The frameworks put forward- 
the entangled cyberspace framework and the SPEC cyber-attack kill-chain- are interdependent for 
pre-empting events in successive phases of the kill chain given events at the current stage of the kill-
chain. Using the benchmark data, the entangled cyberspace framework is capable of untangling the 
entanglement of events in the context of the kill-chain. Therefore, security experts can implement 
such framework to understand the nature of events in their cyber operating space. 
 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 7.4
 
This research attempted to advance theoretical and practical knowledge in cyber defence by 
developing a proactive, predictive model for cyber defence using a benchmark scenario. The research 
has achieved its aims and addressed the research objectives that were identified in chapter 1 of this 
report. However, it is important to identify the limitations of the study for possible further research. 
Given that the kill-chain is a general model for the propagation of cyber-attacks, the framework is 
generalizable to all cyber-attacks assuming they adhere to the stages of the cyber-attack kill-chain. 
However, the experiment in this research is conducted in a single cyber-attack scenario - A denial of 
Service Attack on a Target Network. Therefore, the kill-chain used for the justification of the 
framework was restricted to kill-chain events in a DDOS attack.  
The kill-chain limitation also raises the issue of extracted feature limitation, especially for features on 
the network layer. The features extracted in this research have been tested to improve prediction 
attempts in a DDOS attack scenario significantly. These features may, therefore, be limited to 
predicting events in the kill-chain of said cyber-attack scenario. 
Additionally, the data used in the justification of the entangled cyberspace framework was based on 
benchmarked data. The benchmark data provided by (Cook et al., 2011) is known to contain these 
entanglements of events and the framework put forward in this research proves capable of identifying 
and extracting these entanglements. However, the data used was pre-cleaned and structured which is 
usually not the case in real-life cyber analytical projects. Therefore, the framework is based on a pre-
assumption of a certain structure and format to the data. 




Furthermore, SPEC factors in this research are only represented with financial data. While this is 
sufficient to prove the practical application of the theory, the economic dimension goes further than 
the limited perspective presented in the scenario. The economic dimension serves to represent SPEC 
factors, as such, the scenario development used in this research lacks the robustness to encompass all 
theoretical aspects of SPEC effects on cyber-incidents.  
The Entangled cyberspace framework is positioned to help put defenders ahead of the attackers, 
thereby increasing the overall level of cyber situational awareness in organisations. Another notable 
limitation is the fact that there is a need for empirical evidence to show if the level of cyber situational 
awareness is improved after implementing the strategies of the framework and also evaluate the 
impact on organisations’ cyber defence strategy. There is also a need to measure the value added to 
organisations in terms of cyber-attack mitigations and recovery strategies. 
Lastly, time and financial limitations hindered a rigorous longitudinal study to test the framework 
across multiple cyber-attack scenarios robustly.  
 FUTURE RESEARCH 7.5
 
This research has presented an integrated approach for tracking, monitoring and pre-empting cyber-
attacks. Various methods for pin-pointing entanglements in cyberspace that inform prevention tactics 
in various cyber-attack scenarios. The approach presented in this research is extendible to various 
attack scenarios and open to alternative techniques for co-integration and causal testing. However, 
some of the limitations identified in section 7.4 provides some insights for useful contributions in 
research to improve the findings of this research. Firstly, the experimental designed provides the 
application of the approach in a denial of service attack scenario. Cyber-attack scenarios like malware 
infiltration, data exfiltration, SQL injections are of particular interest in cyber defence. Further 
research is encouraged to test and evaluate this approach in these alternative cyber-attack scenarios. 
Technically, this research opens up the possibilities for simplifying co-integration testing between 
identified events across the various dimensions of cyberspace. In addition to the simplification of co-
integration testing, this research also provides opportunities for in-depth causal testing between events 
on various dimensions. This advanced causal testing can include investigations into confirmatory 
analysis of factors that influence the propagation of cyber-attacks.  
Additionally, since features at each stage of the kill-chain are not necessarily restricted to a single 
dimension as an evidence base, future research may extend this framework to include capabilities for 
robust intra-dimensional co-integration testing of features. This robust testing will address issues 
around automatic evidence identification and data fusion across multiple dimensions of cyberspace. 
Additionally, methods for automating the steps discussed in section 5.3 ‘The Analytical Framework’ 
of this research would significantly improve the lag time in identification of antecedents to cyber-
attacks, thereby, improving the quality of mitigation strategies. 
Additionally, further research can address concrete justification of the effect of SPEC factors on the 
proliferation of cyber-attacks. The current approach justifies the existence of the economic dimension 
with access to simulated data representing SPEC features. Future research may incorporate features 
that characterise political and cultural events and test their predictive capacity in relation to cyber-
incidents from a real-world perspective. 
Lastly, due to time and financial constraints, the industry acceptance level and the willingness of 
cyber experts to implement the entangled cyberspace framework was not within the scope of this 
research. Future researchers will also need to work on measuring the technological acceptance level of 
the entangled cyberspace framework especially related to practical implementation in the industry. 




Additionally, the willingness of cyber experts to implement the techniques in the entangled 
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